2000 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Allocation Games
verfasst von : Prof. Andrey Garnaev
Erschienen in: Search Games and Other Applications of Game Theory
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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3.1 One-Sided Allocation Game Without Search CostConsider the following zero-sum one-sided allocation game on integer interval [1, n]. Hider selects one of the n points and hides there. Searcher seeks Hider by dividing the given total continuous search effort X and allocating it in each point. Each point i is characterized by two detection parameters λi < 0 and αi ∊ (0,1) such that αi(1—exp(-λiz)) is the probability that a search of point i by Searcher with an amount of search effort z will discover Hider if he is there. The payoff to Searcher is 1 if Hider is detected and 0 otherwise. A strategy of Searcher and Hider can be represented by x = (x1,..., xn) and y = (y1,..., yn), respectively, where yi is the probability that Hider hides in box i and xi is the amount of effort allocated in box i by Searcher, where xi ≥ 0 for i ∊ [1, n] and ∑i=1nxi = X. So, the payoff to Searcher if Searcher and Hider employ strategies x and y, respectively, is given by 1$$ M(x,y) = \sum\limits_{i = 1}^n {\alpha _i y_i } \left( {1 - exp\left( { - \lambda _i x_i } \right)} \right). $$