4. A Persistent Refusal: Córdoba’s Contentious Workers in Federal Argentina

Eduardo Angeloz was then the governor of Córdoba from UCR. The poor economic performance under the UCR-led federal government between 1983 and 1989 put this party in a disadvantageous position for the 1989 elections. Further, under president Raul Alfonsin, developmental policies failed short of reviving the manufacturing sector, triggering a negative outlook on the credibility of the UCR politicians. Overall, the economic problems under Alfonsin put Carlos Menem in a favorable position against his rival Eduardo Angeloz (Remmer 1993, 398).

As I discussed in Chap. 2, OEM factories are embedded in a network of suppliers, which need to be equally competitive because the parts provided by the second and first tier suppliers need to satisfy a minimum threshold of quality. As much as this depends on the fixed-cost investments by the management, maximizing sector-wide quality could be best ensured through a systematic coordination of vocational training programs.

See for example “En Argentina no existe politica industrial” La Voz del Interior, 27 February 1997, 11A; “Automotrices amenazan con irse a Brazil” La Voz del Interior, 26 July 1998, 11A.

In 2010, FIAT-Bursa received the Silver prize in World Class Manufacturing, surpassing all other FIAT production centers across the globe. See “Tofas FIAT Uretimde Dunyanin En Iyisi Oldu” accessible at http://​www.​tofas.​com.​tr/​Haber.​aspx?​id=​414. Moreover, FIAT-Bursa occupies the second place after Italy in Research and Development. Córdoba is not yet included in the rankings. “FIAT’in 2. Buyuk Ar-Ge Ussu Olduk,” Gazete Vatan, 8 February 2010. One indicator of competitiveness is the quality certificates, such as ISO 9000 and 9001, obtained by the companies. In Córdoba only five companies possessed this as of March 1996. Most parts producers in the city lacked resources to obtain an internationally recognized quality certificate. See “Las Pyme en busqueda de calidad” La Voz del Interior, 31 March 1996.

This is different than the previous vocational training system under the ISI period where federal government played a greater role in human capital formation. Before the 1990s, formation of vocational skills was primarily administered from the center with minimum local involvement because technical schools were under the jurisdiction of Federal Ministry of Education. The skill formation framework in Bursa during the ISI regime has resemblances with the one in Córdoba during the same period.

Interview #2, FIAT Manager, Córdoba, 5 May 2008.

Interview #18, Former FIAT worker and shopfloor leader, 8 August 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #30, Expert, Federal Ministry of Labor, Department of Training, 6 June 2008, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

See “Los operarios de FIAT Auto mantenian ocupada la planta” La Voz del Interior, 23 January 1997, Frontpage; and “Movilizacion a la casa del gobierno por los despidos en FIAT,” La Voz del Interior, February 1997; “Marchas contra las cambios laborales” La Voz del Interior, 22 February 1997. The conflict continued for months and the insurgent workers pushed for a better deal. See “El paro profundizo el conflicto en FIAT,” La Voz del Interior, 25 April 1997, 11A. When the leader of the protests was laid off by the company, the workers mobilized against FIAT management and asked for Mestre’s help—but in vain. See “Obreros de FIAT reclamaran a Mestre” La Voz del Interior, 26 May 1997, 9A.

Though both UOM and SMATA support the PJ, they belong to opposing camps within the party. These divisions date back to 1980s where the Peronist union leadership split into four main factions: the 62 Organizaciones (the “62”), the Grupo de 25, the Ubaldinistas, and the Grupo de 15 (McGuire 1992: 37). While SMATA joined the Grupo de 15, supporting Menem’s campaign, UOM was in the 62 Organizaciones in opposition (McGuire 1992: 72).

Interview with former HR Manager of Fiat-Córdoba, 17 June 2008, Córdoba Argentina.

Isvor Fiat S.A. Proyecto Argentina Presentation Brochure 1997.

“Política de recursos humanos en la integración” La Voz del Interior, 8 June 1997 and “Con la mira en la capacitación” La Voz del Interior, 20 December 1997.

Even though the legal framework of Programa Emprender indicated that it was destined to meet the demands of new companies or companies who expanded their investment, in practice, the training program was exclusively designed for FIAT. Interview #7, 17 June 2008 and Interview #57, 24 June 2008. Programa Emprender was launched with resolution no 90/96 of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The training bulletin of ISVOR reveals that the workers are especially trained to acquire the new values of the company listed above. Source: ISVOR FIAT S.A. Proyecto Argentina Presentation Brochure 1997. The intensified training period for the blue-collar workers ranged from 55 days to 280 days, depending on the position and experience of the worker.

