In the same way that being the first one to possess an object is generally seen as a valid claim to ownership (Friedman, Van de Vondervoort, Defeyter, & Neary,
2013), people tend to see the original occupants of a territory as owning the land because they were “there first”. In the anthropological literature, this general belief in entitlements for first comers is called autochthony belief (Ceuppens & Geschiere,
2005) and first arrival is seen as an 'historical right' for claiming ownership of a territory (Gans,
2001). Deriving entitlements from first arrival is often taken as self-evident and natural (Geschiere,
2009), and even children perceive first comers to own the land more than those who arrived later (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović,
2015). Furthermore, experimental research has shown that people not only assign territorial ownership based on first arrival, they even transfer ownership to an out-group (at the expense of the in-group) when this out-group is presented as the primo-occupant (Martinović, Verkuyten, Jetten, Bobowik, & Kros,
2020).
Autochthony belief presents territorially established groups with the possibility of excluding groups that arrived later (Ceuppens,
2011; Garbutt,
2006). Anthropological research has shown that autochthony is used by the far-right party in the Flemish part of Belgium to exclude francophone Belgians (Ceuppens,
2011), as well as to exclude non-autochthonous others in Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Ceuppens and Geschiere,
2005). Furthermore, social psychological studies in Europe show that endorsement of autochthony belief among native majority members is associated with prejudice towards immigrants (Martinović & Verkuyten,
2013) as well as collective action against refugees (Hasbún López et al.,
2019). However, previous research has not examined the role of autochthony belief in societies where the dominant group is not autochthonous, such as settler societies. These societies are formed by colonialism, where the original (indigenous) inhabitants have often lost most of their lands to the settlers. Rather than being an ideology that justifies majority ownership, in such contexts, autochthony belief might instead undermine it because the settler majority cannot lay claims to primo-occupancy against indigenous peoples.
Autochthony Belief and Making Amends to Indigenous Peoples
Indigenous peoples in settler societies often occupy marginalized positions and have in many cases lost most of their lands to the colonizers and their descendants. Appeals to autochthony (“we were here first”) have frequently been utilized by these indigenous groups as part of their struggles for rights and sovereignty (Gagné & Salaün,
2012) and against wrongful dispossession (Meisels,
2003). Though marginalized primo-occupant peoples are called “indigenous” rather than “autochthonous”, both terms refer to first comers (the former is derived from Latin and the latter from Greek) and the primary distinction is that “autochthonous” is generally used to refer to primo-occupant peoples who are dominant in a given territory (Zenker,
2011). We define autochthony belief as the general ideological principle that the primo-occupants of any given territory are the ones who are most entitled to that land, irrespective of context or specific groups involved. As a general principle, autochthony belief can be used to attribute ownership to first comers across a range of contexts, including Aborigines in Australia.
The British at the time justified the colonization of Australia and the claiming of territory by arguing that Australia was
terra nullius (“no one’s land”) and therefore not owned by Indigenous Australians (Banner,
2005). The impact of Indigenous Australians’ autochthony claims on current Australian society is illustrated by the repeal of the doctrine of
terra nullius in 1992 (Banner,
2005). This repeal is part of a larger reconciliation process in Australia and represented an important change in the Australian ownership conflict between indigenous peoples and the settler majority. The repeal officially acknowledged that the land was not empty when the settlers arrived, that the taking of Aboriginal lands was illegitimate and that indigenous peoples should have certain entitlements as Australia's first occupants (Attwood,
2005). The official repeal also resulted in the acknowledgement of “native title”, the recognition that Indigenous Australians can make claims to territory based on their primo-occupancy. Since then there have been over 40.000 indigenous land claims just in the state of New South Wales in Australia (Brown,
2016).
The conflict over territory has shaped the relationships between indigenous peoples and majority populations in settler societies (Alfred & Corntassel,
2005), and processes of reparation have been a main feature of attempts to improve relations between the settler majority and Indigenous Australians. Reparations can take a symbolic (e.g. institutional apologies) and instrumental form (e.g. financial compensation). Apologies aim to restore justice by condemning past harms, while compensation aims to restore justice by repairing those harms. Apologies are a way for perpetrator groups to take responsibility for events in the past and to express remorse for those events (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead,
2006) and can help improve intergroup relations and promote intergroup forgiveness (Auerbach,
2004). Official government apologies may or may not include offers of (financial) compensation (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross,
2009), and research suggests that reparations are most effective at improving intergroup relations and promoting reconciliation when they combine apologies and compensation (Okimoto & Tyler,
2016; Philpot, Balvin, Mellor, & Bretherton,
2013).
However, while some research has found that majority people in settler societies tend to be supportive of compensation (Halloran,
2007; Gomersall, Davidson, & Ho,
2000) and institutional apologies (McGarty et al.,
2005), these remain controversial issues (Pettigrove,
2003; Moses,
2011). Consequently, people may also react defensively to reminders of in-group wrongdoing (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson,
2010) and wish to avoid the topic altogether (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown,
2012), which could be detrimental for processes of reconciliation. Therefore, in this paper we examine the desire to avoid the topic in addition to support for both symbolic and instrumental reparations. Just as the repeal of
terra nullius forced the Australian government to address reparations, we expect that White majority’s endorsement of autochthony belief will be related to more support for institutional apologies and instrumental compensation, and to less desire to avoid talking about the past transgressions. We argue that moral emotions play a role in these relationships, as we discuss below.
