6. The Evolving Role of Sub-National Actors in International Economic Relations: Lessons from the Canada-European Union CETA

See European Commission (2009) EU and Canada Start Negotiations for Economic and Trade Agreement, 10 June 2009, http://​trade.​ec.​europa.​eu/​doclib/​docs/​2009/​june/​tradoc_​143427.​pdf, accessed 30 March 2017. CETA has been described several times as Canada’s most ambitious trade agreement to date because it is deeper in ambition and broader in scope than the historic North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (see Government of Canada (2017) Trade Negotiations and Agreements, updated 6 October 2016, http://​www.​canadainternatio​nal.​gc.​ca/​eu-ue/​policies-politiques/​trade_​agreements-accords_​commerciaux.​aspx?​lang=​eng, accessed 3 April 2017). In the words of de Mestral, CETA ‘covers all the ground of previous major trade agreements and then goes into areas never brought together in a single RTA’ (see A de Mestral (2016) The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): A Convergence of Canadian and EU Interests, Canada-Europe Transatlantic Dialogue, March 2016, http://​labs.​carleton.​ca/​canadaeurope/​wp-content/​uploads/​sites/​9/​De-Mestral-CETD-Policy-Brief-final.​pdf, accessed 3 April 2017).

The EU has been a strategic partner for Canada since as far back as 1959 when both parties signed the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (see Krstic 2012, at 4). Regarding concluding a PTA, there had been several attempts in the past to bring both parties to the negotiating table. Notably, in 1976, Canada and the EU signed a Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation. Subsequently, other bilateral agreements followed. These include the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, which established how Canada and the EU consult with each other. There was also the Joint Canada-EU Political Declaration and Action Plan of 1996, which outlined commitments of both parties to working together in many areas. Furthermore, the Canada-EU Partnership Agenda of 2004 strengthened the relationship between these two sides. For a detailed history of the journey to the negotiating table for Canada and the EU, see D’Erman 2016, at 92–93. See also Woolcock 2011, at 21; Deblock and Rioux 2011, at 51–53.

D’Erman describes the deal as ‘the largest free trade agreement in the wealthy industrialized world to date’, i.e., referring to the combined size of both markets as well as the scope of the areas of the agreement (see D’Erman 2016, at 90). Also, the European Commission announced at the commencement of negotiations in 2009 that the estimated value of combined international trade to be generated by the CETA deal for both economies could be up to 20 billion euros per year (see European Commission (2009) EU and Canada Start Negotiations for Economic and Trade Agreement).

However, ratification has taken a little longer than initially expected. See D’Erman 2016, at 92; Reuters (2016) EU, Canada Sign Free Trade Deal but Battle Not Over, 31 October 2016, http://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-eu-canada-trade-idUKKBN12U0HU, accessed 30 March 2017.

Mega-regionals are described as ‘deep integration partnerships between countries or regions with a major share of world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)’ (see T Hirst (2014) What Are Mega-regional Trade Agreements? World Economic Forum, 9 July 2014, https://​www.​weforum.​org/​agenda/​2014/​07/​trade-what-are-megaregionals/​, accessed 3 April 2017). See also Trebilcock et al. 2013, at 87, who describe deep integration PTAs as agreements which are characterised by the inclusion of ‘WTO+’ and ‘WTO-X’ provisions (i.e., WTO+ issues are areas of international trade/services which are already covered by WTO agreements, but these PTAs go further than the WTO in these areas; whereas WTO-X issues are areas not yet covered by WTO agreements which are covered by these twenty-first century PTAs).

De Mestral is of the opinion that these news styled PTAs ‘may well lead to the establishment of global trade patterns and ultimately make possible the adoption of the next set of universal trade rules’ (see A de Mestral (2016) The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): A Convergence of Canadian and EU Interests, at 2).

