6. A Synopsis of Consumer Lending Patterns in Formal Financial Institutions and Lenders’ Responses to Regulatory Reforms in Nigeria

Even when international rules, codes, and guidelines are designed to apply voluntarily, the IMF could enforce compliance, for example, through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

For example, SAP produced more deregulation (by design), more informality (contrary to design), and weaker consumer protection (by indifference) in most of the affected countries, including Nigeria.

This is the theory behind the establishment of microfinance institutions. See also IMF, ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Household Credit Growth in Emerging Market Countries’ (IMF, September 2006) Chapter II https://​www.​imf.​org/​~/​media/​Websites/​IMF/​imported-flagship-issues/​external/​pubs/​ft/​GFSR/​2006/​02/​pdf/​_​chap2pdf.​ashx, accessed 9 September 2019. In an earlier study of emerging markets, the IMF reached the conclusion that credit booms in emerging markets ultimately contract consumption. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Advancing Structural Reforms, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington DC, IMF 2004) 158.

M Carney, FV de Galhau and F Elderson, ‘The Financial Sector Must be at the Heart of Tackling Climate Change’ The Guardian (London, 17 March 2019) https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​commentisfree/​2019/​apr/​17/​the-financial-sector-must-be-at-the-heart-of-tackling-climate-change, accessed 19 April 2019.

For example, the World Bank recently upgraded Nigeria from 44th to sixth place on the Getting Credit indicator of the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index 2018. The basis for this leap in rank is Nigeria’s adoption of international regulatory prescriptions considered necessary for improving access to credit. Nigeria’s reforms package includes enacting the Credit Reporting Act 2017, the Secured Transactions in Movable Assets Act, 2017, and sanctioning out-of-court enforcement of security rights. The rise on the Index is, however, not reflected in the latest credit access figures as reported in Chapter 1, and enforcement of these laws remains imperfect in many ways. The rise in the ranking, as well as the Index itself, can, however, mask the urgent need for radical reforms to expand financial services to those currently excluded simply by underestimating the difficulty of access.

The relevant categories include lenders (commercial banks, microfinance institutions, cooperative societies, fintech operators, and other informal money lenders), consumer borrowers, regulators (the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN), the Consumer Protection Council of Nigeria (CPC), the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC, etc.), and debt recovery practitioners (barristers and solicitors, law academic, police officer/bailiffs).

Sect. 1.4.3, Chapter 1.

The eight respondents consist of people from diverse vocational backgrounds, but the interviews focused primarily on consumer borrowing. They include: a textile seller in Abejukolo, Kogi State (Consumer Borrower 1), a journalist with a media outfit in Abuja (Consumer Borrower 2), a contractor resident in Abuja (Consumer Borrower 3), two mid-level civil servants from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Grade Levels 7 and 10) (Consumer Borrower 4, Consumer Borrower 5), a director in the Ministry of Finance (Consumer Borrower 6), a senior civil servant in Ankpa Local Government Kogi State (Grade Level 15) (Consumer Borrower 7), a police officer (Assistant Superintendent of Police) in the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) unit of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) (Consumer Borrower 8).

The Central Bank of Nigeria (Regulator 1), the Federal Ministry of Finance [Budget and Planning] (Regulator 2), the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development Agency (Regulator 3), and the Consumer Protection Council of Nigeria (Regulator 4). Questionnaires for regulators were structured to elicit responses on the CBN’s regulatory purpose (monetary policy target, credit expansion, approach to banking supervision, informal financial markets, consumer protection, non-performing loans, and bailouts), the role of SMEDAN (advisory role, financing, and collaboration with other agencies), Ministry of Finance’s role (fiscal policy, public debt, employment, and social security), and the Consumer Protection Council (data on consumer complaints, types of complaints received, process of lodging complaints, and the typical time taken to process complaints).

Legal Practitioner 1 and Legal Practitioner 2.

Consumer Borrower 8, Inspector, The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) Unit, Nigeria Police Force Headquarters (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Legal Practitioner 3.

The ultimate objective is to show the significance of captured behaviours, if any, for policy.

Questionnaire for this set of respondents broadly covered questions on individual attitudes to borrowing, reasons for borrowing, the type of loan obtained, whom they borrowed from, satisfaction with the process of borrowing, and the overall satisfaction with the loan.

