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2020 | Buch

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Advance Metadata Fair

The Retention and Disclosure of 4G, 5G and Social Media Location Information, for Law Enforcement and National Security, and the Impact on Privacy in Australia

verfasst von: Stanley Shanapinda

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Buchreihe : Law, Governance and Technology Series

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Inhaltsverzeichnis
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SUCHEN

Über dieses Buch

Dieses Buch beschreibt die rechtlichen Befugnisse einer großen westlichen Nation - Australien - Standortinformationen zu sammeln und zu verwenden. Anbieter mobiler Dienste und sozialer Medien haben nun die Möglichkeit, präzisere Standortinformationen zu verfolgen, aufzuzeichnen und zu speichern. Im Gegensatz zu 4G erfordert die 5G-Mobilkommunikation, dass Mobilfunkmasten und Antennen viel näher beieinander liegen; infolgedessen können die Standortdaten persönlichere und sensiblere Informationen über einzelne Bürger preisgeben. Trotz dieses Aspekts sind Dienstleister verpflichtet, die Daten an die Behörden weiterzugeben, ohne dass es eines richterlichen Haftbefehls bedarf. Dieses Buch wurde aus der Perspektive der Analyse von Big-Location-Daten geschrieben, einer Fähigkeit, die es ermöglicht, verschiedene Standortdaten zu kombinieren, um ein Profil über die Bewegungen, Gewohnheiten und politische, religiöse und ideologische Orientierung eines Individuums zu erstellen. In dieser Hinsicht ist die Privatsphäre schlecht geschützt. Die Begründung zur Rechtfertigung der Befugnisse war die Durchsetzung schwerer Verbrechen - terroristischer Straftaten. Standortdaten können nun für mindestens zwei Jahre gespeichert und erhoben werden, um selbst geringfügige Verstöße aufzuklären. Dies kann geschehen, ohne dass die betreffende Person vernünftigerweise einer Straftat verdächtigt wird - wenn die betreffende Person lediglich als Person von Interesse eingestuft wird. Dies birgt rechtliche Risiken für gefährdete Gemeinschaften. Und doch werden derartige Ermittlungstechniken als rechtmäßig und vernünftig erachtet. In einer Zeit, in der die nationale Sicherheit so weit gefasst ist, dass sie wirtschaftliche Fragen umfasst, die sich wiederum mit dem Klimawandel und dem Umweltschutz überschneiden, sollten diese rechtlichen Befugnisse neu bewertet werden. Das Buch verdeutlicht die komplexen Regeln, die jeder Bürger kennen muss, um handlungsfähig zu sein. Darüber hinaus fordert er die Behörden auf, nachzudenken und sich selbst zu regulieren, indem sie bewusst die Entscheidung treffen, einen Teil ihrer Befugnisse der Überprüfung durch die unabhängige Justiz zu überlassen. Ohne das Erfordernis eines richterlichen Haftbefehls oder einer gerichtlichen Überprüfung sind die Befugnisse ungerecht weit gefasst. Das Buch verfolgt einen interdisziplinären Ansatz, um die Funktionsweise der mobilen Telekommunikation in direktem Zusammenhang mit Strafverfolgungsbefugnissen und bestehenden gerichtlichen Präzedenzfällen zu beurteilen. Darüber hinaus bietet es eine vereinheitlichende techno-rechtliche Perspektive zu einem komplexen Thema, das moderne Datenschutzgesetze und Kommunikationstechnologien berührt.
Mit KI übersetzt