McKenzie argues that, contrary to popular belief that there is a positive correlation between free trade and job creation, ‘[i]n fact, the relationship between trade and jobs is more complicated than the linear link between exports and employment suggests’ (see McKenzie 2014, at 237). He argues that ‘one problem with the claim that free trade creates jobs is that it looks at only half of the dynamic of trade-exports-while ignoring the impact of imports on employment (ibid.). Also, according to a report in The Independent, even after scaling the hurdle presented by the Walloon stand-off within the EU, ‘[m]any MEPs are worried about CETA, reflecting the views of millions of European citizens who have been lobbying them to vote it down. They are concerned about the impact it will have on food standards, public services and financial regulation’ (see N Dearden (2017) By Signing CETA with Justin Trudeau, the EU isn’t Undermining Donald Trump – They’re Helping Him, The Independent, 13 February 2017, http://​www.​independent.​co.​uk/​voices/​ceta-canada-eu-trudeau-trump-trade-deal-ttip-helps-trump-a7577246.​html, accessed 3 April 2017). In Canada, the sentiments are not much different, especially about a perceived democratic deficit in the negotiation process. For instance, it has been pointed out by al Attar and Clouthier that there was limited consultation by the government with the public (al Attar and Clouthier 2015, at 467). They argue that ‘CETA’s negotiators and the Standing Committee spoke almost exclusively with industry stakeholders, keeping the text and their discussions closed and secretive’ (ibid.). They further argue that ‘[t]rade consultations thus appear impoverished – even undemocratic – when compared with best practices from several other federal government departments, such as immigration, environmental protection, and Aboriginal affairs’ (ibid.). According to them, ‘[t]he best explanation for the lamentable state of public consultations on trade is the government’s awareness of the outrage regarding its trade policy. Preferring to ask for forgiveness rather than permission, the government declines to consult before agreements are concluded’ (ibid.).

For a summary of some key concerns raised by various stakeholders in Canada, see McKenzie 2014, at 234. See also Canadian Union of Public Employees (2013) CETA: Corporations in the Loop: Canadians in the Dark, 29 October 2013, http://​cupe.​ca/​trade/​ceta-corporations-loop-canadians-dark, accessed 23 March 2017; Dairy Farmers of Canada (2013) Support Our Canadian Cheese Makers and Farmers, 28 October 2013, https://​www.​dairyfarmers.​ca/​farmers-voice/​farm-policy/​support-our-canadian-cheese-makers-and-farmers, accessed 23 March 2017.

The Council of Canadians also argues that ‘[t]he secret negotiating process and the overall corporate agenda behind these next generation deals are an affront to democracy on both sides of the Atlantic’ (see The Council of Canadians (2017) Canada-EU (CETA), https://​canadians.​org/​ceta, accessed 19 Oct 2017). See also Trew 2013, at 568, who examines the impact of non-governmental (civil societies) actors during the EU-Canada CETA negotiations. He argues that the critical views of these actors show an inherent democratic deficit that privileges corporate insiders at the expense of civil society, the public, and even elected officials (ibid., at 569). He, however, points out that these actors (civil societies) recorded considerable success by forging new linkages with provincial governments, municipalities, European decision makers, and other non-governmental groups in Canada and Europe, which may thrive even after the competition of the Canada–EU CETA process (ibid., at 574–575). See generally, Namur (2016) Good News! The War on TTIP and CETA Can Be Won, Pour Écrire la Liberté, 10 May 2016, http://​www.​pour.​press/​good-news-the-war-on-ttip-and-ceta-can-be-won/​, accessed 21 September 2016; H Spongenberg (2016) European Cities and Regions Rally to Stop TTIP, Euro Observer, 25 April 2016, https://​euobserver.​com/​regions/​133173, accessed 15 September 2017; Canadian Union of Public Employees (2013) CETA: Corporations in the Loop: Canadians in the Dark, 29 October 2013, https://​cupe.​ca/​ceta-corporations-loop-canadians-dark, accessed 29 March 2017.

