2009 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
A New Derandomization of Auctions
verfasst von : Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz
Erschienen in: Algorithmic Game Theory
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Let
A
be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector
b
∈ [
h
]
n
, has expected profit
${\mathbb E}[P(b)]$
. Aggarwal et al. showed that given
A
, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector
b
, guarantees a profit of
${\mathbb E}[P(b)]/4 - O(h)$
. In this paper we show that given
A
, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector
b
of length
n
, guarantees a profit of
${\mathbb E}[P(b)]- O(h\sqrt{n \ln hn})$
. As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.