Skip to main content

2022 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Are SHG Loans Demand Constrained in Backward Areas?

verfasst von : Bibek Ray Chauhduri, Ranajoy Bhattacharyya

Erschienen in: Revisiting the Indian Financial Sector

Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Group lending has been less successful in backward areas compared to more advances area. In this chapter, we argue that group formation eases the supply constraints on loan as the banks’ probability of getting back loan increases, but as expected joint liability payment of the risky borrowers increases their demand for loans. As a result, it is possible that the equilibrium level of loans declines if the proportion of risky borrowers is disproportionately high in any area and their probability of success is low. We argue that people living in backward areas are more risk prone due to low level of infrastructural support such as road, electricity, water supply, healthcare centres and low level of educations, and hence, the result can be used to explain why group lending might have been less successful in backward areas. In backward regions, the proportion of safe borrowers and the probability of success of projects are expected to be low. Our model with adverse selection shows that lending under group contracts in that case may come down in backward areas. We prove that if the conditions are such that both proportion of safe borrowers and probability of success of projects are low, demand for loans may come down outweighing the favourable effects of increase in loan availability due to group contracts. The demand side argument is the innovation we have introduced to show that group lending may not necessarily lead to higher lending.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
For instance, The Report of the Committee on Financial Exclusion (2008) concludes that the SHG movement is weaker in regions with higher levels of exclusion: only 33% of SHG linkages are through Regional Rural Banks (RRBs)—the main vehicle through which SHG credit reaches the backward areas. In fact, group loans as a proportion of total loans in backward rural areas in India are about one-third that of non-backward areas (see below). See also Sriram and Kumar (2005).
 
2
Data for number of SHGs linked for a sample of 299 districts from 24 states in India is available in the Micro Finance Innovation Department (MFID), NABARD. Data for the number of rural bank branches and rural credit at the district level was obtained from Branch Banking Statistics published by RBI. Literacy (both male and female) at the district level have been taken from the Census of India 2001. The Sarma Committee Report (1997) was used to demarcate the 299 district into backward and non-backward districts.
 
3
Since we are not interested in any other activity of the bank except those pertaining to this particular branch, in what follows we will de-link the operation of this branch from the rest of the bank’s activities and consider it as a separate entity. We however maintain the assumption that the branch keeps on receiving funds from the bank (at the bank’s cost of obtaining those funds) for dispersal among these rural borrowers.
 
4
See Bardhan and Udry (1999), Chap. 1.
 
5
Note that the linearity of the supply curve is a corollary of the linear response of search costs to loans. If search costs rise at an increasing (decreasing) rate with loans, the supply curve assumes a concave (convex) shape.
 
6
\(q_{2S} = q + (1 - q)\left\{ {p^{m} + \frac{{2p(1 - p)\{ (1 - p)^{m - 1} - p^{m - 1} \} }}{1 - 2p}} \right.\). Detailed calculations given in Appendix 2.
 
