2. American Post-World War II Grand Strategy and Modes of World Leadership

I tend to affiliate myself to the increasing camp of IR scholars and historian that consider the WWI and WWII as a complex and two phased long second 30 year war, as the participating major war protagonists were almost the same in both cases, and most importantly at the end of the WWI and WWII European and world leaders were facing and had to solve the same principal politico-economic and international issues and cardinal set of problems, meaning that WWI did not solve either of them: where would ethnic and political boundaries match up; what role and where the place of Germany and Russia in New Europe would be; how should the economy of the world be reoriented and how tightly and close should the nations of the world be connected to some sort of International organization, or set of organizations and what the U.S. should do about all of the above.

John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”, 1990, The Atlantic, Vol. 90, No. 8, pp. 35–50.

Barry Buzan and Michael Cox, “China and the US: Comparable Cases of ‘Peaceful Rise’?”, 2013, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 6, pp. 109–132.

Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, 2010; “Enemies Into Friends: How the United States Can Court its Adversaries”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2010 Issue and “Grand Strategy and Power Transition”, New America Foundation, July 2011.

See Feng Yongping, “The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the US”, 2006, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 83–103, also Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends and Grand Strategy and Power Transition.

Barry Buzan and Michael Cox, “China and the US: Comparable Cases of ‘Peaceful Rise’?”, pp. 128–132., see also Reinhard Wolf, “Rising Powers, Status Ambitions and the Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn from Imperial Germany’s Failures”, 2014, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, Issue 2, pp. 185–219.

“City upon a Hill”, used by John Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity”, in Godfrey Hodgson (ed.) The Myth of American Exceptionalism, 2008, New Haven: Yale University Press; see Tami R. Davis and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “City upon a Hill”, 1987, Foreign Policy, No. 66, p. 22; Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation The United States in Historical And Comparative Perspective 1963, New York: W.W. Norton; Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776, 1998, New York: Mariner Books; Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, 2001, New York: Alfred Knopf; “indispensable nation” was US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s 1996 description of the United States, cited in Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (1999), p. 3, and “stand taller and sees further”, stated by her on NBC’s Today Show, February 19, 1998; Hillary Clinton’s remarks on U.S. leadership at the CFR on January 31, 2013.

William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society, 1969, New York: Random House; Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, 2002, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, 2004, London: Allen Lane; Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, 1994, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 87–102.

Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, 2005, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions, p. 209.

William Odom and Robert Dujarric, America’s Inadvertent Empire, 2004, New Haven: Yale University Press; Geir Lundestad, “‘Empire by Invitation’ in the American Century”, 1999, Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 189–217; Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, 2003, London: Vintage.

Rebecca Berens Matzke, Deterrence through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy under Pax Britannica, 2011, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, see also, William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World”, International Security, 1999, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 39.

Prussia had been a regional great power at previous times in its history, but the newly unified (post-1871) German Empire was the first German state (excluding the Austrian monarchy) poised to seek truly global great power status.

Of these, France and Russia, in a way, can also be considered rising states. France rebounded with hardship following its defeat by Prussia (1870–1871) and Russia was a growing threat to the British crown in the Eastern Mediterranean, Central Asia, and the Far East throughout the period, in spite of its defeat by Japan in 1905. Unified Italy represented a new power configuration on the Italian peninsula, while Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were in decline. For assessments of Great Powers of this era, see Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight, 2010, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, pp. 202–249.

Charles A. Kupchan, Grand Strategy and Power Transition, p. 3.

As Walter Russell Mead writes in his God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World, 2007, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 94–95, “The Britons who laid the foundation of the most powerful global empire ever created saw the rivalries of Europe less as a game to play than as a strategic asset. Let France and Prussia duke it out on the Rhine; let Austria and Prussia batter one another over Silesia, an irregular, slightly sausage- shaped territory now part of Poland that is roughly equal to the combined area of Connecticut and Massachusetts. While they were busy with one another, England would build a global economic system that would leave all rivals in the dust”.

Timothy H. Parsons, The British Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective. 1999, London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Peter Harris, “The Imminent US Strategic Adjustment to China”, p. 230.

Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, 1979, quoted from Dinesh D’Souza: What’s great about America.

Ibid., p. 116, fn. 14 and 15.

Ibid., p. 116.

Murray N. Rothbard, “Wall Street, Banks and American Foreign Policy”, p. 5.

In 1921–1922, Britain formally acceded to naval parity with the United States. See Peter Harris, “The Imminent US Strategic Adjustment to China”, p. 236, fn. 58.

William T. Stead, The Americanisation of the World: The Trend of the Twentieth Century, 1901, New York: Horace Markley.

John Lukacs, A New Republic: A History of the United States in the Twentieth Century, 2004, New Haven: Yale University Press; R. Laurence Moore and Maurizio Vaudagna (eds.) The American Century in Europe, 2003, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press; Harm G. Schroder, Americanization of the European Economy, 2005, Dordrecht: Springer; Volker R. Berghahn, “The Debate on Americanization among Economic and Cultural Historians”, Cold War History, February 2010, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 107–130; Peter Conrad, How the World Was Won: The Americanization of Everywhere, 2014, London: Thames & Hudson and others.

