Skip to main content


Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen


A probabilistic analysis on a lattice attack against DSA

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Ana I. Gomez, Domingo Gomez-Perez, Guénaël Renault
Wichtige Hinweise
Communicated by J. D. Key.
Ana I. Gomez and Domingo Gomez-Perez were partially supported by project MTM2014-55421-P from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.


Analyzing the security of cryptosystems under attacks based on the malicious modification of memory registers is a research topic of high importance. This type of attack may affect the randomness of the secret parameters by forcing a limited number of bits to a certain value which can be unknown to the attacker. In this context, we revisit the attack on DSA presented by Faugère, Goyet and Renault during the conference SAC 2012: we modify their method and provide a probabilistic approach in opposition to the heuristic proposed therein to measure the limits of the attack. More precisely, the main problem is formulated as a closest vector problem in a lattice, then we study the distribution of vectors with bounded norm in the lattices involved and apply the result to predict the attack behavior. The benefits of this approach are several: The probability of success of this attack can be lower bounded under some conjecture, which is validated by computational experiments. Also, it finds applications to the FLUSH+RELOAD side-channel attack, studied by van de Pol et al. At the end of the article, there is a summary of findings.

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten

Über diesen Artikel

Premium Partner