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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. A Historical Analysis of “Super Powers” Nuclear Proliferation Cases

verfasst von : Lucky E. Asuelime, Raquel A. Adekoye

Erschienen in: Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter examines the treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which serves as the basis for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The treaty allows only five states—the USA, Soviet Union (now Russia), China, Britain, and France—to have nuclear weapons. A historical analysis is undertaken of these five nuclear powers’ nuclear armament processes. This is achieved by means of both a review of the literature and an analysis of the historical experiences of the nuclear powers. The principal question that this chapter seeks to answer is: what is the level of technological capability and the motivation behind these states’ decision to develop nuclear weapons?

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Vorheriges Kapitel Drivers of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review

Nächstes Kapitel A Historical Analysis of South East Asian “Emerging Powers” Nuclear Proliferation: India and Pakistan

The Indian government claimed that its 1974 test was a peaceful nuclear explosion that was not followed by the manufacture of any weapons. The same argument is used by other countries that may have done the same in the past, such as Israel.

Ibid. According to Goldschmidt, “the essential decision and development of the atomic bomb was made in the strictest secrecy, without the knowledge of the people, the parliamentary authorities, or even the ministerial services concerned.”

It was also reported that General Marshall told Truman that it might cost half a million American lives to force the Japanese to surrender if the USA initiated large-scale invasions of the Japanese home islands.

The first Soviet multimegaton, “true” hydrogen bomb test using Sakharov’s “third design,” essentially a reinvention of the Teller-Ulam.

The Committee’s task was to decide whether an atomic bomb could be produced during the war and whether its military effects would justify the efforts necessary to produce it.

The official British decision to acquire atomic weapons was made in January 1947. The decision was made public in the House of Commons in May 1948.

By October 1957, China and the Soviet Union had agreed that the Soviet Union would provide China with a sample atomic bomb and technical data for its manufacture.

The Chinese Gross National Product (GNP) was estimated at 35–45 billion dollars in 1957. China’s nuclear weapons program probably “cost them the equivalent of approximately 2 % of their GNP and could be drawn from a defense budget of more than 2.3 billion dollars.”

The Chinese were the target of nuclear threats during the Korean War in 1953, in 1954 when US Secretary of State, Dulles raised the prospect of massive retaliation against both Vietnam and the PRC in response to the French predicament in Indochina, and in 1957, when the USA deployed a 600-mile range missile in Taiwan designed to deliver tactical nuclear warheads.

Right states (according to international norms) show that they have successfully detonated weapons of mass destruction—in this case nuclear weapons. There are five states in this category and known today as the “nuclear weapon states” (NWS) under the terms of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In the order of when each of the states acquired nuclear weapons, they include the USA, Russia (Formally Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and China. On the other hand, those nations known to have or suspected to have nuclear weapons in possession are most times referred to as members of the nuclear club.

There is little consensus among scholars about what constitute prohibitive costs and requisite expertise. However, most observers agree that “a nuclear weapons option presupposes a certain level of economic wealth and technological knowhow.”

The Soviet Union contributed to the early Chinese atomic weapons program by providing the Chinese with considerable technology regarding basic atomic research in the 1950s. However, it abruptly ceased this assistance later in the decade by withdrawing technicians and advisers. Considered as having possessed the lowest level of nuclear infrastructure, China later independently developed the technology for weapons design and manufacturing and was able to successfully test its atomic device in 1964 without any further Soviet assistance.

The USA was initially depicted as the major external danger during the early 1950s. Later, the Soviet Union was seen as an additional security threat to the Chinese after the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s.

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Titel: A Historical Analysis of “Super Powers” Nuclear Proliferation Cases
verfasst von: Lucky E. Asuelime
Raquel A. Adekoye
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-33372-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-33373-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33373-1_5