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2020 | Buch

21st Century Prometheus

Managing CBRN Safety and Security Affected by Cutting-Edge Technologies

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This book describes the evolving CBRN risk landscape and highlights advances in the “core” CBRN technologies, including when combined with (improvised) explosive devices (CBRNe threats). It analyses how associated technologies create new safety and security risks, challenging certain assumptions that underlie current control regimes. The book also shows how technologies can be enablers for more effective strategies to mitigate these risks.
21st-century safety and security risks emanating from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials – whether resulting from natural events, accidents or malevolent use - are increasingly shaped by technologies that enable their development, production or use in ways that differ from the past. Artificial intelligence, the use of cyberspace, the revolution in the life sciences, new manufacturing methods, new platforms and equipment for agent delivery, hypersonic weapons systems, information tools utilised in hybrid warfare – these and other technologies are reshaping the global security environment and CBRN landscape. They are leading to a growing potential for highly targeted violence, and they can lead to greater instability and vulnerability worldwide. At the same time, technology offers solutions to manage CBRN risks. Examples are faster detection, more accurate characterisation of the nature and origin of CBRN agents, new forensic investigation methods, or new medical treatments for victims of CBRN incidents. New educational concepts help to foster a culture of responsibility in science and technology and strengthen governance. New training methods help develop practical skills to manage CBRN risks more effectively.
The book concludes that there is a growing need for a holistic framework towards CBRN risk mitigation. Traditional arms control mechanisms such as global, regional or bilateral treaties and export controls are still needed, as they provide a necessary legal and institutional framework. But laws and technology denial alone will not suffice, and institutional mechanisms can at times be weak. Given the pace of technological progress and the diffusion of critical knowledge, tools and materials, policymakers must accept that CBRN risks cannot be eliminated altogether. Instead, society has to learn to manage these risks and develop resilience against them. This requires a “softer”, broadly based multi-stakeholder approach involving governments, industry, the research and development communities, educators, and civil society. Furthermore, educating policymakers that cutting-edge technologies may seriously affect global strategic stability could create incentives for developing a more creative and contemporary arms control strategy that fosters cooperation rather than incremental polarisation.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Introduction
Abstract
This book deals with the changing landscape of risks posed by chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNe) materials and technologies. It looks, in particular, at how advances in science and technology are changing and reshaping this risk landscape. These risks range from natural events such as major disease outbreaks to industrial, transportation and other accidents leading to the release of CBRNe materials, and to their use for hostile purposes as weapons of terror or war. The book also looks at how advances in science and technology create new opportunities for mitigating these risks, and more generally at governance strategies for the twenty-first century to manage these evolving risks. It argues that traditional approaches to WMD arms control need to be rendered flexible and adaptive to allow for the new disruptive technologies and materials that are reshaping the WMD landscape. The architecture and normative basis of the WMD arms control regimes, it concludes, should remain perpetual whilst their definitions, implementation processes and review mechanisms should be revised when necessary, synchronised with the advances in science and technology and their industrial applications.
Maurizio Martellini, Ralf Trapp

The Changing CBRN Risk Landscape

Frontmatter
The Twenty-first Century: The Epoch of Advanced Missile Systems and Growing Vulnerabilities
Abstract
The XXI century have been a broad turnaround for global security in which interstate relationships have been heavily affected by fast-paced military technological developments to which the policy-making process has not kept the pace with. The international security scenario is now degraded due to the inaction of States in front of the new developments in tactical and strategic warfare technologies.
Matteo Frigoli
The Dark Side of Nuclear Energy: Risks of Proliferation from Domestic Fuel Cycle Technologies
Abstract
It has been almost three-quarters of a century since scientists developed ways to split atoms, releasing tremendous amounts of energy that were first used for weapons and then harnessed for more productive purposes in society. Most uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes pose few risks beyond those of safety and security of using radioactive material but the use of nuclear energy to generate electricity will always pose risks of diversion to nuclear weapons. Countries that seek to develop their own fuel cycle capabilities especially pose a higher risk for nuclear proliferation and efforts to restrict fuel cycle technologies – uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing – rely on agreement among suppliers. Although the agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program is historic in its restriction of fuel cycle activities and material stockpiling, it is unlikely to be a model going forward. Additional challenges may arise if fast reactors are commercialized successfully and countries moving toward plutonium economies. This chapter will demonstrate how trends in the supply of and demand for nuclear energy and fuel cycle capabilities will shape future risks of nuclear proliferation.