Interview with UBAd, Credit Risk Manager, UBA (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with Regulator 1, Head of MSMEs (Financial Inclusion Secretariat), CBN (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

SL Sanusi, ‘Global Financial Meltdown And The Reforms In The Nigerian Banking Sector’ (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University Convocation Central Bank of Nigeria Lecture, Bauchi, 2010) 116 https://​www.​cbn.​gov.​ng/​OUT/​SPEECHES/​2010/​GOV_​ATBU%20​CONVOCATION%20​LECTURE.​PDF, accessed 9 September 2019.

Although the bank consolidation exercise was partly to reduce dependence on the public sector for funds (bailouts and MDA current accounts), the subsequent recession following the implementation of the Treasury Single Account reform in 2015 shows otherwise.

Interview with PBc, Head of Credit Operations, PB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with Regulator 3, Business Development Service Officer, SMEDAN (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interviews with GTBf, Credit Operations Unit, GTB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

UBAd (n 15).

ibid.

See Sect. 5.6 for details of BASEL II requirements.

Interview with UnBb, Credit Risk Operator, UnB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

GTBf (n 21).

Interview with FCMBa, Head of Credit Operations, FCMB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with ZBi, Credit Officer, ZB (Lafia, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with ABe, Credit Risk Unit, AB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Union Bank PLC, ‘Personal Loans for Individuals’ (Union Bank, 21 December 2018) https://​www.​unionbankng.​com/​everyday-banking/​personal-loans-for-individuals/​#1486633960164-36e91d26-a31c, accessed 16 September 2019.

PBc (n 19).

GTBf (n 21); ZBi (n 29).

CBN, The Guide to Charges by Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria 2017; Prudential Guidelines for Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria (2010), paragraph 3.8; Diamond Bank PLC, ‘Requirements for a Diamond Personal Loan’ (Diamond Bank, 21 December 2018) https://​www.​diamondbank.​com/​personal/​loans/​personal-loan/​, accessed 16 September 2019.

Regulator 1 (n 16).

ZBi (n 52 in Chapter 5); ABe (n 53 in Chapter 5).

Interview with SBg, Head of Credit Operations, SB (Lagos, Nigeria, 2018).

FCMBa (n 51 in Chapter 5).

ZBi (n 52 in Chapter 5).

ibid. See Sect. 3.2.2, Chapter 3.

GTBf (n 44 in Chapter 5).

UnBb (n 49 in Chapter 5); Regulator 3 (n 43 in Chapter 5); PBc (n 42 in Chapter 5); FCMBa (n 51 in Chapter 5).

Interview with UBNh, Credit Risk Officer, UBN (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

ibid.

Interview with ICBl, Branch Manager, ICB (Abejukolo, Kogi State, Nigeria, 2018).

Regulator 3 (n 43 in Chapter 5); Interview with HMBk, Credit Adviser, HMB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

HMBk ibid.

ICBl (n 69 in Chapter 5).

FCMBa (n 51 in Chapter 5).

Interview with Consumer Borrower 1, Abejukolo Township Market (Abejukolo, Kogi State, Nigeria, 2018); Interview with Consumer Borrower 5, Senior Executive Officer, Finance and Accounts, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with Regulator 4, Consumer Complaints Officer, CPC (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Regulator 4 (n 74 in Chapter 5).

Consumer Borrower 1 (n 73 in Chapter 5).

National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Social Statistics Report 2017’ (NBS, December 2018) https://​www.​nigerianstat.​gov.​ng/​download/​866, accessed 16 September 2019.

Interview with Consumer Borrower 6, Head of International Economic Relations, Federal Ministry of Finance (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with JBq, Head of Customer Services, JB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018). Christians were less likely to borrow from Islamic banks despite the non-interest arrangement due to perceptions [unfounded] that such banks only lend to Muslims.

Interview with Consumer Borrower 8, Inspector, The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) Unit, Nigeria Police Force Headquarters (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

E.g. they accept trade union identification cards as opposed to commercial banks that insist on any one of national identity card, international passports, and driver’s licence often unavailable to the rural poor.

FCMBa (n 28).

GTBf (n 21); ABe (n 30). See Sects. 1, 13, 16, 31–34, and Schedule II of the CBN (Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria) Regulations 2013. See also the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 (as amended), and the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 (as amended).

Interview with UBNh, Loan Officer, Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

UnBb (n 26); Regulator 3 (n 20); PBc (n 19).

Interview with SBg, Head of Credit Operations, SB (Lagos, Nigeria, 2018); GTBf (n 21).

In many cases, these people have made alternative private arrangements where they own their own houses, power their homes with generating sets, and drill boreholes. For credit purposes, however, it is difficult to evidence creditworthiness with these assets.

Interview with FMBj, Loan Officer, FMB (Lagos, Nigeria, 2018); Interview with MTMBn, Loan Officer, MTMB (Lagos, Nigeria, 2018).