“Politica de recursos humanos en la integracion” La Voz del Interior, 8 June 1997. Also the Worldwide CEO of the FIAT company Cesare Romiti repeated the importance of investment in human capital as a company policy during a visit to Córdoba in 1997. See “Córdoba colmo nuestras expectativas” La Voz del Interior, 4 July 1997, 10A. Similarly, FIAT’s rival company, Renault, also had a private training facility on its premises in operation under the Centro de Formacion Renault and the workers and young students had a focused skill training targeted to respond to the changing production organization at the factory. Also see “Formamos a los profesionales del siglo 21” La Voz del Interior, 20 April 1998, Supplement, p.2.

Interview #7, Former FIAT-Córdoba Manager, 17 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #36, also confirms this and argues that technological change in production does not always call for intense technical training because the operation of the machines is relatively easy and does not require detailed knowledge to make it work. Rather, she views these training programs as tools for disciplining the workers in order to create a new profile during the 1990s, rather than a genuine investment. Interview #36, 11 August 2008, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Interview #2, 5 May 2008, Córdoba, Argentina. The respondent noted that many of the technical schools were closed, and as of 2008, approximately 20%–30% of all factory workers were graduates of such schools. The percentage of vocational-technical high school graduates in the FIAT-Bursa factory is over 90%.

Interview #17, FIAT-Córdoba Manager, 8 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

As of August 2008, general skills, and especially behavioral training modules, continued to dominate the agenda. Furthermore, the human resources manager of the Córdoba factory has noted that prior to hiring, candidates are subject to a psychological test and an interview. Interview #17, Manager, FIAT-Córdoba, 8 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

These groups were further split into different cleavages on the direction and content of economic development program. For the first half of the twentieth century, within-party political competition revealed the contradicting views on economic policy, ranging from the proponents of nationalizing the entire economy to groups who called for the elimination of the capitalist system to economic liberals who envisioned a system based on private entrepreneurship. The party was far from having an ideological unity during this period (Snow 1963). At the same time, though some groups within the party advocated industrial development, the UCR did not pursue a well-thought-out industrial policy once it was at power and the old rural elite continued to influence the party’s economic development policy (Moran 1970, 77–8; 87). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the newly rising agro-industry business had a strong influence under the leadership of UCR’s Marcelo Alvear. These producer groups are powerful in Union Industrial Argentina (Moran 1970, 83), whose founder base is largely composed of agricultural industrialists.

For a detailed analysis of the UCR politics in Córdoba during this period, see Tcach 2006(1991).

These principles were endorsed after the 1960 party congress. The convention eliminated nationalist and statist understanding of economic development with a new doctrine that (1) respects private property, (2) foresees cooperation between state and private education and (3) accepts foreign capital for the development of natural resources (Snow 1963: 523–4). For a comparison of UCR and PJ and their relationship with populism, see Saettone 2006; Sabatini 1996.

Perhaps the most significant incident in the collective memory of the entrepreneurs and the workers is the Córdobazo protests of 1969.

During this period, coordination of technical education was centralized under Comision Nacional de Aprendizaje y Orientacion Profesional-CNAOP. It should be noted that Peronist regime did not create a technical education system from scratch. PJ’s primary role in this process was centralization of a patched system that characterized the 1930s. Technical education during the pre-Peronist era was provided through multiple social factors including the church, unions and businesses. For a detailed discussion on the evolution of technical education under Juan Perón, see Dussel and Pineau 1995. For an analysis of the foundation of Workers University under Perón, see Sanchez-Roman 2007. Levitsky (2001) suggests that such links constituted informal ties that link broader segments of the population to the Peronist Party.

Among the factory-schools, the Córdoba Aviation Factory served as a vocational school for most workers in the region. The worker university was founded under Juan Perón and was converted into a Technical University in 1963. The institution still serves a large body of students who have mostly working class backgrounds and offers degrees in engineering.