Sharon Squassoni
Chemical and Biological Risks in the Twenty-first Century
Abstract
Advances in chemistry, biology and related technologies have contributed much to the wellbeing of human society. At the same time, however, they have enabled the battlefield use of poison gas in World War One, the establishment of chemical and biological weapons programmes in a number of countries during the twentieth century, and attempts by non-State actors to acquire and use such weapons at the end of that century. At the same time, risks of accidental releases of hazardous chemical and biological agents have evolved alongside developments in industry and trade, and risks associated with natural pathogens and poisons are being amplified by population growths and increasing movements of people and goods. This risk landscape is about to change again: advances in the life sciences and in enabling technologies are bringing about a technological shift similar to the one that enabled the industrial-scale manufacturing of chemicals at the turn of the nineteenth century. The emerging science, technology and industry environment will be very different from the past, with global technology diffusion and capability distribution, a shift from materials and equipment to information and artificial intelligence, and changing relationships between manufactures and end-users.
Strategies to mitigate these risks have evolved alongside the advances in science, technology and manufacturing. They include, amongst others, the creation of legal instruments in disarmament, arms control and proliferation prevention, and the adoption of measures to strengthen deterrence, preparedness and response. As the pace of science and technology is accelerating, however, new approaches to strengthening chemical and biological safety and security will be needed. Given the nature of these risks, such strategies must involve a variety of stakeholders, and aim at strengthening resilience in society to complement prohibitions and technology transfer controls.
Ralf Trapp
Neuroscience-Based Weapons
Abstract
The focus of this chapter is on the efforts aimed at preventing that cutting-edge scientific and technological advances in the areas of biological and chemical sciences are misused for the development of weapons targeted at the nervous system. It advances the argument that the effective governance of dual-use research requires the active engagement of the chemical and biological science communities. The chapter begins by looking into the issue of dual-use science and how it relates to the international chemical and biological disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It then reviews the efforts made by States Parties within the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention to strengthen the international prohibitions against chemical and biological weapons. The chapter further reviews various scientist engagement initiatives that seek to promote a culture of responsibility among researchers with a particular emphasis on awareness-raising and education activities regarding dual-use issues among those in the field of neuroscience. It concludes by identifying options for enhancing scientist participation in strengthening the chemical and biological disarmament regime.
Tatyana Novossiolova, Malcolm Dando
Hybrid Emerging Threats and Information Warfare: The Story of the Cyber-AI Deception Machine
Abstract
Artificial intelligence is converging with an extraordinary array of other emerging technologies, from cyber and biotechnologies, to affective computing and neurotechnologies, to robotics and additive manufacturing. Yet, this convergence is generating new hybrid threats, and opportunities, that can be leveraged by state, non-state actors, and average citizens alike.
In this paper, we focus on one new hybrid threat in particular – the cyber-AI deception machine. Borne out of the convergence of AI, affective computing, biometrics, neurotechnologies, and cybertechnologies, the deception machine is altering the global intelligence landscape by automating the generation and simulation of data, media, and strategic intelligence. Such fake intelligence has significant implications for the future of propaganda, deception, manipulation, and social-engineering.
By eroding the sense of truth and trust between citizens and the State, between States, and among societies, the cyber-AI deception machine epitomizes the importance of information superiority and its strategic potential for deception and subversion.
