2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
A Case of Dictator Game in Public Finances–Fiscal Illusion between Agents
verfasst von : Paulo Mourão
Erschienen in: Distributed Computing and Artificial Intelligence
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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This paper discusses Fiscal Illusion as a special case of Agents and Multiagents Systems. Under fiscal illusion, each taxpayer does not realize how much he/she really pays to the State; therefore, he/she does not evaluate well the public actions. We will study this issue as a particular case of a ‘Dictator game’ with relevant applications not only for Public Finances but also for specific domains like Pervasive agents and Ambient Intelligence, or for User-centered applications and Assisting Agents.