Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
Prohibition of unfair pricing is an area that has seen a growing number of enforcement activities in China. Unfair pricing, also called excessive pricing in some cases, is ruled under Article 17, Paragraph 1, of the Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”), whereby dominant firms are prohibited to “sell commodities at unfairly high prices or buy commodities at unfairly low prices.” In this chapter, we will introduce the relevant legal framework and provide a review of recent typical cases. The major cases include the investigation against Qualcomm Incorporated (“Qualcomm”) by the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) and the landmark decision issued by the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in Huawei v. InterDigital. Both cases are related to licensing patents that are essential to standards. There are also several rulings in the markets of certain essential input products such as natural gas pipelines and essential drugs. Given the role of the Chinese economy in the world, a review of anti-monopoly enforcement in this field would be helpful to practitioners and researchers.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Baron, J., & Spulber, D. F. (2015). Technology standards and standard setting organizations: Introduction to the searle center database. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3073165
Choi, J. P. (2016). FRAND royalties and injunctions for standard essential patents. Global Economic Review, 45(3), 233–250. CrossRef
Deng, F., & Su, S. (2014, Winter). Determining the FRAND rate: U.S. perspectives on Huawei v. InterDigital. Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 2(1).
Deng, J., & Katsoulacos, Y. (2017, Summer). Antitrust sanctioning in China: How can the NDRC guidelines be further improved, antitrust chronicle. Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 1(2).
Evans, D. S., Zhang, V. Y., & Zhang, X. (2014a). Implications of international experience for evaluating unfair pricing under China’s anti-monopoly law. Competition Policy International Asia Column. https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/implications-of-international-experience-for-evaluating-unfair-pricing-under-china-s-anti-monopoly-law/
Evans, D. S., Zhang, V. Y., & Zhang, X. (2014b). Assessing unfair pricing under China’s anti-monopoly law for innovation-intensive industries. https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assessing-unfair-pricing-under-china-s-anti-monopoly-law-for-innovation-intensive-industries/
Han, M., & Li, K. (2013). Huawei v. InterDigital: China at the crossroads of antitrust and intellectual property, competition and innovation. Competition Policy International Asia Column. https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/huawei-v-interdigital-china-at-the-crossroads-of-antitrust-and-intellectual-property-competition-and-innovation/
Harris, H. S. (2015, Summer). An overview of the NDRC decision in the qualcomm investigation. Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 7(2).
Layne-Farrar, A., & Wong-Ervin, K. W. (2017). Methodologies for calculating FRAND damages: An economic and comparative analysis of the case law from China, the European Union, India, and the United States. https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/methodologies-for-calculating-frand-damages-an-economic-and-comparative-analysis-of-the-case-law-from-china-the-european-union-india-and-the-united-states/
Lee, J. (2016). Implementing the FRAND standard in China. Social science electronic publishing. http://www.jetlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Lee_Final.pdf
Leonard, G. K., & Lopez, M. A. (2014). Determining RAND royalty rates for standard-essential patents. https://www.edgewortheconomics.com/files/documents/Determining_RAND_Royalty_Rates_for_Standard-Essential_Patents.pdf
Liu, Z., & Qiao, Y. (2012). Abuse of market dominance under China’s 2007 anti-monopoly law: A preliminary assessment. Review of Industrial Organization, 41, 77–107. CrossRef
Rill, J. (2015, Spring). The application of China’s anti-monopoly law to essential patent licensing: The NDRC/QUALCOMM action. Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 3(2).
Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting. In A. Jae, J. Lerner, & S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation policy and the economy (Vol. 1, pp. 119–150). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Spulber, D. F. (2018). Standard setting organizations and standard essential patents: Voting and markets. The Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Wong-Ervin, K. W. (2017). An update on the most recent version of China’s anti-monopoly guidelines on the abuse of intellectual property rights. Competition Policy International Asia Column. https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/an-update-on-the-most-recent-version-of-chinas-anti-monopoly-guidelines-on-the-abuse-of-intellectual-property-rights/
Ye, R., Zhu, J., & Chen, W. (2013). Determination of whether abuse of dominance by standard essential patent owners constitutes monopoly: Comments on the Antitrust Lawsuit Huawei v. InterDigital. Electronic Intellectual Property Rights, 2013(3), 46–52.
Zhang, V. Y. (2014, Spring). Assessing unfair pricing under China’s anti-monopoly law for innovation-intensive industries. Competition Policy International Journal, 10(1).
- Anti-monopoly Cases on Unfair Pricing in China
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, Frankfurt School