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2018 | Supplement | Buchkapitel

2. Barriers to Reform

verfasst von : Nils Karlson

Erschienen in: Statecraft and Liberal Reform in Advanced Democracies

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The chapter explains why welfare-enhancing institutional change is a difficult task in advanced democracies due to a strong bias in favor of the status quo, which conserves undesirable, inefficient social states and creates barriers to reform, some of which are especially severe in modern welfare states.

This status quo bias has rational, cognitive, and social reasons that can be summarized into:

Special interests and public goods traps
Negativity biases and ideational traps
Public opinion and preference falsification

Hence, both existing institutions and media logic work against reforms even though the status quo is highly inefficient and undesirable from most perspectives.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Introduction

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Titel: Barriers to Reformbarriers to reform reform reform barriers to reform
verfasst von: Nils Karlson
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Statecraft and Liberal Reform in Advanced Democracies
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-64232-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-64233-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64233-8_2