FMBj (n 66).

Interview with CFANp, Executive Secretary, CFAN (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with Consumer Borrower 2, Defence Correspondent, The Nigerian News (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

See Sect. 3.2.6 for an overview of the key provisions of the Act.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Ease of Doing Business Report 2018.

Interview with Regulator 1, Head of MSMEs (Financial Inclusion Secretariat), CBN (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

See Sect. 5.3, Chapter 4.

See Sect. 5.5.3, Chapter 4.

UBAd (n 15).

PBc (n 19).

Interview with ICBl, Branch Manager, ICB (Abejukolo, Kogi State, Nigeria, 2018); Interview with OCBm, Branch Manager, OCB (Odagba, Kogi State, Nigeria, 2018).

PBc (n 19).

Interview with SCMFAo, Staff Co-operative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018); CFANp (n 68).

UBNh (n 62); FCMBa (n 28).

Interview with HMBk, Branch Manager, Hasal Microfinance Bank (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018); Regulator 1 (n 16).

FCMBa (n 28).

MS Sriram, Inclusive Finance India Report (New Delhi, SAGE 2016); V Prathap and R Khaitan, ‘When is Microcredit Unsuitable?’ (CGAP, December 2016) http://​www.​cgap.​org/​publications/​when-microcredit-unsuitable, accessed 9 September 2019; A Barba and M Pivetti, ‘Rising Household Debt: Its Causes and Macro-Economic Implications—A Long-Period Analysis’ (2009) 33 (1) Cambridge Journal of Economics 113.

See Sect. 20 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act, Cap B3, LFN 2004.

Regulator 1 (n 16). See also European Commission, ‘European Commission Adopts New List of Third Countries with Weak Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Regimes’ (European Commission, February 2019) https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​commission/​presscorner/​detail/​en/​IP_​19_​781, accessed 12 December 2019.

S Kang, ‘Rethinking the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulations to Deter Corruption’ (2018) 67 (3) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 695–720.

ibid 98.

C Udry, ‘Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy’ (1990) 4 (1) The World Bank Economic Review 251–269.

Regulator 1 (n 16).

Interview with Legal Practitioner 3, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria (Nsukka, Nigeria, 2018). See, for example, The CBN’s Guidelines for the Regulation of Agent Banking and Agent Banking Relationships in Nigeria 2013 and the Mobile Money Regulations 2009. The Mobile Money Regulations of 2009 expressly excluded TELCOs from accepting mobile money deposits from depositors or engaging in activities that mimicked traditional banking, e.g. lending.

‘M’ stands for mobile, while ‘pesa’ is Swahili for money.

MTN Rwanda, ‘MoKash FAQs’ (MTN Rwanda, 15 August 2019) http://​www.​mtn.​co.​rw/​Content/​Pages/​452/​MoKash_​FAQs, accessed 15 August 2019.

Bank of Ghana, ‘Impact of Mobile Money on the Payment System in Ghana: An Econometric Analysis’ (Bank of Ghana 2017) https://​www.​bog.​gov.​gh/​privatecontent/​Public_​Notices/​Impact%20​of%20​Mobile%20​Money%20​on%20​the%20​Payment%20​Systems%20​in%20​Ghana.​pdf, accessed 15 August 2019.

S Siroya, ‘A Smart New Business Loan for People with no Credit [TED video]’ (Youtube 2016) https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​kSR8G8mfp84, accessed 9 January 2019.

This is important for them because in the absence of investment in algorithm-based data collection and processing, and reliable credit reporting, the salary and collateral are useful tools to assess creditworthiness and customer loan limit.

The rich inevitably benefit from the aversion to consumer lending and preference for producer credit. See Sect. 6.6.3 below for how the digital credit exclusion might mimick the traditional exclusion patterns.

Federal Republic of Nigeria v Dr (Mrs) Cecilia Ibru FHC/L/297C/2009; Intercontinental Bank v Erastus Bankole Oladipo Akingbola and others 2009 Folio 1680.

Interview with SBg, Head of Credit Operations, SB (Lagos, Nigeria, 2018).

SCMFAo (n 79).

UnBb, (n 26).

Regulator 1 (n 16).

Interview with ABe, Credit Risk Unit, AB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

O Odetola, ‘Corporate Debt Restructuring and the Global Harmonisation Process: Emerging Trends in Africa’ (PhD book, University of Kent 2018) 207.

ZBi (n 29); UBAd (n 15).

Interview with Consumer Borrower 1 (Abejukolo, Kogi State, Nigeria, 2018); Regulator 3 (n 20).