See Goff 2016, at 3; Delagran 1992, at 15; Hayes 2004, at 9–10; Kukucha 2008, at 3.

See Kukucha 2013, at 534; Paquin 2013, at 551; Goff 2016, at 8.

Also, there have been constitutional challenges to CETA within the other EU Member States operating federal systems such as Germany. In what was described by activists (Compact, Foodwatch, and More Democracy) as ‘the biggest constitutional complaint in German history’, a petition with more than 125,000 signatures from concerned German citizens led to a constitutional challenge to the validity of CETA and TTIP before the Constitutional Court in the south-western city of Karlsruhe. However, the outcome of the courts was in favour of Germany ratifying the CETA deal. See BBC (2016) Thousands Challenge EU-Canada Trade Agreement in the German Court, 12 October 2016, http://​www.​bbc.​co.​uk/​news/​world-europe-37629383, accessed 03 April 2017; BBC (2016) German Top Court Backs EU-Canada Trade Deal CETA, 13 October 2016 http://​www.​bbc.​co.​uk/​news/​world-europe-37642261, accessed 03 April 2017.

For example in the US, during the nineteenth century, Justice Taney of the US Supreme Court in Holmes v Jennison, spoke against the intermeddling of US states in foreign affairs. He argued that allowing sub-national governments in the US to hold concurrent powers with the general government in the sphere of foreign relations was capable of eroding the respect of the country abroad and undermining respect within the Union. He further argued, ‘The framers of the [US] Constitution manifestly believed that any intercourse between a state and a foreign nation was dangerous to the Union; that it would open a door of which foreign powers would avail themselves to obtain influence in separate states.’ (see Holmes v Jennison, US Supreme Court, Judgment, 39 US 570, 1840, para 573–574 and 578).

Bernier 1973, at 1–6; Wheare 1963, at 10–11; Nwabueze 1982, at 37; Mingus 2006, at 578.

Wheare 1963, at 183.

See Bernier 1973, at 1–6 and 10–11.

Bernier aptly describes the nature of this relationship as one of ‘attraction-repulsion’ (Bernier 1973, at 1). See also Karagiannis 2011, at 745–746.

Bernier 1973, at 1.

Ibid., at 6. See also Meyer 2017, at 272; Hayes 2004, at 20. See also 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (‘VCLT’), Articles 27–29.

See Meyer 2017, at 286–287. See also Hayes 2004, at 20.

Meyer defines this position as ‘immunity’, which he describes as a local liability rule used by states in international law ‘under which neither the national nor local government can be held responsible for otherwise unlawful discriminatory acts’ (see Meyer 2017, at 268). See also Bernier 1973, at 171.

Bernier 1973, at 171.

Hayes opines that the first question to ask when examining the international regulation of federal nation/states is whether the treaty language evidences an intention to ‘opt out’ of the default rule of nation/state responsibility for sub-national governments (see Hayes 2004, at 20).

Habegger argues that contrary to the traditional notion of foreign policy, today’s political realities do not correspond any longer with the conventional wisdom of a clear division between a domestic and a foreign policy sphere of governance (see Habegger 2003, at 244). See also Hocking 1996, at 40; Öner 2004, at 34.

Blatter et al. 2008, at 171. See also A Slaughter (1997) The Real New World Order, Foreign Affairs, October 1997, https://​www.​foreignaffairs.​com/​articles/​1997-09-01/​real-new-world-order, accessed 3 April 2017; Schafer 2001, at 35.

Revisionism encompasses theories which seek to modify previously accepted norms or historical accounts. For in-depth discussions on the origin, scope, and application of revisionism, see Morgan 1979, at 525; Fitzpatrick 2008, at 682.

See Spiro 1999, at 1223 and 1225–1226; Goldsmith 1997, at 1617 and 1643–1644; Bradley 1999, at 1089.

Wood and Verdun 2011, at 9.