7
\(q_{S0} = q + (1 - q)\left. {\left\{ {p^{m} + \frac{{p^{m} (1 - p)\{ n - p + 2\} - p(1 - p)^{m} \{ n + m + p - 1\} }}{2p - 1}} \right\}} \right]\), \(q_{S} = q + (1 - q)\left. {\left\{ {p^{m} + \frac{{p(1 - p)\{ (1 - p)^{m - 1} - p^{m - 1} \} }}{1 - 2p}} \right.} \right]\). Detailed calculations are provided in the Appendix 2.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Aghion, B. A., & Gollier, C. (2000). Peer group formation in an adverse selection model. The Economic Journal, 110(465), 632–643.CrossRef Aghion, B. A., & Gollier, C. (2000). Peer group formation in an adverse selection model. The Economic Journal, 110(465), 632–643.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Aghion, D. B., & Murdoch, J. (2000). Microfinance Beyond Group Lending. Economics of Transition, 8(2), 401–420. Aghion, D. B., & Murdoch, J. (2000). Microfinance Beyond Group Lending. Economics of Transition, 8(2), 401–420.
Zurück zum Zitat Aniket, K. (2007). Sequential group lending with moral hazard. ESE Discussion Paper No. 136, Mimeo, Cambridge University. Aniket, K. (2007). Sequential group lending with moral hazard. ESE Discussion Paper No. 136, Mimeo, Cambridge University.
Zurück zum Zitat Bansal, H. (2004). SHG-Bank linkage program in India—An overview. Journal of Microfinance, 5(1), 21–48. Bansal, H. (2004). SHG-Bank linkage program in India—An overview. Journal of Microfinance, 5(1), 21–48.
Zurück zum Zitat Bardhan, P., & Udry, C. (1999). Development microeconomics. Oxford University Press. Bardhan, P., & Udry, C. (1999). Development microeconomics. Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Bhole, B., & Ogden, S. (2010). Group lending and individual lending with strategic default. Journal of Development Economics, 91(2), 348–363.CrossRef Bhole, B., & Ogden, S. (2010). Group lending and individual lending with strategic default. Journal of Development Economics, 91(2), 348–363.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Boot, A. (2000). Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 7–25.CrossRef Boot, A. (2000). Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 7–25.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chavan, P., & Bhaskar, B. (2009). Micro finance and financial inclusion of women: An evaluation. Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, 30(2), 109–129. Chavan, P., & Bhaskar, B. (2009). Micro finance and financial inclusion of women: An evaluation. Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, 30(2), 109–129.
Zurück zum Zitat Chowdhury, P. R. (2005). Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability. Journal of Development Economics, 77(2), 415–439.CrossRef Chowdhury, P. R. (2005). Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability. Journal of Development Economics, 77(2), 415–439.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chowdhury, P. R. (2007). Group lending with sequential financing, contingent renewal and social capital. Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), 487–506.CrossRef Chowdhury, P. R. (2007). Group lending with sequential financing, contingent renewal and social capital. Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), 487–506.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Das, P. K., et al. (2018). The dynamics of finance-growth-inequality nexus: Theory and evidence for India. CESifo Working Papers ISSN 2364‐1428 (electronic version). Publisher and distributor: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research—CESifo GmbH. Das, P. K., et al. (2018). The dynamics of finance-growth-inequality nexus: Theory and evidence for India. CESifo Working Papers ISSN 2364‐1428 (electronic version). Publisher and distributor: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research—CESifo GmbH.
Zurück zum Zitat Feigenberg, B., Field, E., & Pande R. (2009). Do social interactions facilitate cooperative behavior? Evidence from a group lending experiment in India. Mimeo, Harvard University. Feigenberg, B., Field, E., & Pande R. (2009). Do social interactions facilitate cooperative behavior? Evidence from a group lending experiment in India. Mimeo, Harvard University.
Zurück zum Zitat Fischer, G., & Ghatak, M. (2011). Spanning the chasm: Uniting theory and empirics in microfinance research. In B. Armendáriz & M. Labie (Eds.), The handbook of microfinance: Toh Tuck Link (pp. 59–75). World Scientific Publishing.CrossRef Fischer, G., & Ghatak, M. (2011). Spanning the chasm: Uniting theory and empirics in microfinance research. In B. Armendáriz & M. Labie (Eds.), The handbook of microfinance: Toh Tuck Link (pp. 59–75). World Scientific Publishing.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1), 27–50.CrossRef Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1), 27–50.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ghatak, M., & Guinnane, T. W. (1999). The economics of lending with joint liability: Theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1), 195–228.CrossRef Ghatak, M., & Guinnane, T. W. (1999). The economics of lending with joint liability: Theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1), 195–228.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Guttman, J. (2008). Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending. Journal of Development Economics, 87(1), 51–56.CrossRef Guttman, J. (2008). Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending. Journal of Development Economics, 87(1), 51–56.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jain, S., & Mansuri, G. (2003). A little at a time: The use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs. Journal of Development Economics, 72(1), 253–279.CrossRef Jain, S., & Mansuri, G. (2003). A little at a time: The use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs. Journal of Development Economics, 72(1), 253–279.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Karlan, D., & Gine, X. (2009). Group versus individual liability: Long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups. Working Paper 61, Yale University, Department of Economics. Karlan, D., & Gine, X. (2009). Group versus individual liability: Long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups. Working Paper 61, Yale University, Department of Economics.
