Skip to main content

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. Analysing Leadership I: Germany in the Eurozone Crisis

verfasst von : Magnus G. Schoeller

Erschienen in: Leadership in the Eurozone

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

When the Economic and Monetary Union found itself in crisis, the actor mostly called on to assume leadership was Germany. This chapter provides three case studies on Germany’s role in the first bailout of Greece, the proposal of a “super-commissioner”, and the genesis of the Fiscal Compact. The analysis not only probes the plausibility of the book’s theoretical model, but also provides a theory-guided and generalizable explanation of Germany’s ambiguous leadership record in the eurozone. The chapter submits that Germany’s (non-)leadership is driven primarily by its material interest in shifting the adjustment costs of the crisis to the national level and thus to the “debtor states”. Whether Germany succeeds in doing so depends on the preferences of other eurozone actors and the respective institutional constraint.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
See e.g. Financial Times (2012), Jacoby (2015: 189f.), Jones (2010: 33), Matthijs (2016b: 136), Matthijs and Blyth (2011), Morisse-Schilbach (2011: 33f.), Steinmeier and Steinbrück (2010), Techau (2014), The Economist (2013).
 
2
See e.g. Bulmer (2014), Bulmer and Paterson (2013), Jacoby (2015), Matthijs (2016a, b), Matthijs et al. (2016), Newman (2015), Otero-Iglesias (2017), Paterson (2011).
 
3
In the wake of the first financial assistance package to Greece, temporary rescue funds (EFSF, EFSM) were created and later replaced by a permanent fund (ESM). However, this permanent fund also turned out to be insufficient, thereby forcing the ECB to step in with the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions in 2012 (Sect. 5.​3).
 
4
While it is true that especially in the beginning of the Greek debt crisis, there was a lot of uncertainty and therefore different opinions regarding the consequences of a potential default, there was an early consensus among governments that a Greek default, or even “Grexit”, would in any case do considerable harm to the eurozone. Even sceptical decision-makers like German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who later adopted a more favourable stance towards “Grexit”, “considered the damage of a default of a euro country to be incalculable and more costly than the rescue” (Schimmelfennig 2015: 182).
 
5
As regards the banks of “creditor countries” like Germany, there was no systemically relevant exposure to Greece alone, but given that a Greek default would most probably have spilled over to other countries like Spain and Italy, the overall exposure was enormous (Ardagna and Caselli 2014: 297; Thompson 2013: 8).
 
6
Translated by the author from the original: “Griechenland ist nicht zahlungsunfähig und deshalb ist die Frage der Hilfen auch nicht die, die wir jetzt diskutieren müssen […] Die beste Lösung für den Euro ist, wenn Griechenland alleine seine Probleme löst, natürlich mit der politischen Unterstützung natürlich [sic] der europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs”.
 
7
Due to the devastating signalling effect to the financial markets, Greece could make an official request for financial assistance only when it was assured that help would definitely be granted.
 
8
See e.g. Merkel’s press conference after the European Council of 11 and 12 December 2009, in which she refers to the responsibility of Greece to implement structural reforms as a solution to its financial problems, instead of financial assistance by the other Eurozone member states (Merkel 2009).
 
9
Translated by the author from the original: “Nein, es gab keinen Trigger-Moment. Ausschlaggebend waren Griechenlands Bereitschaft zu einem entsprechenden Programm und Deutschlands Bereitschaft zur tatsächlichen Finanzhilfe. Beides war möglich weil das der letzte Moment war.”
 
10
This is also shown by the fact that the German Ministry of Finance was “cluttered” at the time with policy proposals outlining alternatives to the existing Monetary Union, such as a split into a northern and a southern eurozone (Interview 26).
 
11
See also Schäuble (2014) and Lamers and Schäuble (2014).
 
12
Translated by the author from the original: “effektivere Kontrolle über Fiskalsünder”.
 
13
Translated by the author from the original: “effektives Mittel zur Haushaltskonsolidierung”.
 
14
Data from 2011 is most appropriate because these are the figures that were known at the time of Germany’s super-commissioner initiative.
 