PJ’s agricultural policies have often generated uproar from the agro-industrial groups, resulting with massive protests. In 1993, Menem was the target of criticisms as a result of his economic liberalization program and faced a major protest from these groups. See “El campo protesta y el gobierno prepara medidas” (“The agricultural producers protest and the government prepares measures [to respond]” La Voz del Interior, 27 July 1993.

For example, teacher unions are among those who broke off from CGT and join a new confederation CTA protesting the Menemist line. For a detailed analysis of teacher union protests and the political dynamics behind it see Murillo 1999. For an analysis of reform coalitions under Menem government in Argentina, see Etchemendy 2001.

The division within the Peronist party was marked by two major factions: Juan Manuel de la Sota and his Movimiento de Unidad Peronista and Julio Cesar Araoz’s Frente de la Victoria. Originally from Córdoba, Juan Manuel de la Sota was the leader of the movement within the Peronist party that opposed the economic policies of Menem and Cavallo. UOM was among the group of unions that supported him, taking a more critical position against the federal government. See “Los Gremios se alinean para la interna del Justicialismo” La Voz del Interior, 8 December 1992. To suppress opposition from Córdoba, the Peronist headquarters intervened in the local party management, and renouncing De la Sota’s provincial authority. See “La Intervencion al PJ seria de 90 dias” La Voz del Interior, 30 December 1992; and “El PJ Nacional desconoce la autoridad de De la Sota” La Voz del Interior, 30 March 1993. Two years later, De la Sota set up a local alliance with Juan Schiaretti to take the lead in the provincial headquarters of the PJ and was back on the political scene. See “De la Sota y Schiaretti: esta vez juntos” La Voz del Interior, 28 July 1995, 3A. The division among the Peronist party also affected SMATA. According to the former manager of training at SMATA-Córdoba, the center in Buenos Aires and Córdoba Branch had a rough relationship by the end of 1990s. While the central management supported Menem, SMATA-Córdoba moved toward the de la Sota line. Interview #5, 28 June 2008 and 3 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

See “Las Pyme estan siendo expulsadas del modelo economico” La Voz del Interior, 24 August 1992. When the central government finally announced a support plan for SMEs, the metalworking sector was again excluded. See “Se ampliaron a comercio, agro, y servicios, creditos para Pyme” La Voz del Interior, 23 December 1992.

For example, criticizing the new industrial regime pursued by Menem, Eduardo Angeloz argued that this was an adventure. See “Pagaron haberes y desocuparon la fabrica Materfer” La Voz del Interior, 25 May 1991.

Angeloz’s cabinet mostly included owners or managers of powerful agro-industrial groups in Córdoba. For more on this see below.

Confirmed by Interview #27, former government official under Eduardo Angeloz, 8 August 2008, Córdoba, Argentina. These programs are Emeta (Expansion y Mejoramiento de la ensenanza technica agropecuaria) and Emer (Expansion y Mejoramiento de Educacion Rural). Both projects foresaw new investments to be made in schools, machinery and tools, development of education programs beyond the school, curricular modification and retraining teachers. “La Interaccion entre educacion y trabajo” La Voz del Interior, 22 February 1991, p.3.

“Siempre es tiempo de aprender” La Voz del Interior 22 February 1991, p.4. Throughout the province, the capital—Córdoba City—had the highest number of adult training centers (168) offering programs in the field of agricultural technology and automobile technology. The participants are granted a certificate after completing the program that lasts for two years.

“Invertiran 600.000 dolares en area de ciencia y tecnica” ([Córdoba] will invest 600.000 in the area of science and technology) La Voz del Interior, 28 February 1992.

“Angeloz detallo su politica para el sector rural” La Voz Del Interior, 7 August 1991, 5A.

Yet, even though UCR politicians did not play a great role in the development of this sector, Angeloz saw a political opportunity in the growing importance of automobiles (i.e. in terms of job creation). To signal interest, Angeloz went to the grand openings of a few multinational factories in the greater metropolitan area of Córdoba and met with automobile producers to deliberate on resolving the problems they faced in a globalizing economy. See “Angeloz encabezara la presentacion de Cormec” La Voz del Interior. 25 November 1991. 7A. However, the tension between Angeloz and the central government authorities during the inauguration of the new factory was quite visible.

Interview #32 30 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina and Interview #1, 24 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #32, 30 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

In 2008, Avalle was the Ministry of Industry and Commerce under the Peronist Juan Schiaretti government in Córdoba. As of 2017, he continues to serve in the same position.