The role played by sub-national actors in these two countries has no doubt brought to the fore the practical implications of including and excluding sub-national actors from the design and implementation of international economic agreements.

Deblock and Rioux 2011, at 40. See also McKenzie 2014, at 234 and 242; Wood and Verdun 2011, at 12–13.

Geo-political justifications for trade do not guarantee the viability of CETA. Rather, it only explains one of the reasons that informed the signing of the agreement.

The constitutional configuration of the federal system in Canada gives the provinces considerable autonomy to act in certain designated spheres. See Lecours and Anderson 2006, at 21; Goff 2016, at 3; Kukucha 2009, at 21; Elgie 2007, at 67.

The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict c 3 (UK). In 1982, the British North America Acts (BNA), which is Canada’s founding constitutional document, was renamed ‘the Constitution Act, 1867’. The Peace, Order and Good Government (POGG) clause is the introductory phrase of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which outlines the scope of the Parliament’s legislative jurisdiction in Canada. This clause (the POGG clause) enables the central government to legislate on matters relating to foreign policy in Canada, especially on matters not specifically conferred upon the provinces, i.e., on ‘residuary’ matters. See Elgie 2007, at 67;

The Constitution Act, 1867, para 91(2).

Ibid., para 132.

Kukucha 2008, at 44; Kukucha 2009, at 21 and 27. See also Bernier 1973, at 51; A de Mestral (2016) The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): A Convergence of Canadian and EU Interests, at 51.

Generally see Citizens Insurance Company v Parsons, Supreme Court of Canada, Judgment, 7 App Cas 96, 26 November 1881. In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada did not use trade and commerce to entrench federal or provincial power. Instead, ‘it reaffirmed that there was no federal power to regulate a single trade or business. And, it indicated that issues […] must be determined on a careful case by case basis’ (Kukucha 2009, at 28). See also Kukucha 2008, at 44.

Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario and Others, Supreme Court of Canada, Judgment, [1937] AC 326, 28 January 1937 (‘Labour Conventions’).

Ibid. (see particularly the dictum of Lord Atkinat, paras 353–354). See also Morrissette 2012, at 583; Kukucha 2009, at 21.

See Delagran 1992, at 18; de Beer 2012, at 54.

Kukucha 2009, at 27.

Kukucha 2009, at 28–35; Kukucha 2008, at 44; Lecours and Anderson 2006, at 22–23.

Globalisation has played a pivotal role in re-shaping the dynamics of international relations, especially as it pertains to the concept of sovereignty and accepted practices of international law in the twenty-first century. Slaughter argues that globalisation has challenged the sovereignty status quo of Westphalian statehood by disaggregating traditional governance structures and encouraging the emergence of new ones (global and sub-national). See Slaughter (1997) The Real New World Order. See also Keating 1999, at 1.

See Kukucha 2009, at 35; Kukucha 2008, at 43. More recently during the CETA negotiations, new areas of provincial interest have included technology-related topics, such as biotechnologies and information communications technologies (de Beer 2012, at 52).

See Kukucha 2008, at 47.

See Kukucha 2004, at 134; Kukucha 2009, at 35; Delagran 1992, at 15.

For details of the role of the FPCD in central-provincial co-ordination in Canada, see Hocking 1993, at 193–195.

Ibid.

The CTTC was responsible for gathering briefs from businesses, unions, consumer groups, the provinces, and other interested parties during the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. See Protheroe 1980, at 156; Winham 1986, at 334–337; Kukucha 2009, at 36.

See Winham 1986, at 332.

Kukucha 2009, at 36.

Ibid.; P Fafard and P Leblond (2012) Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements: Challenges for Canadian Federalism, The Federal Idea, September 2012, http://​ideefederale.​ca/​documents/​challenges.​pdf, accessed 21 September 2016.

P Fafard and P Leblond (2012) Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements: Challenges for Canadian Federalism, at 5–6.

Kukucha 2009, at 35.