The Role of Moral Emotions
To the extent that settler majority members believe that primo-occupancy is a relevant basis for claiming ownership, they might perceive the appropriation of indigenous lands as having been illegitimate and in conflict with the moral values of their in-group. That is, the appropriation of Aboriginal lands by British colonizers can be construed as a wrongdoing committed by the in-group. According to social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel & Turner,
1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987), group memberships and their associated category attributes can become internalized into an individual's self-concept, and intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith,
2000) proposes that emotions can derive from self-categorization as a member of a social group. Therefore, the actions of other in-group members, including one’s ancestors, can have affective implications for that individual and generate feelings of "vicarious" remorse or regret (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames,
2005) as well as shame and guilt (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar,
2006). Thus, wrongdoings committed by the in-group may evoke collective emotional responses regardless of one’s personal involvement in these events (Branscombe & Doosje,
2004), because the self can be linked to the wrongdoings through a shared group identity (Tajfel & Turner,
1979). In this paper, we consider guilt, moral shame and image shame, which, respectively, derive from viewing the in-groups’ wrongdoing (1) as a failure of the group’s
behaviour (“we did something wrong”), (2) as a failure of the group’s
moral standing (“we are bad people”) and (3) as harmful to the
image of the group in the eyes of others (“we are seen by others as bad people”). We expect that settler majority support for autochthony belief will be related to stronger experience of guilt, moral shame and also image shame.
Self-conscious moral emotions originating from a (real or perceived) wrongdoing by the in-group are aversive (Branscombe & Doosje,
2004; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek,
2007) and therefore motivate behaviour aimed at reducing these feelings through seeking out positive affect and avoiding negative affect (Schmader & Lickel,
2006). In other words, moral emotions could motivate support for institutional apologies and instrumental compensation (Halloran,
2007; Gomersall et al.,
2000; McGarty et al.,
2005), as well as the desire to avoid the topic (Gausel et al.,
2012), but this will depend on the type of emotion, as we argue below.
First, the appraisal that one’s group is responsible for the wrongdoings committed against another group can elicit feelings of collective guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead,
1998; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel,
2007). Because feeling guilty originates from feeling responsible for specific
acts and how this has affected the victims (Baumeister, Stillwel, & Heatherton,
1994; Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen,
2004), guilt motivates seeking forgiveness, taking responsibility and compensating for the specific wrongdoing. At the same time, guilt is considered an approach-oriented emotion (Schmader & Lickel,
2006), and avoiding the topic should not directly help reduce feelings of guilt (but note that research on this is still limited). Instead, apologies allow perpetrator groups to take responsibility, express feelings of guilt and seek forgiveness for the wrongdoing (Iyer et al.,
2004), and offering compensation allows perpetrator groups to attempt to repair the damage caused (Doosje et al.,
2006). Research has indeed found that guilt is associated with increased support for institutional apologies (Schmader & Lickel,
2006; Haidt,
2003) and compensation (Brown & Cehajic,
2008; Gunn & Wilson,
2011; Halloran,
2007; Schmader & Lickel
2006). We therefore expect that collective guilt will be associated with greater support for offering apologies and instrumental compensation, as well as a lower desire to avoid the topic.
Second, people have a need to see their group as moral (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto,
2007), and immoral behaviour by the in-group, past or present, undermines this self-image (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,
1999), which can lead to feelings of collective moral shame (Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna, & Teroni,
2014). Consequently, moral shame should motivate behaviour that helps restore the self-perceived morality of the group. This includes offering apologies whereby one expresses their respect for morality (Barlow et al.,
2015), but also acts of instrumental compensation that are consistent with the group’s moral values (Ding et al.,
2016; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan,
2011). However, we also expect that moral shame would discourage topic avoidance, because self-perceived morality can only be restored by acting more moral in the present, and avoiding the topic is not moral behaviour. In previous research, moral shame has indeed been shown to be associated with a greater willingness to compensate and apologize, as well as a lower desire for self-defensive behaviour (Silfver-Kuhalampi, Figueiredo, Sortheix, & Fontaine,
2015; Allpress et al.,
2014; Gausel et al.,
2012). We therefore expect that moral shame will be associated with greater support for offering apologies and compensation and a lower desire to avoid the topic.
Third, the real or imagined public exposure of the wrongdoing and the perception that one is (or will be) judged by others for the wrongdoing can be experienced as a threat to the image of the group (Gausel and Leach
2011), which can lead to feelings of collective image shame (Allpress et al.,
2014). Image shame is therefore associated with behaviour aimed at reducing the perception that one’s group is judged by others. Offering institutional apologies and instrumental compensation, all of which are public acts, could therefore help perpetrator groups restore their damaged social image (Benoit & Drew,
1997; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic,
2008). However, research suggests that these may not be the most likely consequences of experiencing image shame. In many cases, the restoration of the (perceived) social image in the eyes of others is most easily and least costly achieved through self-defensive behaviour in the hopes that the issue will simply be forgotten (Rees, Allpress, & Brown,
2013; Lickel et al.,
2005; Allpress et al.,
2014). We therefore expect that image shame will be associated with more support for apologies and reparations, but at the same time we expect it to be particularly associated with a greater desire to avoid the topic.
Bringing together the reasoning on autochthony, moral emotions and reparations, we expect that the positive associations between autochthony and apology and instrumental compensation will be accounted for primarily by guilt and moral shame, and to a lesser degree by image shame. Furthermore, we expect the negative association between autochthony and topic avoidance to be accounted for by guilt and moral shame, while being suppressed by image shame. We tested our propositions in two studies using samples of Australians of Anglo-Celtic (English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh) descent. In Study 1, we only considered the associations between autochthony, guilt and instrumental compensation, whereas in Study 2 we also examined moral and image shame, as well as apologies and topic avoidance. The data and analysis code are available at
https://osf.io/efqxk/.