“Angeloz cuestiono traspaso de servicios educativos” La Voz del Interior, 12 September 1991.

For example, Córdoba did not have any infrastructure for training teachers and this was an important infrastructural problem. “Por ahora es imposible formar a formadores” La Voz del Interior, 13 September 1991.

“Córdoba no recibira los centros nacionales de formacion docente” La Voz del Interior, 27 November 1992, 12A.

“Posicion de la provincia ante el reclamo docente” (Position of the Province against teacher demands) La Voz del Interior, 8 March 1993, 7A. and “La UEPC ratifico el paro y la marcha de manana” (UEPC approves the strike and the march tomorrow) La Voz del Interior, 31 March 1993. In particular the teachers unions opposed the delegation of educational services to the local municipalities. See “Docentes rechazan el traspaso de escuelas a los municipios” La Voz del Interior, 24 August 1993.

Interview #35, 7 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Córdoba was the last of all provinces to accept the decentralization of education. “Educacion nego fondos a Córdoba” La Voz del Interior, 11 August 1994.

Interview #54, Córdoba-UOM, 15 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

In a research done four years later, a respondent from SMATA quoted in Parisi (1999) notes that the technical schools in Córdoba was of low quality, and argues that decentralization of education should have taken gradually, and with modernization of the curricula. (A SMATA respondent quoted in Parisi 1999: 177.) Even though SMATA initially gave passive support, the union management was not happy with the outcome.

Menem’s proposal on flexibilization of labor included introducing contracts for part-time and work-on-demand positions. This would significantly reduce the power of organized labor because flexible labor force is much more difficult to unionize. Second, as a result of decline in unionization rates, the unions would lose a good portion of their stable income.

Interview #36, Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 11 August 2008, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

“La ley de empleo no solucionara nada” La Voz del Interior 10 March 1991. In another report, Sappia likens the proposed changes to “a Dracula movie” labeling the proposal as terrorizing. “Sappia: La reforma es terrorrifica” La Voz del Interior, 22 October 1992. 7A.

Córdoba was not the only province that launched a tax-deductible investment stimulus plan. The autonomous city of Buenos Aires and the province of Santa Fe also had similar plans. On the other hand, Santa Fe, which participated in the fiscal pact, was quick to receive the resources from Buenos Aires to extend the stimulus plan. “Habra rebaja generalizada de aportes en Santa Fe” La Voz del Interior, 23 February 1994, 7A

“Los industrias insisten en desgravaciones” La Voz del Interior, 8 January 1994. The producers in the metalworking particularly opposed Angeloz’s stimulus plan on the grounds that the metalworking sector was excluded from this preferential treatment plan: the head of the CIM argued that they were exposed to external competition in the absence of protections. Of all metalworking industry in Córdoba, only 26 companies were included while 352 were excluded. The “winners” of the stimulus program mostly included producers in the agro-industrial sector (milk and milk products, fruit and fruit-based products). The selected companies in the metalworking sector are machinery suppliers to agro-industrialists such as tractor producers and other agro-industrial equipment assemblers. “Los mayores beneficios senalan hacia este” La Voz del Interior, 9 January 1994.

In an interview the head of UIC ruled out this option, arguing that it is the UIA (the umbrella organization in Buenos Aires) that needs to negotiate with the central government and Domingo Cavallo and UIC would only talk to local government. “Leonida Panaioti (UIC): El actual esquema es mas distortivo que otra cosa” and “Hugo Paladini (CIM): Ahora tenemos la competencia en las provincias vecinas” La Voz del Interior, 23 January 1994.

In response to Angeloz’s stimulus plan, UIC also called on the government to expand the number of companies to be included in the program. In fact, UIC sided with Menem government on the flexibilization of labor market, but this organization was careful to tone down its critique against Angeloz because many UIC companies were included in the local stimulus plan.

“La Plaza Córdoba es tampoco una Isla” La Voz del Interior, 6 January 1995, 7A.

Because flexible work would generate fluctuations in the worker wages, the union management was highly likely to be deprived of a stable financial income when the rank-and-file is unable to pay their dues regularly.

Interview #1, 24 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #1, 24 July 2008, Córdoba Argentina.

“La Nacion abandono a Córdoba antes que comenzara la crisis” La Voz del Interior, 28 June 1995.