15
Information obtained from the Chancellery on 16 June and from the Treasury on 3 July 2015.
 
16
As a background talk with a strongly involved ECB official revealed, for instance, it was the ECB which before the onset of the eurozone crisis alerted the Commission several times to disconcerting irregularities in the Greek data on sovereign debt and deficit.
 
17
Karlsruhe is the city where the Federal Constitutional Court is located and has thus become a synonym for the Court.
 
18
Translated by the author from the original: “Die andern konnten das Wort ‘Karlsruhe’ nicht mehr hören, auch wenn es nicht explizit eingesetzt wurde”.
 
19
This assessment is confirmed by Janning’s “power calculator”, according to which Germany scores highest with 60 points, but is closely followed by France (53) and Italy (43). The index includes indicators which go beyond the three categories considered by the present work. It comprises size of population, contribution to EU budget, military strength, status in international affairs, geographic location, net contribution position, opt-outs (Schengen, EMU), good governance, capacity for coalition building, and public opinion (Janning 2013: 7–9).
 
20
Translated by the author from the original: “Deutschland ist zum Hegemon Europas geworden – was wir nie sein wollten”.
 
21
Thus, the value of the independent variable is “neutral” with regard to a (dis)confirmation of the theoretical model: while the confidence in the theoretical proposition on power resources (H3) cannot be increased by means of the congruence method or process tracing (because the value on the independent variable is not perfectly congruent with the outcome), it does not diminish the plausibility of the causal model either.
 
22
Coercion or blackmailing are no viable options for a leader as they contradict the defining criterion of a common goal (Sect. 2.​1).
 
23
Translated by the author from the original: “solange ich lebe”.
 
24
On 6 December 2017, the European Commission presented a legislative proposal on how to integrate the Fiscal Compact into EU law.
 
25
As a result, the EP obtained the so-called “repatriation clause”, according to which the Treaty should be incorporated into EU law five years after its entry into force (Art. 16), the right to organize a conference on budgetary issues with national parliaments (Art. 13), and the right for non-Eurozone countries to participate in Euro Summits under certain circumstances (Art. 12.3) (Interviews 1, 6).
 
26
According to the final agreement, member states can bring each other before the court for not transposing the Fiscal Compact provisions into their national laws, but not for non-compliance with the rules, as was envisaged by Germany (Interview 27).
 
27
While Germany wanted a strong role of the Commission, enabling it to bring member states before the ECJ in case of non-compliance with the rules, France succeeded in downgrading this to a reporting role (Kreilinger 2012: 4; Interview 27).
 
28
Even the structure of the final treaty, which in large part consists of one section providing the rules for the debt brake (Title III) and another codifying Euro summits (Title IV), still mirrors the original proposal.
 
30
Some member states already had a debt brake in their national law, but not at a constitutional (or equivalent) level (Interview 4).
 
31
Translated by the author from the original: “Die Nehmerländer zeigten sich erkenntlich.”
 
32
As explained in Sect. 3.​2, if all actor agree on a solution ex ante, there is no need for a leadership.
 
33
The values of this variable can range from a strong convergence on the leader’s preferred outcome to a strong convergence on an outcome different from the one preferred by the leader. The unit of interest are the actors’ strategic preferences at the beginning of the case study (see Sect. 3.​4).
 
