A Constitutional Theory of Intergenerational Equity

This essay is my tribute to someone whom I counted elsewhere as one among a handful of people “that played, in one way or another, a decisive role in my academic career.” I could have added on that occasion that, unlike almost all others in that treasured list of benefactors, my debt to “Uncle George” is immeasurable and intangible. Indeed, the man whose legacy his students and colleagues celebrate with this Festschrift opened the doors of my mind to three mainstays of what has become my scholarly constitution—the excitement and fecundity of interdisciplinary inquiry, a solid bond with the academia on the other side of the ocean, and the commitment to reconcile the universal and the particular dimensions of political community. Apart from reflecting that shared heritage, this essay is my attempt to fulfill an old promise of mature interdisciplinary collaboration on the constitutional issues that we are both passionate about.

See Braga de Macedo (1976) for evidence of this.

I shall use “equity” and “justice” interchangeably throughout this essay.

On the distinction, see Alexy (1994, pp. 71–103), Atienza and Manero (2012, pp. 23–50), and Dworkin (1977, pp. 22–31, 71–80).

Two notable dissenters are Hayek (1982) and Nozick (1974).

Although rights and interests are not the same, I shall not elaborate on the distinction on this occasion.

For a survey of the theories, see Gosseries (2004) and Campos (2017).