2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
A Mechanism Design Approach to Dynamic Price-Based Control of Multi-Agent Systems
verfasst von : Cédric Langbort
Erschienen in: Distributed Decision Making and Control
Verlag: Springer London
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We show how ideas and tools from the field of mechanism design in economics can be brought to bear on the problem of price-based control of dynamical systems. Specifically, we take inspiration from the Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves mechanism to design
strategy-proof
dynamic price-functions, which can induce subsystems to apply socially efficient control inputs even though they are self-interested and possibly strategically misreport their cost and dynamics’ models to the control designer.