“Asalto y incendio de la casa Radical” La Voz del Interior, 24 June 1995 and “Temores y consequencias del paquetazo” La Voz del Interior, 24 June 1995.

“Chrysler confirmo la inversion de US$80 millones en Córdoba” La Voz del Interior, 22 March 1995, 11A; and “FIAT se decidio por Córdoba” La Voz del Interior, 11 April 1995.

Jose Porta was the only minister who survived from the Angeloz administration and he retained his position as the Minister of Industry and Commerce under the Mestre government.

According to a former Consultant to the Minister of Labor, because Mestre was under pressure to pull the economy together by reducing public expenditure, his temporary alliance with Menem helped him to facilitate targeted labor training through using federal funds for training programs. Interview #55, 21 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Some of these programs include PRONAPAS (1994–1995), Programas de Apoyo a la Reconversion Productiva (Jovenes) (1994–2000), Capacitacion Ocupacional (1995–1996), Programa Aprender (1995–1997), Capacitacion para empleo (1996) and Projecto Joven (1997–2002). Source: Maria Estela Lanari, “Las Politicas del Empleo en los Paises del Mercosur,” Working paper. Also these training programs got notable public attention. See “Capacitacion laboral para 20 mil personas” (Labor training for 20,000 people) La Voz del Interior, 8 October 1997, 10A. Furthermore, the federal government promoted these programs and asked the producers to sponsor them in return for tax reductions. See “Las empresas podrian desgravar los gastos para capacitar personal” (Companies can eliminate tax on the expenses to train personnel) La Voz del Interior, 18 October 1997. In addition, some of these programs were partially sponsored by the Interamerican Development Bank. “Capacitacion para Pyme en la provincia” (Training for SMEs in the province) La Voz del Interior, September 1998.

Even though Perez had to soften his words in the face of rising protests from the parents of students who had their children enrolled in these schools, the minister continued with his dismissive attitude vis-à-vis public vocational education in Córdoba. See “Perez flexibiliza su postura sobre la educacion tecnica” La Voz del Interior, 13 March 1997, 13A. In an interview, a former government member also noted the lack of funds for undertaking a large-scale investment program in these schools. Interview #31, 7 August 2008, Córdoba, Argentina. Moreover, Perez’s predecessor, Juan Carlos Bocco severely criticized Perez on neglecting technical schools. Interview #8, Former Minister of Education, 1 August 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

“Demoran inicio de clases en el Cassafousth” La Voz del Interior, 27 February 1997; and “El Gobierno analiza restablecer talleres en el Cassafousth” La Voz del Interior, 12 March 1997. Indeed, a former government member under Angeloz, argues that the price for neglecting technical schools in Córdoba has been quite high especially during the later stages of industrial development. Interview #32, 30 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Rising unemployment was a major problem that Mestre was unable to resolve during his term in the office. The 1997 figures indicated that Córdoba city suffered from an increasing rate of unemployment (18.8%) which was above the national mean. See “¿Córdoba: entre las ciudades con mas empleo?” La Voz del Interior, 8 January 1997, 8A. In order to minimize risks associated with unemployment, Mestre government launched short-term training programs for the youth and also signed a short-term training program deal with the Renault Foundation as a part of Programa Crecer. See “Capacitacion” La Voz del Interior, July 1998; and “1700 chicos en riesgo reciben capacitacion para el trabajo” La Voz del Interior, 1 December 1998. In fact, the federal government used the same technique after the 2001 crisis. Interview #36, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Director of Institutional Capacity, 11 August 2008, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

A news report on skill formation programs notes that Córdoba is unable to meet the growing demand of qualified labor force in multiple sectors, including automobiles. See “Por Ahora ‘la docta’ se va a marzo” La Voz del Interior, 23 March 1997, 2E. In fact, Mestre’s minister of production and work, Jose Porta, notes that the growth in automobile sector in Córdoba is unlikely to address the problem of unemployment. See “Este renacer industrial no solucionara el desempleo” La Voz del Interior, 9 May 1997, p.9. A program that was launched by the federal government also proved ineffective and soon became the target of accusations and critiques for discrimination and ineffectiveness. See “Plan Trabajar: cruce de acusaciones” La Voz del Interior, 19 November 1998, 9A; and “Programa trabajar: ¿quien discrimina a quien?” La Voz del Interior, 6 December 1998, 14A. It should be noted that Plan Trabajar was intended to employ the poor in public works projects but vocational training was not an integral part of the program.

