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U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy in the Northeast Asian region during the cold war: The South Korean case

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Abstract

In over forty years of relations with the United States, South Korean decision-makers have had plenty of time to estimate the costs and benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons. The puzzle becomes why South Korea did not develop an operational nuclear capability, given the North Korea threat, the weakening of the U.S. guarantee, a vibrant economy, and an advanced nuclear manufacturing base. This case provides proof that U.S. rewards and threats significantly affect Third World states' nuclear decision-making and that the United States has greater influence with smaller and more vulnerable states than with larger and more technologically advanced states.

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  1. In defining “Third World,” this study accepts Mohammed Ayoob's analysis in Conflict and Intervention in the Third World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). He states “that the Third World concept encompasses in its totality the feeling of deprivation, both in terms of the recent past and the current situation, among a large section of the world's population vis-à-vis the privilleged few. What binds the Third World together in an emotional and psychological sense is the perception of having been on the receiving end for the last 300 to 400 years, at the receiving end economically, militarily, politically, and above all technologically” (p. 241).

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Siler, M.J. U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy in the Northeast Asian region during the cold war: The South Korean case. East Asia 16, 41–86 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-998-0003-7

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