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Journal of Business Ethics

Erschienen in:

28.11.2014

Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives

verfasst von: Anica Zeyen, Markus Beckmann, Stella Wolters

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Ausgabe 2/2016

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Abstract

As forms of private self-regulation, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have emerged as an important empirical phenomenon in global governance processes. At the same time, MSIs are also theoretically intriguing because of their inherent double nature. On the one hand, MSIs spell out CSR standards that define norms for corporate behavior. On the other hand, MSIs are also the result of corporate and stakeholder behavior. We combine the perspectives of institutional theory and club theory to conceptualize this double nature of MSIs. Based on a stage model that looks at the interplay of actor and institutional dynamics, we generate insights into why actors join a voluntary MSI, how the various motivations and intentions of the actors influence the standard development, and how these as well as the MSI design are subsequently influenced by both external (institutional) and internal (club) dynamics.

Vorheriger Artikel Export Intensity and MNE Customers’ Environmental Requirements: Effects on Local Chinese Suppliers’ Environment Strategies

Nächster Artikel Environmental Protection in Environmentally Reactive Firms: Lessons from Corporate Argentina

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Other terms include new governance (Pies et al. 2011; Scherer and Palazzo 2011), global public policy networks (Witte et al. 2005), transnational private regulation (Bartley 2007; Graz and Nölke 2008), multi-sector networks (Bäckstrand 2006; Roloff 2008b), and stewardship councils, (Baccaro and Mele 2011; Fransen 2011; Gugerty et al. 2010).

Note that we thus exclude MSIs that were practically mandated by, for example, the state or that emerged because of short-term pressures in the face of an acute crisis or scandal, such as the The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety after the 2013 catastrophe when a major textile factory collapsed and left more than 1,100 workers dead.

We consider the difference between legitimacy and reputation to be the following: Reputation refers to what the company “stands for” in the eyes of others, while legitimacy only results if the company additionally gains social acceptance by fulfilling prevailing norms of appropriate behavior. To illustrate, a company might build up a reputation for offering eccentric design without gaining substantial legitimacy if there are no social norms that expect companies to do so.

“Regulatory capture” occurs when regulatory agencies created to serve the public interest are “captured” by the very actors, such as firms, they are supposed to regulate. As a result, the “captured” agency fails to serve its public purpose. In political economy, regulatory capture usually refers to government agencies, thus describing a problem that can arise in conventional nation-state governance. We suggest that the idea of “regulatory capture” can be usefully transferred to the field of new governance and self-regulation. For the original idea of regulatory capture, see Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Levine and Forrence (1990).

Similarly, this may also occur if more and more members are not actually implementing standards.

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Titel: Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives
verfasst von: Anica Zeyen
Markus Beckmann
Stella Wolters
Publikationsdatum: 28.11.2014
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe 2/2016
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2468-1

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