Indeed, this transformation of the labor force constitutes the backbone of new training programs during the 1990s. Interview #36, 11 August 2008, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Interview #24, CIM, 17 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #19, 19 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina and Interview #28, 30 July 2008.

Labor turnover rate is the rate of employee replacement in a given time period. This is an indicator of stability of the workforce.

Interview #24, CIM, 17 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #18, 31 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina. The same finding resonates in an earlier study by Parisi

(1999), where an interviewee, when asked about labor training programs, responds by arguing that the proposed changes have a harming effect on the work relations because [flexibilization] is exclusionary (Parisi 1999: 181,184).

“La capacitacion como herramienta esencial” La Voz del Interior, 6 September 1997. UOM was not the only union, in fact, unions in a similar position and organized in other sectors also took up the challenge of offering training to their workers. See “La capacitacion laboral es el pilar de la tarea gremial” La Voz del Interior, 18 March 1998, 13A.

Interview #54. 15 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Until 1999, SMATA managers were more supportive of new training programs for labor training, including behavioral trainings. In the words of a SMATA manager “it is coming, through other countries, that the labor instability is not the same as before, the companies—with technological advancement—need less labor force each time…because of that we have the responsibility to train our members so that they can face a new situation if they end up losing their job” Interview by Parisi 1999, 186a.

“SMATA marcha contra las suspenciones” La Voz del Interior, 31 July 1995; “Se logro acuerdo para una huelga provincial” La Voz del Interior, 3 August 1995.

“Descendio el 8.1% la produccion en Córdoba” La Voz del Interior, 26 September 1995. Among the sectors, transport materials had a decline rate of 40.9%, while the volume of production in auto-motors and auto-parts went down by 23.9%.

“Angelocistas se resisten aceptar a un mestrista al frente del congreso” La Voz del Interior, 6 March 1996; and “Una pelea que puede durar hasta 1999” La Voz del Interior, 23 February 1997, 8A.

During the initial time of Mestre in office, the local Peronists gave open support to him. In fact, contrary to the critics who accused Mestre of deploying authoritarian means to govern, the ultraperonists like Leonor Alarcia, argued that the governor was doing whatever he could to pull Córdoba together. See “Leonor Alarcia: Mestre esta haciendo lo que puede” La Voz del Interior, 19 January 1997. Also see “En el PJ crece el fantasma del pacto Menem-Mestre” La Voz del Interior, 23 February 1997, 9A and “Confirman que Menem avala el proyecto de Mestre” La Voz del Interior, 28 February 1997, 8A.

Under Mestre big multinational companies such as Chrysler, Iveco, FIAT, Renault and Volkswagen made new investments in Córdoba (all are located around the city of Córdoba). This wave of MNC investment initially triggered a rise in the overall automobile production figures in 1997. (See “Córdoba sera el gran centro automotor” La Voz del Interior, 2 September 1997, p.7.) However, Mestre’s policies excluded any detailed plan of support for the small and medium sized enterprises supplying parts to the multinational car companies, which left SMEs in a disadvantageous position. “¿Quien financia la reconversion de las Pyme?” La Voz del Interior, 12 May 1997, 12A. Toward the end of 1997, the automobile sector was experiencing difficulties due to an ongoing crisis in global markets. The automobile producers began to slow down production beginning from November 1997 onwards. See “El sector automotor desacelara la produccion” La Voz del Interior, 14 November 1997, 12A.

The proposal included reducing the number of provincial deputies in the local parliament. In a way, Mestre wanted to maximize his political power by reducing possible opposition against his policy line. See for example “¿Por que y para que reformar la constitucion de Córdoba?” La Voz del Interior, 22 April 1997, 13A. Supporters of Angeloz continued with their critiques against Mestrist plan, especially concerning the proposal on constitutional reform that aimed to centralize the power of the provincial governor. See “El Angelocismo se opone al proyecto de Mestre” La Voz del Interior, 2 May 1997, 6A.

As tension between the federal government and Mestre intensified, the governor lost the elections to the Peronist José Manuel de la Sota in December 1998. “De la Sota Gobernador” La Voz del Interior, 21 December 1998, Frontpage.