Interview with Consumer Borrower 5 (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Interviews with Consumer Borrower 4, Secretary of Staff Co-Operative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018); Interview with Consumer Borrower 6 (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018); Interview with Consumer Borrower 7, Department of Agriculture, (Ankpa, Kogi State, Nigeria, 2018).

FMBj (n 66); HMBk (n 81).

HMBk (n 81).

ibid.

FCMBa (n 28).

Interview with UnBb, Credit Risk Operator, UnB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

ibid.

Interview with ABe, Credit Risk Unit, AB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

Economic & Financial Crimes Commission v Diamond Bank Plc & Ors (2018) LPELR-44217(SC). See also AG Plateau State v AG Nasarawa (2005) 129 LRCN 1523 at 1531; UNIBIZ v Commercial Bank (2005) 125 LRCN 1484 at 1495; University of Ilorin v Oyelana (2001) FWLR (Pt. 83) 2193 at 2209.

PBc (n 19); UnBb (n 26); HMBk (n 81).

HMBk (n 81).

ICBl (n 77); Interview with Legal Practitioner 2, Associate, Abdullahi & Santino (Lagos, Nigeria, 2018).

Interview with Legal Practitioner 1, Associate, S.I. Ameh (SAN) & Company (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018); Consumer Borrower 7 (n 110).

FMBj (n 66).

Consumer Borrower 7 (n 110).

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110); Consumer Borrower 5 (n 109); Consumer Borrower 6 (n 110); Consumer Borrower 2 (n 69).

Consumer Borrower 5 (n 109).

CFANp (n 68).

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110).

Regulator 3 (n 20).

CFANp (n 68).

ibid 2.

ibid 5.

E.g. on subsidised agricultural loans which, in any case, benefits industrial-scale farmers more.

Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (n 154 in Chapter 5) 143.

CFANp (n 68).

ibid.

Interview with Regulator 4, Consumer Protection Council of Nigeria (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

ZBi (n 29); PBc (n 19); Interview with UnBb, Credit Risk Operator, UnB (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018); HMBk (n 81).

HMBk (n 81).

PBc (n 19).

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110).

ibid.

Consumer Borrower 5 (n 109).

Subsidised agricultural loans are generally lower, with one respondent lending at 4.20%. See Nigeria Galleria, ‘Nigeria Banks’ Lending Rates’ (Nigeria Galleria, 16 November 2018) https://​www.​nigeriagalleria.​com/​Galleria_​Finance/​Bank-Lending-Interest-Rates.​html, accessed 16 September 2019.

CBN, ‘Money Market Indicators (In Percentage)’ (CBN, November 2018) https://​www.​cbn.​gov.​ng/​rates/​mnymktind.​asp, accessed 16 September 2019.

MPR was 14% as of May 2018 when this study took place. See CBN, The Guide to Charges by Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria 2017. See also CBN, ‘Monetary Policy Decisions: Key Decisions of the Central Bank of Nigeria Monetary Policy Committee on November 21 and 22’ (CBN, 23 November 2018) https://​www.​cbn.​gov.​ng/​MonetaryPolicy/​decisions.​asp, accessed 16 September 2019.

ICBl (n 77).

HMBk (n 81).

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110); Regulator 4 (n 138).

PBc (n 19).

FCMBa (n 28).

Interview with Legal Practitioner 2, Associate, Abdullahi & Santino (Lagos, Nigeria, 2018).

Consumer Borrower 6 (n 110); PBc (n 19).

HMBk (n 81).

CBN, The Guide to Charges by Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria 2017.

See Sect. 5.3, Chapter 5.

Union Bank PLC, ‘Personal Loans for Individuals’ (Union Bank, 16 September 2019) https://​www.​unionbankng.​com/​everyday-banking/​personal-loans-for-individuals/​#1486633960164-36e91d26-a31c, accessed 16 September 2019.

CBN, ‘Financial Literacy’ (CBN, 11 January 2019) https://​www.​cbn.​gov.​ng/​Devfin/​finliteracy.​asp, accessed 16 September 2019.

Regulator 3 (n 20).

ZBi (n 29); UBAd (n 15); PBc (n 19).

Regulator 3 (n 20); Regulator 4 (n 138).

JA Shepperd and others, ‘A Primer on Unrealistic Optimism’ (2015) 24 Current Directions in Psychological Science 232. See Financial Conduct Authority, Credit Card Market Study: Consultation On Persistent Debt and Earlier Intervention Remedies (2017) Consultation paper CP17/10, https://​www.​fca.​org.​uk/​publications/​consultation-papers/​persistent-debt-earlier-intervention-cp17-10, accessed 29 August 2019. See also Sect. 3.4.4 Chapter 3 for full discussion of BE.