Eleonore Pauwels, Sarah W. Deton
Artificial Intelligence and Warfare
Abstract
New developments in Artificial Intelligence may overshadow the traditional foundation of nuclear deterrence by reducing the survivability of missile launch platforms. AI has the capability to gather and quickly synthesize information from thousands of sources to produce highly accurate estimates of locations for missile-submarines, or land-based mobile launchers. Thus, mobile nuclear assets for deterrence may become easier targets, which reduces the threat of successful retaliation after a deliberate first-strike. Other traditional forms of defense may also be rendered obsolete. While traditional defenses are designed to protect against larger, stronger weapons, AI has the new capability to operate autonomous weapons at the miniaturized level. Miniature devices can fly toward a target undetected and then swarm together at the last minute to deliver a powerful, coordinated blow through autonomous synchronization. Many critics encourage policy makers to prevent AI weapons from ever killing humans as part of a military mission without first receiving explicit permission from a human operator. However, other experts warn that AI may someday evolve beyond submission to their human controllers, and may independently and dynamically set up their own new missions and goals which may conflict with the original designers. AI is currently an area of intense research for China and Russia. Moral objections to AI by contractor-technicians in the US may slow new development by the DOD. However, US commercial development of AI is moving forward rapidly, and can be seen in new products such as self-driving cars. AI may be considered a dual-use technology, similar to strong encryption, which makes legal controls to limit uses and prevent export somewhat difficult.
Clay Wilson
Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon Systems
Abstract
Cyber space, the fifth warfare domain, is benefitting from technological advancements and already accommodating Artificial Intelligence (AI) as its essential part. Enhanced by machine learning capabilities and AI decision making potential, autonomous military systems have been presented as highly efficient new generation weapons ready to replace conventional armaments and human combatants.
Cyber physical weapon systems, ranging from self-targeting missiles to self-learning ground vehicles are boosting covert military offensive capabilities increasing heated discussions and tensions between nations. The AI cyber arms race, escalated by super powers competing for global dominance, is supported by multi-billion-dollar investments into state-of-the-art technologies and leading research institutions. Further uncontrollable AI-based military technology development will expand the threat landscape with self-replicating cyber weapons and autonomous offense.
The chapter reviews the AI impact on autonomy and its major criteria, explores cyber vulnerabilities in autonomous technologies, highlights critical issues of the AI use in AWS, deliberates on incorporation of ethical principles into development of technologies, reveals legal complications and consequences of AI arms race, forecasts future challenges. It also provides some potential crisis scenarios.
Current research arguments that the generated neural networks and machine learning algorithms, being of complex nature, still remain unpredictable, unreliable and even dangerous when fully autonomous. Joint global action, legally bounding regulations and internationally coordinated research are the major solutions to harness and revert the emerging existential danger.
Stanislav Abaimov, Maurizio Martellini
Understanding the Threat Posed by COTS Small UAVs Armed with CBR Payloads
Abstract
Commercial off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles are becoming a powerful force-multiplier in asymmetric conflicts. These platforms have been readily adopted by both state and non-state actors for a variety of military tasks including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, and increasingly for direct strike missions. This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of these platforms, and discusses their use for the deployment of conventional munitions as well as chemical, biological, and radiological payloads. The chapter highlights factors that determine the effectiveness of such non-conventional attacks, including agent properties, target characteristics, and methods of delivery. It then describes factors that constrain the acquisition of CBR agents by non-state actors, as well as other barriers to a successful CBR attack using COTS small UAVs. Whilst these platforms have significant advantages over traditional ground-based CBR delivery vectors such as precision, access to targets, difficulty of interception, optimised dispersion, reduced risk of detention, anonymity, and a demonstration of ‘modern’ capabilities, their utility is limited by, amongst other factors, UAV characteristics such as payload size, range, and flight time. Governments, nevertheless, are adopting regulatory and technical control measures to manage security risks associated with the proliferation of these delivery vehicles. Manufacturers are also responding to real and perceived risk, integrating restrictions such as ‘geofencing’ and IFF systems into their products. At the same time, non-state actors have begun implementing steps to circumvent such countermeasures. On balance, although the threat of a CBR terror event using COTS UAVs remains lower than that of other attack modes, ongoing assessments of the feasibility of such attacks and of appropriate defences must remain part of the counter-terror dialogue.
