Skip to main content
Log in

Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Metaphysica

Abstract

Scientific models occupy centre stage in scientific practice. Correspondingly, in recent literature in the philosophy of science, scientific models have been a focus of research. However, little attention has been paid so far to the ontology of scientific models. In this essay, I attempt to clarify the issues involved in formulating an informatively rich ontology of scientific models. Although no full-blown theory—containing all ontological issues involved—is provided, I make several distinctions and point to several characteristic properties exhibited by scientific models that are relevant for individuating scientific models.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This claim is not accepted by all philosophers working on scientific representation. In my currently unpublished manuscript “In Defence of Pragmatic Similarity in Scientific Representation”, I show that the criticisms on similarity are unfounded if a pragmatic version of similarity is upheld (Ducheyne, unpublished manuscript).

  2. It is important to note that at this stage a model does not count as a scientific model of its target. Whether a model counts as a scientific model is the thing we want to establish.

References

  • Bailer-Jones, Daniela (2003), When Scientific Models Represent, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17(1), pp. 59–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Contessa, Gabriele (2007), Representation, Interpretation and Surrogative Reasoning, Philosophy of Science 74(1), pp. 48–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frigg, Roman (2006), Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories, Theoria 55, pp. 49–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, Ronald (1988), Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (University of Chicago Press: Chicago).

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, Ronald (2004), How Models Are Used To Represent Physical Reality, Philosophy of Science 71(5), Supplement, Proceedings of the 2002 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science, Part II: Symposium Papers, S742–S752.

  • Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (1983), Mental Models, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, Mary S. & Morrison, Margaret (eds.) (1999), Models as Mediators, Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paivio, Allan (1986), Mental representations: a dual coding approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Suárez, Mauricio (2003) Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17(3), pp. 225–244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suárez, Mauricio (2004), An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation” Philosophy of Science 71(5), Supplement, Proceedings of the 2002 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science, Part II: Symposium Papers, S767–S779.

  • Teller, Paul (2001), Twilight of the Perfect Model, Erkenntnis 55 (3), pp. 393–415.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to S. Ducheyne.

Additional information

The author is Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation (Flanders).

About this article

Cite this article

Ducheyne, S. Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models. Int Ontology Metaphysics 9, 119–127 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y

Keywords

Navigation