Zurück zum Zitat Kodongo, O., & Kendi, L. G. (2013). Individual lending versus group lending: An evaluation with Kenya’s microfinance data. Review of Development Finance, 3(2), 99–108.CrossRef Kodongo, O., & Kendi, L. G. (2013). Individual lending versus group lending: An evaluation with Kenya’s microfinance data. Review of Development Finance, 3(2), 99–108.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kumar, P., & Golait, R. (2009). Bank penetration and SHG-BANK linkage program—A critique. Reserve Bank of India Occasional Paper Series, 29(3), 119–138. Kumar, P., & Golait, R. (2009). Bank penetration and SHG-BANK linkage program—A critique. Reserve Bank of India Occasional Paper Series, 29(3), 119–138.
Zurück zum Zitat Laffont, J. J. (2000). Collusion and group lending with adverse selection. Journal of Development Economics, 70(2003), 329–348. Laffont, J. J. (2000). Collusion and group lending with adverse selection. Journal of Development Economics, 70(2003), 329–348.
Zurück zum Zitat Lehner, M. (2009). Group lending versus individual lending in microfinance. Discussion Paper No. 299, GESY. Lehner, M. (2009). Group lending versus individual lending in microfinance. Discussion Paper No. 299, GESY.
Zurück zum Zitat Mukherjee, A. K. (2013). Microfinance and credit to the ultra-poor. International Journal of Social Economics, 41(10), 975–993.CrossRef Mukherjee, A. K. (2013). Microfinance and credit to the ultra-poor. International Journal of Social Economics, 41(10), 975–993.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat NABARD. (2008). The Report of the committee on financial exclusion. NABARD, India. NABARD. (2008). The Report of the committee on financial exclusion. NABARD, India.
Zurück zum Zitat Petersen, M. (2004). Information: Hard and soft. Mimeo, Northwestern University and NBER. Petersen, M. (2004). Information: Hard and soft. Mimeo, Northwestern University and NBER.
Zurück zum Zitat Rana, K., & Viswanathan, B. (2019). Patterns of access to microfinance loans in India. Review of Development and Change, 24(2), 259–279.CrossRef Rana, K., & Viswanathan, B. (2019). Patterns of access to microfinance loans in India. Review of Development and Change, 24(2), 259–279.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ray Chaudhuri, B. (2010). Outreach of SHG-bank linkage in India—A district-level analysis. In Sudha et al. (Eds.) Conference Proceedings, Financial Inclusion—Aspects, Issues and the Way Forward. Himalaya Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. Ray Chaudhuri, B. (2010). Outreach of SHG-bank linkage in India—A district-level analysis. In Sudha et al. (Eds.) Conference Proceedings, Financial Inclusion—Aspects, Issues and the Way Forward. Himalaya Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.
Zurück zum Zitat Sangwan, S., & Nayak, N. C. (2019). Do outreach approaches differ between self-help group-bank linkage and microfinance institution-based microfinance? Evidences from Indian states. Journal of Social and Economic Development, 21(1), 93–115.CrossRef Sangwan, S., & Nayak, N. C. (2019). Do outreach approaches differ between self-help group-bank linkage and microfinance institution-based microfinance? Evidences from Indian states. Journal of Social and Economic Development, 21(1), 93–115.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Sarma, E. A. S. (1997). Report of committee for identification of hundred most backward and poorest districts. Planning Commission of India. Sarma, E. A. S. (1997). Report of committee for identification of hundred most backward and poorest districts. Planning Commission of India.
Zurück zum Zitat Singh, S., & Kaur, S. (2019). Constraints faced by the members in functioning of self-help groups in Punjab district current. Journal of Applied Science and Technology, 33(1), 1–8. Singh, S., & Kaur, S. (2019). Constraints faced by the members in functioning of self-help groups in Punjab district current. Journal of Applied Science and Technology, 33(1), 1–8.
Zurück zum Zitat Sriram, M., & Sundaram, N. (2015). Financial inclusion index: A customized regional model with reference to economically most backward districts of Tamil Nadu, India. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 6(6), 209–216. Sriram, M., & Sundaram, N. (2015). Financial inclusion index: A customized regional model with reference to economically most backward districts of Tamil Nadu, India. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 6(6), 209–216.
Zurück zum Zitat Sriram, M. S., & Kumar, R. (2005). Conditions in which microfinance has emerged in certain regions and consequent policy implications. IIMA Working Papers 2005-05-03, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department. Sriram, M. S., & Kumar, R. (2005). Conditions in which microfinance has emerged in certain regions and consequent policy implications. IIMA Working Papers 2005-05-03, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
Zurück zum Zitat Stiglitz, J., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review, 71(3), 393–410. Stiglitz, J., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review, 71(3), 393–410.
Zurück zum Zitat Udell, G. (2008). What’s in a relationship? The case of commercial lending. Business Horizons, 51(2), 93–103.CrossRef Udell, G. (2008). What’s in a relationship? The case of commercial lending. Business Horizons, 51(2), 93–103.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Vigenina, D., & Kritikos, S. A. (2004). The individual micro-lending contract: Is it a better design than joint-liability?—Evidence from Georgia. Economic Systems, 28(1), 155–176.CrossRef Vigenina, D., & Kritikos, S. A. (2004). The individual micro-lending contract: Is it a better design than joint-liability?—Evidence from Georgia. Economic Systems, 28(1), 155–176.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Are SHG Loans Demand Constrained in Backward Areas?
verfasst von
Bibek Ray Chauhduri
Ranajoy Bhattacharyya
Copyright-Jahr
2022
Verlag
Springer Nature Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7668-0_8