N. R. Jenzen-Jones
Education and Training as a Disruptive Dual Use Technology
Abstract
Scientific and technical education can have dual uses, with both peaceful and WMD applications. Examples include Iraqi engineering students in the 1970’s learning skills that would later be useful in Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons programs, and A. Q. Khan, who went from European degrees in metallurgy to stealing URENCO centrifuge technology and leading Pakistan’s program. Engineering and scientific education in proliferation-related fields should be controlled as are tangible dual use materials and technologies, and denied to citizens of countries likely to be proliferation risks.
J. I. Katz

Evolving Risk Mitigation Strategies and Technologies

Frontmatter
Detection and Identification Technologies for CBRN Agents
Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of available technologies for the detection and identification of agents released (alone or in mixtures), at the scene of a major intentional, accidental or natural CBRNE incident. These technologies are crucial to ensure adequate risk assessment, optimal risk management, and proper counter-measures including medical treatment, personal protection and restored access to infrastructure. In addition, monitoring/screening of these agents (and their precursors/dual agents) is also essential during production, storage and transport.
Olivier Mattmann
Chemical Forensics
Abstract
Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) have lately been used in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Republic of Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom. In the two latter cases, normal investigation by authorities, such as evidence collection and identification of unknown materials found at the crime scenes, was possible. However, in Syria and Iraq the inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) collected evidence in a hostile environment and under tight time constraints. The collected samples were analyzed at the OPCW’s designated laboratories under a strict scope of analysis. The verification protocol for determining the presence or absence of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) related chemicals includes sample preparation followed by analysis by different chromatographic, spectrometric, and spectroscopic techniques. According to the rules of the OPCW for the sample analyses, the identification is considered unambiguous if two different analytical techniques giving consistent results confirm the presence of the same chemical.
The term “chemical forensics” is defined as an application of chemistry and forensic toxicology in a legal framework. Various research techniques and methods have potential for forensic crime scene investigations related to CWC and alleged use of CWAs. In this review, the forensic information about chemical analyses obtained from the public reports of the OPCW and scientific publications on recent studies related to CWAs, illicit drug profiling, poisons, and incapacitating chemicals, as well as chemical profiling of precursors, impurities, and side products are presented. Finally, the need for recommended operation procedures for attribution analysis for sampling, sample preparation, complementary analytical methods, data analysis, reporting, quality control, and proficiency tests similar to those of CWA analysis from environmental and biomedical samples is discussed.
Paula Vanninen, Hanna Lignell, Harri A. Heikkinen, Harri Kiljunen, Oscar S. Silva, Sini A. Aalto, Tiina J. Kauppila
Recent Developments in the Clinical Management of Weaponized Nerve Agent Toxicity
Abstract
Human exposure to weaponized organophosphates (e.g. nerve agents) occurs in the context of military and terrorist attacks, assassinations, laboratory accidents, and suicide attempts. Increasing global tensions have led to renewed scrutiny of nerve agents and their deliberate use to poison political enemies. Poisoning from these highly potent agents present several challenges. Toxicitiy from these agents may persist untreated if clinicians do not recognize the resultant cholinergic toxidrome. Despite clinicians lack of familiarity with nerve agent toxicity, large scale exposures due to chemical munitions may significantly stress healthcare systems and deplete antidote availability. Finally, recent history suggests that environmental persistence of some nerve agents may pose additional threat due to delayed exposure and injury to innocent bystanders. This chapter reviews important advances in the clinical management of individuals exposed to nerve agents. It discusses contingency management and alternate antidotes in the setting of mass depletion of existing antidote stock.
Alexander F. Barbuto, Peter R. Chai
Diagnosing the Cause of Disease: Interactive Teaching Approaches
Abstract
Interactive teaching approaches have proven to be very effective. This chapter presents two examples that may inspire the reader to use them, or develop their own. The first section arose following detailed discussions between Tatyana Novossiolova and me (Alastair Hay), and we ran the first exercise together, as described in the text, after agreeing the format. Tatyana’s input was vital to the outcome of the exercise.
