1 Review
1.1 Introduction
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comprehensively address the unique challenges introduced by the EV penetration specifically for each power grid components and identify opportunities to improve the grid operations and system reliability;
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systematically classify the mathematical frameworks for optimal control and management of EV demand; and
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survey the communication requirements, standards, and candidate technologies that could serve the IoEVs and smart grid applications.
2 Internet of electric vehicles and the current power grid
2.1 Internet of electric vehicles
Type | Connection | Power (kW) | Max current |
---|---|---|---|
Europe | 1-Phase AC | 3.7 | 16 to 20 |
Europe | 1 or 3 Phase AC | 3.7 to 22 | 16 to 32 |
Europe | 3-Phase AC | >22 | >32 |
Europe | DC Fast | >22 | >3.225 |
USA | AC Level-1 | 1.44 | 12 |
USA | AC Level-2 | 7.7 | 32 |
USA | DC Fast | 240 | 400 |
Year | US EIA - USA | NRC (probable) - USA | IEA world |
---|---|---|---|
2015 | 1 million | 1.5 million | 1.1 million |
2020 | 2.3 million | 3 million | 6.9 million |
2025 | 3.2 million | 7 million | 17.7 million |
2030 | 4 million | 14 million | 33.3 million |
2.2 Power generation and electricity prices
2.2.1 Current status
2.2.2 Impact of the EV penetration
2.2.3 Opportunities
2.3 Transmission network
2.3.1 Current status
2.3.2 Impact of the EV penetration
2.3.3 Opportunities
2.4 Distribution network
2.4.1 Current status
2.4.2 Impact of the EV penetration
2.4.3 Opportunities
3 Demand management for the internet of electric vehicles
3.1 Control objectives
3.1.1 Technical objectives
3.1.2 Economical objectives
3.2 Control frameworks
3.2.1 Centralized control
3.2.2 Distributed control
3.3 Scale of the problem
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Transmission scale: At this scale transmission, system operators and wholesale energy markets operate. Corollary, the control techniques applied considers thousands of EVs located in large geographical regions. The primary goal of this scale is to develop pricing policies to achieve optimal valley-filling during night time [62, 69].
4 Available communication standards and technologies
4.1 Communication needs at customer premises
4.1.1 EV-electric vehicle supply equipment
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SAE J2293: This standard covers the functionalities and architectures required for EV energy transfer system.
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SAE J2836/1 and J2847/1: Define use cases and requirements for communications between EVs and the power grid, primarily for energy transfer. The central focus is on grid-optimized energy transfer for EVs to guarantee that drivers have enough energy while minimizing the reducing the stress on the grid.
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SAE J2836/2 and J2847/2: Define the uses cases and requirements for the communications between electric vehicles and off-board DC charger.
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SAE J2836/3 and J2847/3: Identify use cases and additional messages energy (DC) transfer from grid to electric vehicle. Also supports requirements for grid-to-vehicle energy transfer.
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SAE J2931: Defines digital communications requirements between EV and off-board device. SAE J2931/1 covers power line communications for EVs.
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SAE J2931/2: Defines the requirements for physical layer communications with in-band signaling between EV and EVSE.
4.1.2 Energy management unit to power grid
Latency | Throughput | Security | Scalability | |
---|---|---|---|---|
WiFi | ||||
IEEE 802.11a | L | H | M | M |
IEEE 802.11b | L | M | M | L |
IEEE 802.11g | L | H | M | L |
IEEE 802.11n | L | H | M | M |
3G | ||||
UMTS/HSPDA | M | M | H | H |
EVDO | M | M | L | H |
4G | ||||
LTE/HSPA+ | L | H | H | H |
IEEE 802.16e | L | H | H | H |
Technology | Pros | Cons |
---|---|---|
Power line communications | Every EV owner has an access. Easy penetration | Indoor applications are not allowed in every country. Regulatory and technical issues |
White-space networking | High penetration and coverage | Require technologies to operate at varying bandwidths |
Utility-owned wired infrastructure | Full control over the network. No need for interoperability among various standards | Very high cost and cost of ownership is not clear |
Fixed broadband | Low cost (customers already have it) | Level of broadband deployment can be problematic |
Wireless cellular networks | Easy adoption with already existing structure | Coverage is limited in developing countries |
WiFi mesh network | Low cost, unlicensed frequency band | May require complex designs |
End users | Application | Name of standards and technologies |
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EV-EVSE | Energy transfer - garage charging | SAE J2293, SAE J2836/1, J2847/1, SAE J2836/2, J2847/2, SAE J2836/3, SAE J2847/3, SAE J2836/4, J2847/4, SAE J2931, IEC 61851-23, IEC 61851-24 |
EVSE - Energy Management Unit (EMU) | Home area network | Zigbee, 802.11, HomePlug |
Customer (EMU) - grid | Garage charging, load shifting, valley filling, energy trading | PLC, 3G/4G/WiMAX/LTE/5G, WMN, TV white space, DSL, cable |
Mobile EV - control center | Public charging | 3G/4G/WiMAX/LTE/5G, WMN |
Inter-control center | Public charging | IEC 60870-6/TASE.2 |
Application | EV perspective | Grid perspective | ||
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Communication needs | Communication requirements | Communication needs | Communication requirements | |
Public charging | Locate and reserve charging station | High availability, service differentiation may be required | Load balancing among neighboring stations | QoS requirements increases with EV population |
Residential charging | Respond to price updates to minimize charging cost | Part of AMI network (see [85]) | Valley filling to better utilize power generation | Price updates sent every 15 min. Requirements for AMI hold |
Energy trading via V2G | Sell part of stored energy to make profit or use stored energy during peak hours | High security and availability | Decrease the volume of storage medium needed by purchasing energy from EV fleets | The same as EV perspective |
4.2 Mobile EV to control center communications
4.2.1 Cellular network communications
4.2.2 Wireless mesh networks
4.3 Inter-control center communications
4.4 Further communication needs
5 Communication requirements and performance metrics
5.1 System reliability and availability
5.2 Quality-of-service
5.3 Cyber-physical security
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Data injection: The type of attacks in this category falsify the meter measurements (e.g., garage charging) to mislead the power grid operator. The main purpose of this type of attack is to create revenue loss.
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Vulnerability: This type of attack is caused by the failure of a communication channel or a device. Information on the feedback channel can be unsynchronized due to erroneous communication links.
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Intentional: In this type, the attacker has the full knowledge of network topology. It can be carried out by targeting the node with the highest degree with a denial-of-service attack.
5.4 Scalability
5.5 Capacity
5.6 Interoperability
5.7 Measurement-based studies
Amherst | Seattle | San Francisco | |||
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Average | Peak | Average | Peak | Average | |
3G (UMTS) | 90% | 85.5% | 82% | 79% | 89% |
WiFi | 12% | 10% | 10% | 8.5% | 11% |