Delagran 1992, at 20; Paquin 2013, at 548.

Lecours and Anderson 2006, at 52.

CTRADE is the current federal–provincial cooperation forum in Canada. It involves a series of meetings between Ottawa and the provinces, which are held four times annually. Ibid.

Ibid., at 54. See also P Fafard and P Leblond (2012) Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements: Challenges for Canadian Federalism, at 22.

See Goff 2016, at 2. See also Paquin 2013, at 546 and 550; Van Duzer also postulates that the EU took cognisance of the fact that the Canadian provinces are not obliged to implement Treaty provisions falling under their jurisdiction due to the Labour Conventions case principle, as such their presence was crucial for CETA to have any chance of success (Van Duzer 2013, at 536).

Woolcock 2011, at 27. See also D’Erman 2016, at 94.

See Kukucha 2010, at 5; Kukucha 2013, at 534; Goff 2016, at 8.

Kukucha 2010, at 5.

Ibid.

Goff 2016, at 551.

Paquin 2013, at 551.

Goff 2016, at 8.

See Lecours and Anderson 2006, at 22. For instance, when the provinces sought input into the definition of Canada’s negotiating position during the negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement with the United States in the 1980s, Ottawa refused and insisted on maintaining only ‘close consultation, but nor an ultimate right of refusal for the provinces’. Eventually, the compromise reached was the establishment of the CCTN.

The most notable achievement by the provinces in this era of negotiation was during the Doha multilateral negotiation and the NAFTA negotiation processes. During these negotiations, the provinces’ objection to certain issues such as the original US proposal for Article 2.2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), which Washington intended to use as a limitation on the competitive state subsidies in Canada, was reflected in the final negotiation position adopted by Canada. See Kukucha 2009, at 37.

European Commission (2014) CETA – Summary of the Final Negotiating Results, December 2014, http://​trade.​ec.​europa.​eu/​doclib/​docs/​2014/​december/​tradoc_​152982.​pdf, accessed 3 April 2017.

Côté 2016, at 23. See also de Mestral who points out that CETA takes a negative list approach to exceptions, something the EU had been reluctant to adopt until this point (A de Mestral (2016) The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): A Convergence of Canadian and EU Interests, at 3).

The Economist (2016) Canada’s Internal Trade: The Great Provincial Obstacle Course, 23 January 2016, http://​www.​economist.​com/​news/​americas/​21702495-country-far-being-single-market-may-be-about-change-great-provincial, accessed 3 April 2017.

Ibid.

This argument has theoretical support from Robert Putman’s ‘two-level game’ theory which analyses the intersection between domestic and international regimes and its impact on the policy choices made at both the domestic and international levels. Putman focuses on the impact of domestic ‘win sets’ and the opportunities and constraints, which these factors have in international negotiations (see generally Putman 1988). See also Habegger 2003, at 244.

Woolcock 2011, at 27. See also D’Erman 2016, at 94.

See 2007 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326/49 (‘TFEU’), Article 2. Rosas argues that ‘the question of exclusive competence should be seen in the broader context of the competence and powers of the European Union in external relations and its treaty relations with third states in particular’ (see Rosas 2015, at 1074).

See TFEU, Articles 3, 207 and 218. The management of foreign relations with third countries is one of the longest standing competences of the EU, which evolved as a necessary corollary of the Common Commercial Policy of the EU. This was reflected in the 1957 Treaty of Rome which provided that an internal customs union required a uniform external tariff and single trade arrangements with third countries. Accordingly, the EC Members at the time delegated authority for foreign relations to the European institutions on matters connected to the attainment of the customs union. This delegation of power to the EC was done to effectively empower it with the responsibility of speaking with one voice in international economic negotiations with third countries and setting the expectation that enlargement to future Members would mandate the criterion of pooling sovereignty in the same way. See Woll 2011, at 42; Morrissette 2012, at 602.

Rosas 2015, at 1078.

