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Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: are they different species?

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Abstract

Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics seem to inhabit different academic spheres and have little collaboration with one another. Neither side cites much research by the other. Does this de facto academic separation impede fruitful possibilities for mutual inspiration and joint development? This paper addresses this question by considering (1) the different origins and research orientations of the two genres, (2) to what extent evolutionary economists could make use of evolutionary game theory, and (3) what evolutionary game theorists might learn from other, less formal, modes of theorising. The paper concludes that while significant possibilities for collaboration exist, the foremost test is whether they can help enhance our understanding of structures and causal processes in the real world.

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Notes

  1. The authors are very grateful for very useful and stimulating comments by Thorbjørn Knudsen, Yanis Varoufakis and anonymous referees on earlier versions of this paper.

  2. Consider, for example, Brenner (1998), Friedman (1998), McKelvey (1998), Barucci (1999), Nooteboom (2000), Winter (2000), Witt (2001) and Allen et al. (2007).

  3. Note that more of the journals cited here are in theoretical biology than economics. This clearly indicates that evolutionary game theory has influenced both disciplines.

  4. We use the terms of Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 46). A small sample of discussions of the formalistic nature of modern economics could include Klamer and Colander (1990), Krueger et al. (1991), Blaug (1997); Chick (1998), Krugman (1998, 2009) and Hodgson (2006, ch. 7).

  5. Including Marshall (1890), Veblen (1898, 1909), Schumpeter (1934, 1942), Downie (1958), Hayek (1967) and Boulding (1981).

  6. The history of evolutionary economics has been a controversial field (Hodgson 1993). In their own account of intellectual precursors, Nelson and Winter (1982) acknowledged neither Darwin nor Veblen, but since then their importance for evolutionary economics has been more widely recognised. And while there has been ongoing homage to Schumpeter, Marshall has been rehabilitated as a more dynamic theorist than his static shadow in the textbooks (Foster 1993; Dosi and Nelson 1994). On Downie’s evolutionary contribution see Nightingale (1997). On the relevance of Darwin and Veblen see Hodgson (1993, 2004) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2010).

  7. Potts (2000) and Dopfer and Potts (2008) make bold attempts to establish core principles of evolutionary economics but these have not found universal favour (Runde 2009).

  8. Several articles using evolutionary game theory have been published in the Journal of Evolutionary Economics, but generally their authors are not prominent in the ‘evolutionary college’.

  9. But Federico Cecconi et al. (2010) have argued that they are potentially complementary. Note also that there are a number of different types of computational model (Hartmann 1996).

  10. Colander (2005) gives some evidence of a greater interest in empirical realism in mainstream economics. But Krugman (2009) argues that in failing to deal adequately with the 2008 crash, ‘the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth’.

  11. See Price (1995) for a general formulation of the selection concept and Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b, 2010) for a discussion of the two forms of selection.

  12. By contrast, Lawson (1997) argues that all models are inappropriate except in the ‘extremely rare’ circumstances where event regularities are present. Hodgson (2006, ch. 7) responds in turn, with the argument that Lawson concentrates mostly on predictive and purportedly representative rather than heuristic models, and underestimates the role that the latter can help to play in locating and understanding underlying causal mechanisms. While Lawson rightly identifies the characteristic predilection of post-1950 economics for formal models, we emphatically reject his conclusion that models are generally inappropriate except in ‘extremely rare’ cases.

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  1. Business School Department, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, AL10 9AB, UK

    Geoffrey M. Hodgson

  2. Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Shanda Nanlu 27, Jinan, 250100, People’s Republic of China

    Kainan Huang

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Hodgson, G.M., Huang, K. Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: are they different species?. J Evol Econ 22, 345–366 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0203-3

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