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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing

verfasst von : Sujit Gujar, Boi Faltings

Erschienen in: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Crowdsourcing marketplaces link large populations of workers to an even larger number of tasks. Thus, it is necessary to have mechanisms for matching workers with interesting and suitable tasks. Earlier work has addressed the problem of finding optimal workers for a given set of tasks. However, workers also have preferences and will stay with a platform only if it gives them interesting tasks. We therefore analyze several matching mechanisms that take into account workers’ preferences as well. We propose that the workers pay premiums to get preferred matches and auction-based models where preferences are expressed through variations of the payment for a task. We analyze the properties of two matching different mechanisms: Split Dynamic VCG (SDV) and e-Auction. We compare both the mechanisms with Arrival Priority Serial Dictatorship (APSD) empirically for efficiency.

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Fußnoten
1
The workers has to be logged into the system for his availability and hence cannot report early arrival or late departure.
 
3
It should be noted that, the settings of expert crowdsourcing are different than microtasking where the workers finish the task quickly and move on to a next task immediately.
 
4
\(\mu \) takes \(\mathbf {b_j}\)s, \(arr_j,dep_j\) as inputs and produces a bipartite matching. However to simplify notation, we just refer to \(\mu \) as a bipartite matching.
 
5
Note that this is upper bound on competitive ratio.
 
7
Note that we are referring to expert crowdsourcing tasks and not the microtasks. Hence, such rewards are feasible.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing
verfasst von
Sujit Gujar
Boi Faltings
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Buch
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-54228-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-54229-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54229-4_4