Schütze 2009, at 308. See also Morrissette 2012, at 603–604, who points out that ‘[i]n the case of a mixed agreement, no rules exist for how the negotiations should be conducted. Sometimes the member states will mandate the Commission itself or the Presidency of the Council to negotiate and initial the draft mixed agreement on their behalf. At other times these processes are taken on by a negotiating team consisting of the Commission, acting for the EU according to Article 218 TFEU, and representatives of the Council, acting for the member states’.

Rosas 2015, at 1074.

For an in-depth comparison of both systems, see Morrissette 2012, at 577–616.

See D’Erman 2016, at 91.

See TFEU, Article 4(2) and 5. The EU has recognised the need for differentiation in its harmonisation technique by encouraging experimentation in policy formulation at local levels under the guidance of the subsidiarity principle. However, negotiation of most international trade agreements traditionally fall within the EU’s a priori exclusive competence by virtue of TFEU Article 3(1) and (2). As such, the regions only have an advisory role on these matters. See Schütze 2009, at 347; Kresl 1994, at 309; Morrissette 2012, at 601–602; Panara 2010, at 60–61.

See European People’s Party Group (2016) Trade for All: from the Heart of Europe to its Outermost Regions, 1 March 2016, http://​epp.​cor.​europa.​eu/​press-releases/​trade-for-all-from-the-heart-of-europe-to-its-outermost-regions/​, accessed 3 April 2017.

See European Committee of the Regions (2015) EU Regions Eager to Exploit TTIP Potential but Urge for Guarantees on Public Services and Protection Standards, 13 February 2015, http://​cor.​europa.​eu/​en/​news/​Pages/​ttip-potential.​aspx, accessed 3 April 2017.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

D’Erman 2016, at 91.

Ibid.

Ibid.

There is still uncertainty as to whether CETA will eventually be classified as a ‘mixed agreement’ or an ‘EU Agreement’. According to a European Parliament press release in July 2016, the Commission was faced with a dilemma because although it favoured presenting CETA as an ‘EU-only’ agreement, in contrast, many Member States argued for the agreement to be a mixed agreement. Especially, in a letter to the EC signed in June 2014 by 21 chairs of relevant committees in national parliaments, there was a demand for CETA and even the future TTIP to be considered as mixed agreements. The signatories to the letter argued that a ‘mixed agreement’ was appropriate since both agreements (CETA and TTIP) contain provisions that concern policy areas which are within the competences of the Member States. See European Parliament Research Service (2016) Is CETA a Mixed Agreement? 1 July 2016, http://​www.​europarl.​europa.​eu/​RegData/​etudes/​ATAG/​2016/​586597/​EPRS_​ATA(2016)586597_​EN.​pdf, accessed 3 April 2017. This position has been further strengthened by the Court of Justice’s opinion delivered in May 2017.

Rosas argues that in the EU’s relations with third states, third states ‘will normally prefer EU agreements to mixed agreements, wishing to avoid the complexities and uncertainties stemming from mixed agreements – who, on the EU side, is responsible for what?’ (See Rosas 2015, at 1075).

See Court of Justice of the European Union, The Free Trade Agreement with Singapore Cannot, in Its Current Form, Be Concluded by the EU Alone, Press Release No 52/17, 16 May 2017.

