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01.12.2024 | Research Paper

An Individual-Based Hybrid Well-Being Theory

verfasst von: Sangmu Oh

Erschienen in: Journal of Happiness Studies | Ausgabe 8/2024

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Abstract

This paper advances an individual-based hybrid well-being theory and argues that it is able to overcome the main drawbacks of existing objective list theories and avoid the shortcomings of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories. The individual-based hybrid well-being theory has characteristics of perfectionist objective theories in that it recognizes objective goods and explains the commonality of goods from the perspective of perfectionism, but it also differs from existing objective list theories insofar as it provides not a single list of goods for everyone but plural lists of goods based on each individual for each individual. In addition, it represents a hybrid theory rather than a pure objective list theory because it recognizes the individual’s desire as a factor influencing the contribution of objective goods to well-being and the individual’s experiences of pleasure as a component of well-being outside the list of goods.

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Fußnoten
1
Generally, philosophical well-being theories are divided into hedonism, desire-fulfillment theories, and objective list theories based on Parfit’s taxonomy (Parfit, 1984). Hedonism is “the view that well-being wholly depends on how you feel” or the view that “all and only positive experiences are good for you, and that all and only negative experiences are bad for you.” (Gregory, 2016).
 
2
Desire-fulfillment theories claim that what is good in itself for you is the fulfillment of your desires, and what’s bad in itself for you is the frustration of your desires (Heathwood, 2016).
 
3
Objective list theories are theories “that specify particular things as non-instrumentally prudentially good (or bad) for people, whether or not they have any pro (or con) attitude towards them” (Fletcher, 2016). Some scholars consider desire-fulfillment theories and hedonism to be subjective theories in that well-being in those theories is based on the individual’s subjective states (Haybron, 2020); some scholars argue that hedonism may be a type of objectivist list theory with a single item, given that pleasure is attitude-independent (Fletcher, 2013).
 
4
Regarding theories that suggest a single list of goods, see Arneson, 2010; Griffin, 1986; Fletcher, 2013; Hooker, 2015; Finnis, 2011; Murphy, 2001.
 
5
In this respect, the individual-based hybrid well-being theory shares the idea of “internalism” that “maintains that the constituents of an agent’s well-being are ultimately determined wholly by the particulars of the individual’s make-up qua individual (vs. qua group or class member” (Haybron, 2008) or the idea of “subject-dependent theories” that “make a person’s good depend, at least in part, on her individual features” (Hall & Tiberius, 2016).
 
6
An interesting perspective related to the individual-based hybrid well-being theory is Richard Kraut’s “bottom-up” approach, according to which the good for an individual is determined only by the capacities of the individual in question (Kraut, 2013). In this respect, Kraut’s approach seems to share a common link with the individual-based hybrid well-being theory. However, what his model seeks to attain is not the plural lists of goods for each individual but a single list for “us”. For example, for particular individual A who does not have good potential capacity for chemistry, chemical knowledge is on the list of goods for “us” in his theory (Kraut, 2013) but is not on the list of goods for individual A in the individual-based hybrid well-being theory. Making a list of goods for each individual should end at the “bottom” step, and there is no need to progress to the “up” step – the up step is not for making a list of goods for each individual, but for all human beings – but Kraut sets the up step as a final step. Following this line of thinking, if we were to use the terms “bottom” and “up,” the individual-based hybrid well-being theory would only have a bottom step, with no up step.
 
7
Bradford, 2016. According to Hurka, perfectionism claims that a good life consists of developing the central properties of human nature to a high degree (Hurka, 1993). Although he treats perfectionism as a moral theory and not as a well-being theory, his definition of perfectionism has been widely accepted by well-being perfectionist theorists. However, Richard Kraut prefers to use the term “developmentalism” instead of “perfectionism” for certain reasons (Kraut, 2007).
 
8
Haybron criticizes the idea of well-being perfectionism. However, the reasoning for why the exercise of human capacities equates to goods, ironically, explains the goods of perfectionism well (Haybron, 2008).
 
9
The metaphor of the sparrow and the condor, in the strictest sense, might not be perfectly appropriate in explaining the differences between individuals because the sparrow and the condor are not the same species. However, I regard the sparrow and the condor as symbolic of different individuals who have the same type of capacity but to different degrees.
 
10
The deaf here refers to the people who cannot improve their auditory capacity in any way. If their auditory capacity can be restored through an operation, the exercise of the capacity is a real good for them. This would be the same for the blind.
 
11
In addition to these responses, the problem of a bad capacity can be resolved based on the view that the capacities that make up human nature are so important that a creature without them is not judged as a human being (Nussbaum, 1987). From this perspective, a bad capacity is not a component of human nature.
 
12
Richard Kraut maintains an objective view of well-being while also attempting to sensitively respond to the issue of the diversity of individuals. His view apparently recognizes the diversity of individuals, but it could be accused of a regression to subjectivism in that the agent alone sets the standard for him- or herself (Kraut, 1979). He also sometimes emphasizes the diversity of individuals, but his view seems to be a modified version of a species-based objective list theory (Kraut, 2007).
 
13
The goods on the lists in the individual-based hybrid well-being theory are individual-dependent as they are derived from the characteristics of an individual. But the fact that the goods depend on the individual does not necessarily imply that they depend on the attitude of an individual. The goods may not depend on the attitude of the individual even though they depend on the characteristics of the individual, as the diet for Jack depends on his physical condition, but not his desire. Thus, the goods in the individual-based hybrid well-being theory are individual dependent, in that they depend on the types and measures of the capacities an individual possesses, but are also objective, in that they are independent of the attitude of the individual. Regarding the subject dependency of well-being, see Sumner, 1996; Haybron, 2008; Hall & Tiberius, 2016.
 
14
For scholars who add autonomy to the list of goods, see Griffin, 1986; Hooker, 2015.
 
15
My idea borrows from Christopher Woodard’s description of “Holism” in Chap. 13 “Hybrid Theories” (Woodard, 2016). However, Woodard’s argument for holism is that, in explaining the components of well-being, the contribution of one component to well-being depends on the contribution of the other components. However, in the individual-based hybrid well-being theory, the desire for a good is not a component of well-being, and my argument is not about the interdependence between different components of well-being.
 
16
Ben Bradley surmises that objective list theories give up “the philosophical project of understanding well-being” in that they do not give any explanation regarding the goods on a list (Bradley, 2009). However, not all objective list theorists avoid explaining the reason why the goods are on the list and, as Philip Kitcher observed, there is not only “bare objectivism,” which simply offers a list of goods, but also “explanatory objectivism,” which explains and justifies the goods on a list (Kitcher, 1999).
 
17
The way the individual-based hybrid well-being theory accepts pleasure is different from the way it accepts desires. Desires are not a component of well-being (i.e., a good), but an influential factor that affects the contribution of a good to well-being. On the other hand, individual pleasure is a component of well-being.
 
18
Enjoying a drink every night or having a good dream every night can both be a component of well-being (Hooker, 2015).
 
19
Regarding the experience machine objection and the deceived businessman objection, see Nozick, 1974; Kagan, 1998.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
An Individual-Based Hybrid Well-Being Theory
verfasst von
Sangmu Oh
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2024
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Journal of Happiness Studies / Ausgabe 8/2024
Print ISSN: 1389-4978
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7780
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-024-00826-8