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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

43. Analytic Narratives

verfasst von : Mark Koyama

Erschienen in: An Economist’s Guide to Economic History

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Analytic narratives are used to understand historical phenomena where the data required to employ econometrics is lacking. This methodological approach allows for the analysis of a historical setting using economic theory or arguments combined with historical evidence that can be diverse in nature. Analytic narratives offer interesting alternatives to general formal models which may not be suited to understanding a particular case study or historical institution. A series of examples illustrate potential areas of application in economic history.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Case Studies

Nächstes Kapitel Measurement and Metrics

There are of course many other examples of analytical narratives that cannot be surveyed here due to space constraints. Examples include Johnson and Koyama’s (2014) analysis of the evolution of tax farming in early modern England and France and Hoffman (2012) on the military rise of Europe. In addition to his work on pirates, Leeson has written on the conditions under which trade and cooperation can only in the absence of a formal legal system (Leeson 2014) and on the role of superstitious beliefs in supporting social order and market exchange (Leeson 2017). In medieval economic history, analytical narratives have been used to study craft guilds (Richardson 2005; Richardson and McBride 2009) and the evolution of usury laws (Rubin 2010; Koyama 2010).

Allen, Douglas W. 2002. The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail. Explorations in Economic History 39 (2): 204–231.CrossRef

Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 2000. Analytic Narratives Revisited. Social Science History 24 (4): 685–696.CrossRef

Benjamin, Daniel K., and Levis A. Kochin. 1979. Searching for an Explanation of Unemployment in Interwar Britain. Journal of Political Economy 87 (3): 441–478.CrossRef

Boettke, Peter J. 2000. Review of Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry Weingast, Analytical Narratives. Constitutional Political Economy 11: 377–379.CrossRef

Brownlow, G. 2015. Back to the Failure: An Analytic Narrative of the De Lorean Debacle. Business History 57 (1): 155–181.CrossRef

Edwards, Jeremy, and Sheilagh Ogilvie. 2012. Contract Enforcement, Institutions, and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised. Economic History Review 65 (2): 421–444.CrossRef

Eichengreen, Barry, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1985. Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s. The Journal of Economic History 45 (4): 925–946.

Greif, Avner, 1989. Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders. The Journal of Economic History 49 (4): 857–882.

———. 1993. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition. American Economic Review 83 (3): 525–548.

———. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2012. The Maghribi Traders: A Reappraisal?. Economic History Review 65 (2): 445–469.

Hoffman, P.T. 2012. Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World? The Journal of Economic History 72 (3): 601–633.CrossRef

Irwin, Douglas A. 2000. Did Late-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Tariffs Promote Infant Industries? Evidence from the Tinplate Industry. The Journal of Economic History 60 (2): 335–360.

Johnson, Noel D., and Mark Koyama. 2014. Tax Farming and the Origins of State Capacity in England and France. Explorations in Economic History 51 (1): 1–20.CrossRef

Koyama, Mark, 2010. Evading the ‘Taint of Usury’: The Usury Prohibition as a Barrier to Entry. Explorations in Economic History 47 (4): 420–442.

———. 2012. Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods? The Journal of Legal Studies 41 (1): 95–130.

———. 2014. The Law and Economics of Private Prosecutions in Industrial Revolution England. Public Choice 159 (1): 277–298.CrossRef

Leeson, Peter T. 2007. An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization. Journal of Political Economy 115 (6): 1049–1094.

———. 2009. The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 2014. Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better than You Think. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

———. 2017. WTF?! An Economic Tour of the Weird. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Richardson, Gary. 2005. Craft Guilds and Christianity in Late-Medieval England. Rationality and Society 17 (2): 139–189.

Richardson, Gary, and McBride, Michael, 2009. Religion, Longevity, and Cooperation: The Case of the Craft Guild. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2): 172–186.

Rubin, Jared. 2010. Bills of Exchange, Interest Bans, and Impersonal Exchange in Islam and Christianity. Explorations in Economic History 47 (2): 213–227.CrossRef

Temin, Peter. 2010. The Roman Market Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Titel: Analytic Narratives
verfasst von: Mark Koyama
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: An Economist’s Guide to Economic History
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-96567-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-96568-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96568-0_43