Within the EU and across the world, opinions are divided over the action of Wallonia during the Canada-EU CETA. Those who are opposed to the capitalism, globalisation, and free trade tenets naturally welcome these developments. However, those in favour of these principles have questioned the motives behind Wallonia’s action and have raised concerns about the future of international trade liberalisation. Verlaine points out that ‘[t]he revolt by the Socialist-led regional parliament [of Wallonia] representing just 0.7% of the EU’s population is a microcosm of a broader backlash against globalization, under which the region hasn’t flourished’ (see J Verlaine (2016) World News: A Belgian Region’s Anti-Globalization Stand Once an Industrial Powerhouse, Wallonia has Hit Hard Times in the Post-War Era of Expanding Free Trade, The Wall Street Journal Asia, 28 October 2016). Also, some activists who see it as a new constitutional weapon to scupper future mega-regional trade deals have welcomed the action by Wallonia. For instance, in a publication by Namur, it is stated that ‘[b]ecause many of the provisions in CETA and TTIP fall within the ambit of regional government, the Walloon resolution is of huge importance. To acquire legal force, CETA must be approved and ratified by all EU member-states and the resolution is therefore a decisive first step towards ensuring the non-adoption of the treaty’ (see R Namur (2016) Good News! The War on TTIP and CETA Can Be Won, Pour Écrire la Liberté, 10 May 2016, http://​www.​pour.​press/​good-news-the-war-on-ttip-and-ceta-can-be-won/​, accessed 21 September 2016). A columnist writing in the Economist argued that ‘CETA would make Europe €5.8 billion a year richer, by one estimate. But the real danger of letting Wallonia derail it is the precedent it would set. With so many potential vetoes, […] it is hard to imagine the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (a much bigger deal between America and the EU) being passed’ (see The Economist (2016) Wallonia is Adamantly Blocking the EU’s Trade Deal with Canada, The Economist, 22 October 2016, https://​www.​economist.​com/​news/​europe/​21709060-tiny-region-belgium-opposes-trade-reasons-are-hard-understand-wallonia, accessed 10 March 2017). See also a publication in The Economist, where it is argued that there is a ‘globalisation trilemma’ (i.e., a scenario where stakeholders over the world are attempting to have at most two of economic integration, national sovereignty, and democracy), which creates a hard choice for all stakeholders involved in the economic liberalisation process. It is further argued that this is however impossible because ‘[l]iberalisation, like many economic shifts, creates winners and losers. Many existing political structures advantage the votes of the losers, giving them, in many cases, the ability to block changes that generate net, though unevenly distributed, benefits. In order to move toward greater liberalisation, then, one either has to ignore popular opinion in these places (abandoning the democracy leg of the trilemma), or change the locus of political decision-making (abandoning national sovereignty)’ (see The Economist (2016) Making Sense of the Wallonian Veto, The Economist, 23 October 2016, https://​www.​economist.​com/​blogs/​freeexchange/​2016/​10/​trading-down, accessed 20 October 2017).

Former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was defiant about the value of CETA in the face of oppositions by some sections of stakeholders in Canada. See T Milewski (2013) CETA Deal: Free Trade Opponents ‘Will Lose,’ Says Harper, CBC News, 18 October 2013, http://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​ceta-deal-free-trade-opponents-will-lose-says-harper-1.​2125736, accessed 12 April 2017. Even though he did not get re-elected to office, his successor Justin Trudeau maintained the same levels of optimism and support for the values of the CETA deal. See S Osborne (2017) CETA: Justin Trudeau Defends Controversial EU-Canada Trade Deal, The Independent, 16 February 2017, http://​www.​independent.​co.​uk/​news/​world/​americas/​ceta-latest-justin-trudeau-trade-deal-eu-canada-parliament-prime-minister-a7583291.​html, accessed 3 April 2017.

Although the Canadian federal government argues that CETA was the most transparent and collaborative trade negotiations Canada has ever conducted, the view is different for groups who are critical of the proposed agreement for some reasons, some of which have already been discussed in this chapter.

Trew 2013, at 570.

The Trade Justice Network (TJN), which brought together a variety of non-governmental organizations interested in hearing more about the proposed Canada-EU agreement, was initiated in February 2010 in Ottawa. The meeting included representatives from labour, environmental non-governmental associations (ENGOs), food sovereignty and farmers’ organizations, student federations, and cultural and social justice advocates.