34
See Sect. 3.​3 for an overview of the single strategies.
 
35
Formally, the negotiation agenda was provided by the Council Legal Service.
 
36
Germany’s export-driven economic performance, extremely low interests on sovereign debt (“flight to safety”), and its relatively powerful position at the European (“hegemony”) and global level are but a few benefits from the euro.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Ardagna, Silvia, and Francesco Caselli. 2014. The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6 (4): 291–323. Ardagna, Silvia, and Francesco Caselli. 2014. The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6 (4): 291–323.
Zurück zum Zitat Beach, Derek. 2013. The Fiscal Compact, Euro-Reforms and the Challenge for the Euro-Outs. In Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2013, ed. Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, 113–133. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Beach, Derek. 2013. The Fiscal Compact, Euro-Reforms and the Challenge for the Euro-Outs. In Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2013, ed. Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, 113–133. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).
Zurück zum Zitat Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès et al. 2018. Reconciling Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform. CEPR Policy Insight 91, London. Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès et al. 2018. Reconciling Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform. CEPR Policy Insight 91, London.
Zurück zum Zitat Bonatti, Luigi, and Andrea Fracasso. 2013. The German Model and the European Crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (6): 1023–1039.CrossRef Bonatti, Luigi, and Andrea Fracasso. 2013. The German Model and the European Crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (6): 1023–1039.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulmer, Simon. 2014. Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics. West European Politics 37 (6): 1244–1263.CrossRef Bulmer, Simon. 2014. Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics. West European Politics 37 (6): 1244–1263.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulmer, Simon, and William E. Paterson. 2013. Germany as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints. Journal of European Public Policy 20 (10): 1387–1405.CrossRef Bulmer, Simon, and William E. Paterson. 2013. Germany as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints. Journal of European Public Policy 20 (10): 1387–1405.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bulmer, Simon, and William E. Paterson. 2018. Germany and the European Union: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon? London: Red Globe Press. Bulmer, Simon, and William E. Paterson. 2018. Germany and the European Union: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon? London: Red Globe Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Buti, Marco, and Nicolas Carnot. 2012. EMU Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms. Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (6): 899–911.CrossRef Buti, Marco, and Nicolas Carnot. 2012. EMU Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms. Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (6): 899–911.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Collier, David. 2011. Understanding Process Tracing. Political Science and Politics 44 (4): 823–830.CrossRef Collier, David. 2011. Understanding Process Tracing. Political Science and Politics 44 (4): 823–830.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat De Grauwe, Paul. 2013. Design Failures in the Eurozone: Can They Be Fixed? LEQS Paper 57, London. De Grauwe, Paul. 2013. Design Failures in the Eurozone: Can They Be Fixed? LEQS Paper 57, London.
Zurück zum Zitat Dor, Eric. 2015. The Exposure of European Countries to Greece. IESEG Working Paper EQM 01, Lille. Dor, Eric. 2015. The Exposure of European Countries to Greece. IESEG Working Paper EQM 01, Lille.
Zurück zum Zitat Drudi, Francesco, Alain Durré, and Francesco P. Mongelli. 2012. The Interplay of Economic Reforms and Monetary Policy: The Case of the Eurozone. Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (6): 881–898.CrossRef Drudi, Francesco, Alain Durré, and Francesco P. Mongelli. 2012. The Interplay of Economic Reforms and Monetary Policy: The Case of the Eurozone. Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (6): 881–898.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat EP (European Parliament). 2012. Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. European Parliament Resolution of 20 November 2012 with Recommendations to the Commission on the Report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (2012/2151(INI)), P7_TA(2012)0430, Brussels. EP (European Parliament). 2012. Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. European Parliament Resolution of 20 November 2012 with Recommendations to the Commission on the Report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (2012/2151(INI)), P7_TA(2012)0430, Brussels.
Zurück zum Zitat European Commission. 2012. A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European Debate, COM(2012) 777 final/2, November 30, Brussels. European Commission. 2012. A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European Debate, COM(2012) 777 final/2, November 30, Brussels.
Zurück zum Zitat Featherstone, Kevin. 2011. The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime. Journal of Common Markets Studies 49 (2): 193–217.CrossRef Featherstone, Kevin. 2011. The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime. Journal of Common Markets Studies 49 (2): 193–217.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Frieden, Jeffry, and Stefanie Walter. 2017. Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis. Annual Review of Political Science 20 (1): 371–390.CrossRef Frieden, Jeffry, and Stefanie Walter. 2017. Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis. Annual Review of Political Science 20 (1): 371–390.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Friedrich, Carl J. 1963. Man and His Government. New York: McGraw-Hill. Friedrich, Carl J. 1963. Man and His Government. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Zurück zum Zitat Gros, Daniel, and Cinzia Alcidi. 2014. The Case of the Disappearing Fiscal Compact. CEPS Commentary, May 11, Brussels. Gros, Daniel, and Cinzia Alcidi. 2014. The Case of the Disappearing Fiscal Compact. CEPS Commentary, May 11, Brussels.