Henry Luce, “The American Century”, Life, February. 17, 1941, pp. 61–65; Thomas McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 1990, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press; Mary Nolan, Transatlantic Century: Europe and the United States, 1890-2010, 2012, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; David Ellwood, The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century, 2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Joint Declaration, also known as—The Atlantic Charter, agreed upon and accepted by both the U.S. and Britain on August 14, 1941, following meetings and negotiations between President Roosevelt and PM Churchill. From the 8 principle points laid down in the Charter, 3—did not fare well with the British interests: freedom of the seas (No. 7); removing or lowering trade barriers (No. 4), and most importantly—the principle of self-determination (No. 3). The American side was insistent, that the Charter acknowledged that the war was to be fought to ensure self-determination of nations and peoples. See, William Roger Louis, “American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire”, 1985, International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 395–420. The British were forced to agree to these terms but in his September 1941 speech, Churchill stated that the Charter only applied to states under German occupation, and certainly not to the peoples of the British Empire. See, Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention, 2002, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 297.

Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, 1969, New York: McGraw Hill, p. 651. See also, Keith Kyle, Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East, 2011, London: I.B.Tauris, p. 464.

First used by Zalmay Khalilzad, “Congage China”, 1999, RAND issue Paper, Vol. 187, in the sense of a mastery hybrid strategy of “congagement”, exploiting both the “engagement” and “containment” strategies. Later the approach was popularized by other scholars and strategists, ex. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy.

Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Rise of China”, 1993, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, p. 72. See also, Walter Russell Mead, “In the footsteps of the Kaiser: China Boosts US Power in Asia”, The American Interest, September 26, 2010; Edward Luttak, “China’s Military Adventurism is Ill-Timed”, The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2013; Joseph Nye Jr., “1914 Revisited”, Project Syndicate, January 13, 2014.

Zhang Yongjin, “System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations”, pp. 60–61.

Ibid., p. 1.

See G.John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, where the link between liberal democracy and the resilience of the U.S. hegemonic order is emphasized.

G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, 2001, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, 2008, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 27–35. See also Joseph Nye Jr., The Future of Power, 2011, New York: Public Affairs Book, pp. 157–163.

John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design”, The National Interest, No. 111, January/February 2011.

William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, 1969; Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, 2002, Cambridge: Harvard University Press and “New Rome, New Jerusalem”, Wilson Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 50–58; Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America, 2007, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; Lea Brillmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One Superpower World, 1994, New Haven: Yale University Press; Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “Empire, Hierarchy, and Hegemony: American Grand Strategy and the Construction of Order in the Asia-Pacific”, 2005, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 115–131; Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, 1999, New York: Columbia University Press; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, World Out of Balance and many others.

Yuen Foong Khong, The American Tributary System, p. 19.

John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design”, The National Interest, No. 111, January/February 2011.

Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, International Security, Spring 1993, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 5–51; and Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy”, International Security, Summer 1997, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 86–124.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories”, American Political Science Review, December 1997, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 915–916, Christopher Layne, “Unipolar Illusion”; Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War”, International Security, Spring 1997, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 44–98.

Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity”, International Security, Fall 1998, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 40–79; Douglas Lemke, “Continuity of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War”, Journal of Peace Research, February 1996, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 203–236.

William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World.

William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, pp. 7–37.

Ibid., p. 39.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World”, Daedalus, Summer 1964, Vol. 93, No. 3, p. 887.

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 161–163, 199–204.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”. International Security, Fall 1993, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 44–79, at p. 45, fn. 5.

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, 2008, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, 2008, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 86.

Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment”, Fall 2006, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 7–41; Christopher Layne, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony – Myth or Reality? A Review Essay”, Summer 2009, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 147–172; see also Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”, Spring 2011, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 7–44.

Richard N. Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order, 2013, New York: Basic Books.

Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, 2008, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; see also, Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Vision on International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline”, 2011, International Security, Summer, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 41–72.

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Power, 1987, New York: Random House; see also, Richard N. Haass, “What Follows American Dominion?”, Financial Times, April 15, 2008.

Ibid., p. 12.

See Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayrna, Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-state, Extra-state, Intra-state and Non-state Wars, 1816-2007, 2010, Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History”, The National Interest, Summer 1989.

Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, 1990/1991, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1.

John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, 2018, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design”, p. 16.

Ibid., p. 18, 34.

As quoted in Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubiwitz, “ Strategy for a Divided America”, July/August 2007, Foreign Affairs.

Ibid.

Charles A.Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Dead Center”, Fall 2007, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 9–10. In my understanding a Grand Strategy is a state theory of how to use all instruments of statecraft—political power; military power; economic power; ideological power; foreign and domestic policy, and how they should be integrated and employed with one another to achieve the security of a country and its national interest in its relations with the outside world.

Robert J. Art, “A Grand Strategy for America “, 2003, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ibid., pp. 7–8.

Ibid., pp. 8–10.

Robert J. Art, “America’s Grand Strategy and World Politics”, 2009, New York: Routledge.

Ibid., pp. 290–297.

1990, p. 1, 1994, p. 1, 2002, p. 7, 2010, p. 15.

1987, p. 1; 1990, pp. 2, 4, 6, 10; 1994, p. i; 1998, pp. 1–2; 2002, pp. vi, 7; 2006, pp. 7, 12, 22; some analyses and publications claim that in NSS 2010 and 2015, “lead” and “leadership” were used in many dozens of times.

1987, pp. 21–24; 1990, pp. 22–25.

1994, pp. 14–18; 1998, pp. 1, 2, 7.

2002, pp. 18, 26, cover letter.

2002, pp. 27–28.

2015, p. 1 of Obama’s Cover Letter to the NSS, pp. 10, 19, 25.

John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design”, p. 18.

Ibid., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., xi.

Ibid., p. 1.

Ibid., p. 2.

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