Asymmetric Rivals, State Capacity, and Regional Peace

States engaged in rivalries are positively associated with expansions in state capacity. Several studies over the years have confirmed this basic proposition. But do expansions in state capacity at the state-level mean that states are better off than their rivals? Relative decline of a state vis-à-vis its rival can be a cause of severe strategic vulnerabilities. Given that rivalry is a dyadic concept involving two states, presumably both states improve their state capacity as a consequence of their involvement in a rivalry. Therefore, it is possible that one rival experiences relative decline compared to its rival despite making absolute gains in its state capacity. Given that one hundred and fifty out of two hundred and thirty-six strategic rivalries in the post 1816 period have been asymmetric, little to no attention has been paid to understanding the dynamics of asymmetric rivalries. The question is: given that rivalry is positively associated with state capacity, what type of rivalries tend to be associated with relative power parity vs. relative power disparity, or asymmetry? I argue that when two rivals see each other as their principal rivals, and are engaged in a positional rivalry, they are more likely to see relative power parity because such rivalries tend to be resource intensive. While I find robust evidence for this proposition, I point out that these general results are largely driven by pre-World War II Europe, Asia, and inter-regional rivalries.