Meanwhile, Mestre government accused rival groups from the PJ of supporting protesters and their militant means to bring down the government of Córdoba. “Intentan quebrar al gobierno de Córdoba” La Voz del Interior, 24 May 1998, 13A; “Marcha pacifica, con fuertes criticas a Mestre” La Voz del Interior, 30 May 1998, 10A; “Córdoba bajo el signo de la protesta” La Voz del Interior, 31 May 1998.

An expert in the Federal Ministry of Labor, Training Department notes that during the 1990s, most MNCs specified the content of these trainings according to their production needs. Interview #30, 6 June 2008, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

It must be noted that the selection of these workers was primarily done by the human resources department, and despite my appeals, the management did not follow the block sampling guidelines I submitted. In contrast to their counterparts in Bursa, these directors were extremely cautious when administering the survey. In fact, the manager edited the questionnaire line by line and took out sections and questions that he considered sensitive. Interviews took place in the HR management room in the presence of other HR department employees. This is in stark contrast to my experience in Bursa where the management did not intervene in any of the questions. Therefore, positive worker responses to questions on Toyotist training modules in Córdoba may not accurately reflect a broader trend.

Interview #46, 29 April 2008, Córdoba Argentina.

Source: Trabajo en Equipo, FIAT Argentina (Scarpatti y Asociados, Consultores en gestion Organizacional), and FIAT Internal Training Documents, 2007. As stated by a FIAT worker, the company provides trainings around these themes every month. Interview #46, 29 April 2008, Córdoba Argentina. My interviews with multiple FIAT workers also confirm this observation. In a personal interview, a FIAT worker cited company-based quality and leadership trainings as the most influential components in his training. Interview #47, 14 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #46, 29 April 2008, Córdoba Argentina.

Interview #48, 18 June 2008, Córdoba Argentina.

According to a FIAT manager, 5S technique is the most influential tool to maximize worker efficiency in production, Interview #17, 8 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #47, 14 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #15, SMATA-Córdoba, 27 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Parisi (1999) interviewed 157 small and medium sized enterprises in Córdoba. The lack of training rate is particularly high in small sized companies, above 50% (Parisi 1999: 98).

For example, when the managers of these enterprises are asked about basic attributes that would have enhanced education for work, they list the ability to work as a team and a dedication for constant improvement as their top choices (Parisi 1999: 109). Most of these businesses prefer that these values and the initial base for training should be provided by the education system, rather than the company itself (Parisi 1999: 110).

As Mestre’s alliance with Menem began to deteriorate during the second half of his term in the office, the governor initially saw a political opportunity in providing infrastructural support to the small and medium sized enterprises who had been calling for help. “Córdoba tramita que la nacion promueva un regimen especial para las autopartistas” (Córdoba makes a new arrangement so that the central government promotes a special regime for the auto parts producers) La Voz del Interior, 8 October 1997, 10A. However, he soon abandoned his discursive support. For example, despite repeated demands from the small and medium sized business for cheaper electricity rates from Epec (the public electricity provider) the local government was unwilling to give privileged treatment to these business owners.

Interview #1, 30 June 2008, Córdoba, Argentina .

The exercise of obligatory conciliation was mostly motivated by political concerns of the ruling politicians. In this way, the strike would be suspended by the intervention of the government (local or provincial) until the parties would reach an agreement. The negotiations would restart, going back to the pre-strike conditions.

For example, see “Intervendra el Ministerio de Trabajo en el conflicto de la UOM” La Voz del Interior, 25 May 1990, 5A; “Conciliacion obligatoria para el conflicto en Perkins” La Voz del Interior, 20 July 1990, 5A; “Nueva mediacion en el conflicto metalurgico” La Voz del Interior, 10 December 1990; “La UOM suspendio las medidas de fuerza al acatar el arbitraje” La Voz del Interior, 6 April 1991.

“Traen a Córdoba el conflicto del Arcor” La Voz del Interior, 11 April 1992. On 22 April 1992, Jorge Sappia intervened in the strike in Banco de Córdoba using obligatory conciliation.

It must be added that in Córdoba, political divisions that polarized businesses and unions were somewhat reconciled following the 2001 economic meltdown. Indeed, 2001 crisis reset the terms of political divisions among local actors, and from this date onwards, partisan preferences of business groups and unions were gradually de-polarized under Juan Manuel De la Sota’s leadership.