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Über dieses Buch

This book recapitulates and extends Ned Lebow’s decades’ long research on conflict management and resolution. It updates his critique of conventional and nuclear deterrence, analysis of reassurance, and the conditions in which international conflicts may be amenable to resolution, or failing that, a significant reduction in tensions. This text offers a holistic approach to conflict management and resolution by exploring interactions among deterrence, reassurance, and diplomacy, and how they might most effectively be staged and combined.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction

Abstract
This book revisits and expands on my critique of threat-based strategies of conflict management and discusses the use of reassurance and diplomacy as alternatives. This chapter provides a brief account of the theory and practice of deterrence. I go on to describe how deterrence and compellence have been adapted to the post-Cold War world and how the lessons of the Cold War provide the basis for a critique these applications.
Richard Ned Lebow

Chapter 2. Generational Learning and Foreign Policy

Abstract
Lessons people and policymakers learn from history rarely meet the canons of good scholarship. They tend to be adopted because they are politically useful and psychologically satisfying. Once learned, they guide policy and are often counterproductive. This is due to the lessons themselves but also the likelihood that they will be applied to situations that bear only a superficial resemblance with those on which they are based. I demonstrate this problem in an analysis of the origins application the lessons of World Wars I to the events leading up to World War II, and the lessons of that war to the Cold War.
Richard Ned Lebow

Chapter 3. Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique

Abstract
The strategy of deterrence rests on a number of reinforcing assumptions. They include the belief that challenges are opportunity driven, that would-be challengers conduct a rational assessment of the risks and possible gains of any challenge, that would-be deterrers can successfully fathom and manipulate the cost-calculus of adversaries, and that the best way to do this is through increasing costs by means of threats. Drawing on empirical evidence, I show how these assumptions are all questionable at best, and how the practice of immediate deterrence has the potential to provoke the very behavior it seeks to prevent. I draw on motivational psychology, rational analysis, and domestic politics to explain such outcomes.
Richard Ned Lebow

Chapter 4. Lessons of World War I

Abstract
World War I is a foundational or critical case for theories of international relations that address the causes of war. They include balance of power, deterrence, power transition theory, and rationalist models of decision making. Recent historical work on the underlying and immediate causes of World War I raises serious problems for all these approaches. Among other things, they highlight the importance of context, how it is understood by leaders, their motives and assumptions, and their tendency to exaggerate the constraints acting on them, the freedom of other actors, and their ability to predict events and control risks.
Richard Ned Lebow

Chapter 5. Lessons of the Cold War

Abstract
Contrary to the convention wisdom, Janice Stein and I argue that nuclear weapons and threats provoked rather than preventing the conflict between the superpowers for many of the reasons I lay out in Chap. 3. We further contend that minimal general deterrence was sufficient to restrain the superpowers, as neither was really discontent with the status quo and all leaders on both sides were terrified by the prospect of even a conventional war. Nuclear weapons and forward deployments were a consequence of the Cold War, but after the Helsinki Accords resolved any territorial conflict in Europe, they became the major cause of continuing conflict.
Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein

Chapter 6. How are Conflicts Resolved?

Abstract
Conflict resolution describes a continuum of possibilities that begin with the significant reduction of the likelihood of war between adversaries and can but do not necessarily develop into a pattern of friendly relations at the national, sub-state, and individual levels. Using three empirical cases—Anglo-French, Egyptian-Israeli, and Soviet-American relations—I explore one important pathway to at least the first stage of accommodation. It requires leaders with domestic agendas dependent on conflict resolution, the belief on both sides that confrontation has not been productive, and a willingness to reciprocate the olive branch if extended.
Richard Ned Lebow

Chapter 7. Rethinking Conflict Management and Resolution

Abstract
I briefly review the findings of the chapters and assess the conditions in which deterrence, reassurance, and diplomacy aimed at resolving specific clashes of interest are most likely to work or fail. I go beyond the analysis of individual strategies to develop a holistic approach to conflict management and resolution that integrates deterrence, reassurance, and diplomacy.
Richard Ned Lebow

Backmatter

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