This view has been echoed by The Council of Canadians who argue that the first time people in Canada and Europe were allowed to see the official text of the agreement was only at the announcement of the completion of CETA negotiations. According to them, ‘[t]he deal was signed without any public consultation’. See The Council of Canadians (2017) Canada-EU (CETA).

Trew 2013, at 570.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., at 571.

Ibid., at 571–572.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also The Council of Canadians (2010) Burnaby, North Vancouver City Councils Pass CETA Resolutions, Demand Answers on Municipal Impact of Trans-Atlantic Free Trade, 27 April 2010, http://​canadians.​org/​fr/​node/​4222, accessed 3 April 2017.

See City of Nelson (2013) The Corporation of the City Of Nelson: Committee of the Whole Meeting Agenda, Monday, 21 January 2013, https://​nelson.​civicweb.​net/​document/​23971, accessed 3 April 2017.

Trew 2013, at 572–573; see also Toronto Food Policy Council (2012) Toronto City Hall Requests Exemption from CETA, 6 March 2012, http://​tfpc.​to/​news/​ceta, accessed 3 April 2017.

Trew 2013, at 573.

Al Attar and Clouthier argue that ‘[t]he value of a revitalized trade consultative process should not be underestimated’ (al Attar and Clouthier 2015, at 468). They point out that ‘[i]n recent years, we have observed, both in Canada and across Europe, growing public interest in trade deliberations, interest that, in the case of the secretly negotiated Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), morphed into a pan-European opposition movement widely credited with the European Parliament’s rejection of the agreement’ (ibid.).

‘Political opportunity structures’ is defined by Princen and Kerremans ‘as the set of characteristics of a given institution that determines the relative ability of (outside) groups to influence decision-making within that institution’ (see Princen and Kerremans 2008, at 1130).

Ibid.

Ibid.

Trew 2013, at 574.

Ibid., at 575.

Labour in Europe (2015) Labour MEPs Secure Massive Support from European Social Democrats Against Private Tribunals in Trade Deals, March 2015, http://​www.​eurolabour.​org.​uk/​eu-us-canada-ttip-ceta-isds, accessed 3 April 2017.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid

Ibid.

See Court of Justice of the European Union, The Free Trade Agreement with Singapore Cannot, in Its Current Form, Be Concluded by the EU Alone, 2017.

Schill 2017, at 3.

See P Namur (2016) Good News! The War on TTIP and CETA Can Be Won.

See previous discussions in Sect. 6.4 of this chapter about Cecilia Malmström’s engagement with the CoR.

See Marks and McAdam 1996, at 251; Reising 1998, at 4; cf. Princen and Kerremans 2008, at 1131.

In 2012, Victoria City Councillor Marianne Alto who put forward the successful resolution for Victoria to opt out of the CETA said, ‘The imminence of passing the deal is pushing municipalities into a last-ditch place: if we can’t be party to the deal, we don’t want to be part of it.’ See DP Ball (2012) Canada-Europe Free Trade: After Victoria’s Pullout, Vancouver Demands Clarity on ‘Clandestine’ CETA Deal, 14 May 2012, http://​www.​vancouverobserve​r.​com/​politics/​2012/​05/​14/​canada-europe-free-trade-city-victoria-votes-against-clandestine-ceta-deal, accessed 18 October 2017.

See Friends of the Earth Europe (2016) 2000 CETA and TTIP-free Zones in Europe, 7 September 2016, http://​foeeurope.​org/​2000-CETA-and-TTIP-free-zones-in-Europe, accessed 18 October 2017.

Ibid.

See A Mullins (2012) Opting out of Trade Agreement an ‘Embarrassment:’ Business Leader, Metro, 2 May 2012, http://​www.​metronews.​ca/​news/​london/​2012/​05/​02/​opting-out-of-trade-agreement-an-embarrassment-business-leader.​html, accessed 1 September 2017.

According to Goff, ‘[f]uture research should focus less on establishing that subnational actors will be involved in trade agreements and more on establishing when they will be involved’ (see Goff 2016, at 7).