MD Grubb, ‘Overconfident Consumers in the Marketplace’ (2015) 29 (4) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9–35.

S Lichtenstein, B Fischhoff, and LD Phillips, ‘Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980’ in D Kahneman, P Slovic, and A Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York, Cambridge University Press 1982) 306–334; TG Silk, ‘Examining Purchase and Non-Redemption of Mail-in Rebates: The Impact of Offer Variables on Consumers’ Subjective and Objective Probability of Redeeming’ (PhD Dissertation, University of Florida 2004) http://​etd.​fcla.​edu/​UF/​UFE0004380/​silk_​t.​pdf, accessed 29 August 2019.

FCMBa (n 28).

R Mazer, K McKee, and A Fiorillo, Applying Behavioural Insights in Consumer Protection Policy (CGAP 2014); B Babcock, Using Brain Science to Design New Pathways out of Poverty (Economic Mobility Pathways 2014).

Regulator 4 (n 138 in this chapter); Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3).

UBNh (n 62 in this chapter); FCMBa (n 28).

O Bar-Gill and E Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 (1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1–101.

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110).

There is an on-going global debate about the choice of law for business between the common law and civil law with one school of thought claiming that the former is more pro-business and correlates to more credit access in countries where it operates, in contrast to the civil law system. It seems rather anachronistic to rely primarily on nineteenth-and twentieth-century legal philosophies for consumer protection in the twenty-first century other than as aid to interpreting statutes. See R Michaels, ‘Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Book, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law’ (2009) 57 The American Journal of Comparative Law 765.

(2009) LPELR-1245(SC).

J Zinman, ‘Consumer Credit: Too Much or Too Little (or Just Right)?’ (2014) 43 (2) The Journal of Legal Studies S209-S237.

PBc (n 19).

UBNh (n 62).

PBc (n 19).

See S Pearlstein, Can American Capitalism Survive? Why Greed Is Not Good, Opportunity Is Not Equal, and Fairness Will Not Make Us Poor (New York, St. Martin’s Press 2018). See also MJ Sandel, What Money Cannot Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2013).

Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘The Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2015’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, January 2019) https://​www.​judiciary.​uk/​wp-content/​uploads/​2016/​01/​lcj_​report_​2015-final.​pdf, accessed 16 September 2019.

M Dakolias, ‘Court Performance around the World: A Comparative Perspective’ (1999) 2 (1) Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 87–142.

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3); PBc (n 19 in this capter); Legal Practitioner 2 (n 153); Odetola (n 106) 207.

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3).

This example is not about a consumer loan but the account is similar to the experiences of consumer borrowers whose desperation is preyed upon by these lenders.

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3).

Legal Practitioner 2 (n 153); Consumer Borrower 7 (n 110).

Regulator 3 (n 20).

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110).

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3).

ibid.

Interview with Consumer Borrower 8, Inspector, The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) Unit, Nigeria Police Force Headquarters (Abuja, Nigeria, 2018).

(2012) LPELR-20621(SC).

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3).

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3); Consumer Borrower 7 (n 19).

Legal Practitioner 2 (n 153).

ibid.

See Sect. 3.5.1, Chapter 3.

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in chapter 3); Legal Practitioner 2 (n 153).

Legal Practitioner 1 (n 15 in Chapter 3).

ibid.

ibid.

Legal Practitioner 2 (n 153).

UBNh (n 62).

ibid.

PBc (n 19).

Legal Practitioner 2 (n 153).

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110); Consumer Borrower 6 (n 110); Consumer Borrower 7 (n 110).

Legal Practitioner 3 (n 93).

Consumer Borrower 4 (n 110); Consumer Borrower 6 (n 110); Consumer Borrower 7 (n 110).

CFANp (n 68); Regulator 4 (n 138).

ZBi (n 29).

A Khazanov and others, ‘The Microfinance Disappointment: An Explanation Based on Risk Aversion’ (2018) CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12659 https://​warwick.​ac.​uk/​fac/​soc/​economics/​staff/​omoav/​cepr-dp12659.​pdf, accessed 9 September 2019.

PBc (n 19).

SMEDANand NationalBureau of Statistics, ‘Collaborative Survey: Selected Findings’ (SMEDAN 2013) https://​www.​smedan.​gov.​ng/​images/​PDF/​2013-MSME-Survey-Summary-Report.​pdf, accessed 16 September 2019.