Zurück zum Zitat Heipertz, Martin, and Amy Verdun. 2010. Ruling Europe: The Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Heipertz, Martin, and Amy Verdun. 2010. Ruling Europe: The Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jacoby, Wade. 2015. Europe’s New German Problem: The Timing of Politics and the Politics of Timing. In The Future of the Euro, ed. Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, 187–209. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jacoby, Wade. 2015. Europe’s New German Problem: The Timing of Politics and the Politics of Timing. In The Future of the Euro, ed. Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, 187–209. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Janning, Josef. 2013. State Power Within European Integration: On the Limits and Context of Germany’s Power in the Union, DGAPanalyse kompakt 1/2013, Berlin. Janning, Josef. 2013. State Power Within European Integration: On the Limits and Context of Germany’s Power in the Union, DGAPanalyse kompakt 1/2013, Berlin.
Zurück zum Zitat Karagiannis, Yannis, and Mattia Guidi. 2014. Institutional Change and Continuity in the European Union: The Super-Commissioner Saga. Acta Politica 49 (2): 174–195.CrossRef Karagiannis, Yannis, and Mattia Guidi. 2014. Institutional Change and Continuity in the European Union: The Super-Commissioner Saga. Acta Politica 49 (2): 174–195.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kreilinger, Valentin. 2012. The Making of a New Treaty: Six Rounds of Political Bargaining, Policy Brief Notre Europe 32, Paris. Kreilinger, Valentin. 2012. The Making of a New Treaty: Six Rounds of Political Bargaining, Policy Brief Notre Europe 32, Paris.
Zurück zum Zitat Krotz, Ulrich, and Joachim Schild. 2013. Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krotz, Ulrich, and Joachim Schild. 2013. Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Ludlow, Peter. 2010a. Brussels and Copenhagen: The European Council and the New Global Disorder. Briefing Note: Eurocomment. Ludlow, Peter. 2010a. Brussels and Copenhagen: The European Council and the New Global Disorder. Briefing Note: Eurocomment.
Zurück zum Zitat Ludlow, Peter. 2010b. In the Last Resort: The European Council and the Euro Crisis, Spring 2010. Briefing Note: Eurocomment. Ludlow, Peter. 2010b. In the Last Resort: The European Council and the Euro Crisis, Spring 2010. Briefing Note: Eurocomment.
Zurück zum Zitat Ludlow, Peter. 2012a. The European Council of 8, 9 December 2011. Preliminary Evaluation: Eurocomment. Ludlow, Peter. 2012a. The European Council of 8, 9 December 2011. Preliminary Evaluation: Eurocomment.
Zurück zum Zitat Ludlow, Peter. 2012b. The European Council of 30 January 2012: Between German Hegemony and ‘More Europe’. Preliminary Evaluation: Eurocomment. Ludlow, Peter. 2012b. The European Council of 30 January 2012: Between German Hegemony and ‘More Europe’. Preliminary Evaluation: Eurocomment.
Zurück zum Zitat Ludlow, Peter. 2012c. The Informal European Council of 30 January 2012: The Agenda, Eurocomment. Ludlow, Peter. 2012c. The Informal European Council of 30 January 2012: The Agenda, Eurocomment.
Zurück zum Zitat Matthijs, Matthias. 2016a. Powerful Rules Governing the Euro: The Perverse Logic of German Ideas. Journal of European Public Policy 23 (3): 375–391.CrossRef Matthijs, Matthias. 2016a. Powerful Rules Governing the Euro: The Perverse Logic of German Ideas. Journal of European Public Policy 23 (3): 375–391.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Matthijs, Matthias. 2016b. The Three Faces of German Leadership. Survival 58 (2): 135–154.CrossRef Matthijs, Matthias. 2016b. The Three Faces of German Leadership. Survival 58 (2): 135–154.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Matthijs, Matthias, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, and Hubert Zimmermann. 2016. A New German Hegemony: Does It Exist? Would It Be Dangerous. In Key Controversies in European Integration, 2nd ed., ed. Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür, 234–250. London: Palgrave. Matthijs, Matthias, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, and Hubert Zimmermann. 2016. A New German Hegemony: Does It Exist? Would It Be Dangerous. In Key Controversies in European Integration, 2nd ed., ed. Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür, 234–250. London: Palgrave.
Zurück zum Zitat Mayhew, Alan, Kai Oppermann, and Dan Hough. 2011. German Foreign Policy and Leadership of the EU—‘You Can’t Always Get What You Want … But You Sometimes Get What You Need’. SEI Working Papers 119, Brighton. Mayhew, Alan, Kai Oppermann, and Dan Hough. 2011. German Foreign Policy and Leadership of the EU—‘You Can’t Always Get What You Want … But You Sometimes Get What You Need’. SEI Working Papers 119, Brighton.
Zurück zum Zitat Miller, Vaughne. 2012. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union: Political Issues. Research paper 12/14, March 27, House of Commons Library, London. Miller, Vaughne. 2012. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union: Political Issues. Research paper 12/14, March 27, House of Commons Library, London.
Zurück zum Zitat Morisse-Schilbach, Melanie. 2011. ‘Ach Deutschland!’: Greece, the Euro Crisis, and the Costs and Benefits of Being a Benign Hegemon. International Politics and Society 1: 26–41. Morisse-Schilbach, Melanie. 2011. ‘Ach Deutschland!’: Greece, the Euro Crisis, and the Costs and Benefits of Being a Benign Hegemon. International Politics and Society 1: 26–41.