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Generating 4G, 5G and Social Media Location Information
Abstract
Social media messaging applications like Instagram and Signal are increasingly becoming more popular. These applications run on top of the integrated 4G and 5G mobile telecommunications networks. As location service clients, using the best estimated location of the mobile device, these applications leak personal and sensitive information about the individual’s profile and the persons they are associated with. The latest mobile technology, 5G, uses more base stations, creating a dense network of small cells, thereby making location estimates even more precise. Other technical data such as battery power strength are all measures used to calculate the best location estimate and the route travelled. By using satellite technology and creating a line of sight with the mobile device, the estimated location is also becoming more precise in metres. This is contrary to claims by law enforcement agencies that the location estimate is coarse, thereby justifying the retention and disclosure of location information without prior judicial authorisation.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 2. The Legal Scheme for Mobile Telecommunications Companies and Social Media Platforms to Retain Location Information
Abstract
This Chapter describes the legal framework to retain location information. It starts with a discussion of the key legal and technical concepts used to refer to the types of data to be collected and retained, based on technical description of how the telecommunications network operates. The discussion shows that the legal label placed on the information is crucial, because based on the legal name, the legal powers to access and use it are determined. As such, location information is legally classified as telecommunications data and simply because of this legal classification, does not require a judicial warrantto collect, disclose and use.
There are certain types of location information the Australian telecommunications companies are not required to retain. The Telco may therefore retain certain types of location information voluntarily. The chapter also discusses the legal exclusions to the duty to retain location information and critically analyses the negative impact of the discretion granted to the Telco to retain location information voluntarily and for longer periods, for its commercial purposes. This information remains available for the agencies to collect, and thereby has a chilling effect on the exercise of the right to free movement, civil and property rights.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 3. The Legal Framework for Mobile Telecommunications Companies and Social Media Platforms to Disclose Location Information
Abstract
The Telco has both the legal duty and the discretion to disclose location information. Although there are types of location information the Telco is not required to retain, but may do so voluntarily, the Telco is still required to disclose these types of location information, if authorised and notified by the Agencies to do so, and without any prior judicial participation. The Agencies use a self-certification process to collect location information, without any third oversight body vetting the authorisations. The Agencies also use a pre-check process, that is not provided for in the guidelines on how to exercise their collection powers. The warrant processes to collect the location information of journalist sources has been undermined by the broad powers of the Agencies, and the ambiguity in the language of the law, giving rise to interpretations that benefit the Agencies and thereby defeating the intended public interest and the privacy protections. In this manner press freedom is not adequately protected.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 4. The Powers of the Agencies to Collect and Use Location Information
Abstract
The powers of the Agencies to use the disclosed historical and prospective location information are broad and lack transparency to challenge. This is demonstrated by the use of the word ‘security’, the meaning of which is broad, but is accepted by Australian courts as the discretionary realm of the executive branch of government. There appear to be no clear public guidelines on what actions qualify as potential threats to security, thereby placing tech—and politically-savvy climate change and environment protestors, at risk of being inquired into—the government has equated their actions to threats of security. No clear guidelines exist how metadata collections may be initiated at an arm’s length basis, between the Agencies and the government if such cases were to be referred to the Agencies by the government. Telecommunications data is also collected for what may be considered as offences that do not risk national security such as public order offences, theft and a category of miscellaneous offences that are not disclosed. In this manner the collection and use of metadata across all types of offences is indiscriminate, whereas the original motivation for metadata retention and collection were serious crimes that threaten national security, such as terrorist acts. This situation puts climate change protesters at potential risk of their metadata being stored indefinitely and analysed.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 5. Limits to the Powers of the Agencies to Collect and Use Location Information
Abstract
In this Chapter, the limits to the powers of the AFP are described and analysed. It critically analyses how the Attorney-General’s Guidelines protect privacy and how privacy is a tool used to limit the powers of ASIO. There are various tests, such as the ‘Privacy Tests’, which includes the ‘Reasonable and Proportionate Privacy Test’, and the ‘Connection Tests’, that the Agencies must follow to collect and use location information, as a limit to their powers. It analyses how the competing privacy and public safety interests are not well balanced, given that personal information itself is the target.
