The concept of compliance has attracted increasing interest among political scientists in recent years.1 However, the discussion focuses primarily on the international level, the object of study being state compliance with the prescriptions of international treaties and regimes.2 Contributions on compliance on the part of individual actors are less common. Nevertheless, most of the social science literature on common-pool resources contains a more or less explicitly stated assumption of preconditions which have to be met in order for individuals to comply with established regulations. The aim of this chapter is to see major traditions within this debate in relation to the compliance literature.3 More specifically, the former’s inherent reasoning on compliance will be made explicit and incorporated into a model of how public authorities can make use of two categories of compliance mechanisms to induce compliance in individuals. On the one hand, contributions maintaining the basic assumptions of public choice theory have an innate image of individual compliance with regulations being the result of coercive measures on the part of public authorities. On the other hand, the emerging co-operative action or co-management literature would emphasise legitimacy or discursive measures as more effective in securing compliance with management regulations. Finally, the question is addressed as to which factors other than management initiatives may affect individuals’ choices concerning compliance vs. non-compliance.
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- A Model of Compliance in Fisheries — Theoretical Foundations and Practical Application
- Springer Netherlands
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