Zurück zum Zitat Newman, Abraham. 2015. The Reluctant Leader: Germany’s Euro Experience and the Long Shadow of Reunification. In The Future of the Euro, ed. Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, 117–135. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Newman, Abraham. 2015. The Reluctant Leader: Germany’s Euro Experience and the Long Shadow of Reunification. In The Future of the Euro, ed. Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, 117–135. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Otero-Iglesias, Miguel. 2017. Still Waiting for Paris: Germany’s Reluctant Hegemony in Pursuing Political Union in the Euro Area. Journal of European Integration 39 (3): 349–364.CrossRef Otero-Iglesias, Miguel. 2017. Still Waiting for Paris: Germany’s Reluctant Hegemony in Pursuing Political Union in the Euro Area. Journal of European Integration 39 (3): 349–364.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Paterson, William E. 2011. The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (s1): 57–75.CrossRef Paterson, William E. 2011. The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (s1): 57–75.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Schelkle, Waltraud. 2012. European Fiscal Union: From Monetary Back Door to Parliamentary Main Entrance. CESifo Forum 13 (1): 28–34. Schelkle, Waltraud. 2012. European Fiscal Union: From Monetary Back Door to Parliamentary Main Entrance. CESifo Forum 13 (1): 28–34.
Zurück zum Zitat Schild, Joachim. 2013. Leadership in Hard Times: Germany, France, and the Management of the Eurozone Crisis. German Politics and Society 31 (1): 24–47.CrossRef Schild, Joachim. 2013. Leadership in Hard Times: Germany, France, and the Management of the Eurozone Crisis. German Politics and Society 31 (1): 24–47.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2014. European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism. Journal of European Integration 36 (3): 321–337.CrossRef Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2014. European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism. Journal of European Integration 36 (3): 321–337.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2015. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Area Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (2): 177–195.CrossRef Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2015. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Area Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (2): 177–195.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Schoeller, Magnus, Mattia Guidi, and Yannis Karagiannis. 2017. Explaining Informal Policy-Making Patterns in the Eurozone Crisis: Decentralized Bargaining and the Theory of EU Institutions. International Journal of Public Administration 40 (14): 1211–1222.CrossRef Schoeller, Magnus, Mattia Guidi, and Yannis Karagiannis. 2017. Explaining Informal Policy-Making Patterns in the Eurozone Crisis: Decentralized Bargaining and the Theory of EU Institutions. International Journal of Public Administration 40 (14): 1211–1222.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Thompson, Helen. 2013. The Crisis of the Euro: The Problem of German Power Revisited. Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) Paper 8, Sheffield. Thompson, Helen. 2013. The Crisis of the Euro: The Problem of German Power Revisited. Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) Paper 8, Sheffield.
Zurück zum Zitat Tsebelis, George, and Hyeonho Hahm. 2014. Suspending Vetoes: How the Euro Countries Achieved Unanimity in the Fiscal Compact. Journal of European Public Policy 21 (10): 1388–1411.CrossRef Tsebelis, George, and Hyeonho Hahm. 2014. Suspending Vetoes: How the Euro Countries Achieved Unanimity in the Fiscal Compact. Journal of European Public Policy 21 (10): 1388–1411.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Verdun, Amy. 2015. A Historical Institutionalist Explanation of the EU’s Responses to the Euro Area Financial Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (2): 219–237.CrossRef Verdun, Amy. 2015. A Historical Institutionalist Explanation of the EU’s Responses to the Euro Area Financial Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (2): 219–237.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 1. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official/administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 6. Interview 1. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official/administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 6.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 2. 2014. European Commission, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 7. Interview 2. 2014. European Commission, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 7.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 3. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 12. Interview 3. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 12.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 4. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 13. Interview 4. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 13.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 5. 2014. Permanent Representation of France. Brussels, Belgium, November 13. Interview 5. 2014. Permanent Representation of France. Brussels, Belgium, November 13.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 6. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 14. Interview 6. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 14.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 7. 2014. European Council, senior official/assistant. Brussels, Belgium, November 17. Interview 7. 2014. European Council, senior official/assistant. Brussels, Belgium, November 17.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 8. 2014. Council of the European Union, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 18. Interview 8. 2014. Council of the European Union, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 18.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 9. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, administrator/administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 20. Interview 9. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, administrator/administrator. Brussels, Belgium, November 20.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 10. 2014. Senior EU official. Brussels, Belgium, November 20. Interview 10. 2014. Senior EU official. Brussels, Belgium, November 20.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 11. 2014. Permanent Representation of the Netherlands. Brussels, Belgium, November 24. Interview 11. 2014. Permanent Representation of the Netherlands. Brussels, Belgium, November 24.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 12. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 25. Interview 12. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 25.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 13. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 25. Interview 13. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 25.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 14. 2014. ECB official. Brussels, Belgium, November 26. Interview 14. 2014. ECB official. Brussels, Belgium, November 26.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 15. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 27. Interview 15. 2014. Council of the European Union, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, November 27.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 16. 2014. European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 27. Interview 16. 2014. European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 27.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 17. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 28. Interview 17. 2014. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official. Brussels, Belgium, November 28.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 18. 2015. European Central Bank, official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 9. Interview 18. 2015. European Central Bank, official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 9.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 19. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 10. Interview 19. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 10.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 20. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 11. Interview 20. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 11.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 21. 2015. European Central Bank, official/official/administrator. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12. Interview 21. 2015. European Central Bank, official/official/administrator. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 22. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12. Interview 22. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 23. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12. Interview 23. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 12.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 24. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 13. Interview 24. 2015. European Central Bank, senior official. Frankfurt, Germany, March 13.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 25. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, government official. Berlin, Germany, March 17. Interview 25. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, government official. Berlin, Germany, March 17.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 26. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, government official. Berlin, Germany, March 19. Interview 26. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, government official. Berlin, Germany, March 19.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 27. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, senior official. Berlin, Germany, March 23. Interview 27. 2015. Federal Ministry of Finance, senior official. Berlin, Germany, March 23.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 28. 2015. European Parliament, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, February 2. Interview 28. 2015. European Parliament, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, February 2.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 29. 2015. European Parliament, Member of the European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, February 4. Interview 29. 2015. European Parliament, Member of the European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, February 4.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 30. 2015: European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 6. Interview 30. 2015: European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 6.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 31. 2015. Council of the European Union, administrator. Brussels, Belgium, February 9. Interview 31. 2015. Council of the European Union, administrator. Brussels, Belgium, February 9.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 32. 2015. European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 10. Interview 32. 2015. European Parliament, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 10.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 33. 2015. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official/official. Brussels, Belgium, February 11. Interview 33. 2015. European Commission, DG ECFIN, official/official. Brussels, Belgium, February 11.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 34. 2015. Council of the European Union, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 11. Interview 34. 2015. Council of the European Union, official. Brussels, Belgium, February 11.
Zurück zum Zitat Interview 35. 2015. European Parliament, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, February 12. Interview 35. 2015. European Parliament, senior official. Brussels, Belgium, February 12.
Metadaten
Titel
Analysing Leadership I: Germany in the Eurozone Crisis
verfasst von
Magnus G. Schoeller
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12704-6_4