A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games

The paper aims to study a kind of revenue allocation system with a guarantee of basic interests, which integrates the egalitarianism with the marginalism. This means that a player’s payoff consists of two parts, the basic interests and the performance-based payoff. In cooperative games with coalition structure setting, the Owen value puts emphasis on the individuals’ marginal contribution, in contrast, the equal coalitional division value (ECD-value) gives priority to the egalitarianism. Through introducing the guarantee coefficient \(\alpha\), we propose the compromised solution which is established as the corresponding convex combination of the Owen value and the ECD-value. We call it \(\alpha\)-egalitarian Owen value, as the solution degenerates to the corresponding \(\alpha\)-egalitarian Shapley value when the coalition structure is trivial. Furthermore, we provide three approaches to characterize an \(\alpha\)-egalitarian Owen value, including axiomatization, potential function and implementation.