Instead of opening up its decision-making to judicial review, the executive arm of government is finding innovative policy strategies to incorporate a traditional administrative law review doctrine—legitimate expectations—into its daily decision-making. The legitimate expectations of the Australian community relating to privacy and cybersecurity must be considered when collecting technical information from the likes of Google and Facebook. This may be a welcome move but has its concerns. This is a move that is based on opinion polling, and that entrusts national security, at least partially to opinion polling. It can be generally positive in protecting privacy better, as it may reflect the views of the public on how to better safeguard privacy. However, the competing concern is the extent to which the agencies intend on being swayed by opinion polls in making law enforcement and national security decisions, given that general public opinion may see certain minority groups as particularly criminal and expect a tougher stance on what may be perceived as crime ridden communities, as it relates to collecting metadata from social media tech giants.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 6. Location Information as Personal Information, to Better Protect Privacy
Abstract
Privacy is not protected as a common law right, and neither as a right under the Australian constitution. Given this, the chapter discusses the courts views on the statutory definition of personal information and highlights the issues that are still to be addressed to better protect privacy—whether the various categories of big location data can be considered as personal information when data aggregation occurs, and the impact on privacy.
The major difference between how content and location information are treated, despite them both dealing with information that may be personal and sensitive, is not justifiable. The Agencies can collect personal information based on their sole judgment for reactive and proactive investigations and other uses that are remotely linked to other functions or activities of the Agencies, whereas for other types of personal information such as the contents of a voice call, a Judge’s prior approval is required. The investigatory powers are broad, and their limits are hard to determine.
After the discussion of the circumstances under which location information can be considered personal and sensitive information, the chapter critically discusses the use of aggregated location information ‘in connection with’ or ‘directly related’ to the activities of the Agencies. This analysis sketches the privacy and governance challenges posed using BD software to analyse and use location information.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 7. Oversight Exercised Over the Powers of the Agencies
Abstract
The oversight exercised over the investigatory and location information collection and use powers of the Agencies by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Inspector-General of Security is retrospective. ASIO is seen to be generally compliant with the existing legal requirements under the CAC Determinations 2015 and 2018 and in connection with its functions. Also, no external third party, outside the executive branch of government authorises the collection of location information. The oversight bodies inspect the exercise of the Agencies’ power based on complaints. However, collection process is kept confidential and as such no complaints are received and no accountability can be assessed, in respect of privacy. Despite the culture of compliance, the oversight bodies continue to raise issues of concern regarding the collection of metadata that was not relevant to security and obtaining metadata to investigate whistle-blowers. These are issues the oversight bodies say that they consider as serious, but at the same time these issues have largely remained unaddressed to date. This state of affairs does not instill a sense of trust that the Agencies can also be held accountable, instead of their mistakes being classified as simple human error.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 8. Proposing the Judicial Location Information Warrant, to Better Protect Privacy
Abstract
Court cases in the past couple of years in the USA, the EU and the UK introduced and affirmed judicial oversight in the collection and use of metadata. This has at least led to changes to introduce and independent oversight body to assess applications for metadata in the UK, in an effort to preserve human rights. In the USA, generally a warrant is required. In the Australian framework however, no court nor any independent third party plays any prior role in the collection and use of location information. Privacy is therefore not adequately protected in Australia, even after privacy protections were improved in 2015. The adoption of stricter principles, procedures and requirements for access to and the use of location information under the proposed location information warrant framework to better protect Australian privacy are proposed in this chapter. The chapter analyses how Australia can be a leader in privacy protection by introducing a statutory warrant framework based on the participation of the judiciary and quasi-judicial bodies, as a necessary safeguard to privacy balanced against public safety and security concerns.
Stanley Shanapinda
Chapter 9. Conclusion: Restoring the Balance of Power
Abstract
We started with a note that the balance of power between the Agencies, the Telco, the ISP and the MSP, on the one-side and the individual on the other, is off-kilter. This chapter connects the dots between the various chapters, highlighting the need to restore the balance of power, by introducing a judicial warrant for location information in Australia. Restoring the balance is necessary if location information is to be used along with Big Data analytics algorithms, powered by artificial intelligence, to create and store profiles of persons that happen to be of interest to the Agencies.
Stanley Shanapinda
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Advance Metadata Fair
verfasst von
Stanley Shanapinda
Copyright-Jahr
2020
Electronic ISBN
978-3-030-50255-3
Print ISBN
978-3-030-50254-6
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50255-3