In the first exercise, cases of atypical pneumonia begin to appear in Citytown. However, the few cases that appear initially multiply rapidly and clinicians are at a loss to explain the outbreak. To make matters worse a festival which draws in much needed tourism, and income, is but a few weeks away. What needs to be done? This is an urgent problem that needs to be solved and it affects many including clinicians, epidemiologists and city officials. Using an interactive approach, with a developing scenario introduced in stages, participants are required to debate the issues and outline what needs to be done at each stage and who needs to be informed. Is it just a national problem? Eventually a zoonotic disease Coxiella burnetti, which causes Q fever, and one of the symptoms of which is atypical pneumonia, is identified. Does its identification alter, or strengthen, approaches to contain the disease? What is the most likely cause of the outbreak? Might it have been deliberate?
Also described is a case about making an illegal drug, Crystal Meth. Although aimed at young chemists the case is not just for them, but for many audiences. Drawing on very different interactive approaches and again, using an evolving scenario, participants are encouraged to discuss issues as they arise and what their decision would be. The case is about recognising the point at which perfectly legitimate chemistry questions morph into more problematic ethical decisions
Alastair Hay
Evaluation Systems for Biological Security Risk Mitigation Training and Education
Abstract
Engagement, training and education have been promoted as ways to address and mitigate biological security risks. The rationale of such a promotion may be that attitudes and actions of more aware, competent and capable people will lead to lower biological security risks. However, evaluations of the impact of experiences of engagement, training and education have often been limited to ex-post observation rather than based on structured educational designs which link capacity building efforts with desired learning outcomes and focus on longer-term impacts on security risks. This paper proposes a methodology for evaluating the impact of education or training, particularly looking at security-related biorisks. The methodology seeks to evaluate the impact of education and training as a risk mitigation measure, linking (expected) outcomes in terms of learning to (expected) outcomes in terms of risk. The paper leverages models of Instructional Systems Design (ISD) and of levels of impact of learning as well as approaches of risk management, risk assessment and risk evaluation. The paper proposes evaluation strategies and tools for measuring the impact of training and education aimed at reducing biological security risks, including examples of designed indicators, metrics and data sources. Improved competencies identified in four thematic areas, built with education and training and transferred into behaviour, have the potential to reduce biological security risks in specific risk scenarios via impacting factors that primarily influence risk likelihood. This paper may be of value to those in the security community seeking to enhance work on metrics and measures, and provides a theoretical framework through which projects and programs might be better evaluated.
Giulio Maria Mancini, James Revill
Microbial Forensics: Detection and Characterization in the Twenty-first Century
Abstract
The use of a biological agent during the commission of a crime or as weapon of terrorism or war is criminalized under national and international law. Like their counterparts in the chemical and physical sciences, biologists have begun to develop the means to investigate the malicious use of pathogens and toxins, a process that entails the detection and characterization of the means of delivery or dispersal, characterization of the agent, and, eventually, attribution of the attack to an individual, organization, or state actor. Each of these investigative steps can be approached first by traditional forensic biological approaches. We limit our discussion to microbial forensics, leaving attribution to other venues. The last decade has seen great progress in molecular forensic capability, and we explore recent and/or novel molecular biological tools that allow the analysis of evidentiary samples. We will argue that DNA is central to the analysis of microbial weapons, as increased access to synthetic biological methodology in the context of digitalization of biomaterials paves the way for the potential construction of bioagents for malicious use. DNA sequencing and analysis permits some prediction of the methods used to synthesize and manipulate DNA as well as the means to detect engineered genetic elements. Other issues of high relevance include approaches to international data sharing, sample and reference collection, pertinent disease surveillance mechanisms and statistical methods. We conclude with a discussion of gaps and challenges in the field.
K. Lane Warmbrod, Michael Montague, Nancy D. Connell
Metadaten
Titel
21st Century Prometheus
herausgegeben von
Maurizio Martellini
Ralf Trapp
Copyright-Jahr
2020
Electronic ISBN
978-3-030-28285-1
Print ISBN
978-3-030-28284-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28285-1