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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Beating the Gatecrasher Paradox with Judiciary Narratives

verfasst von : Rafal Urbaniak

Erschienen in: Logic, Rationality, and Interaction

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

A probabilistic model for the narrative approach to reasoning in legal fact-finding is developed and applied to the gatecrasher paradox.

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Fußnoten
1
The paradox is mathematically the same as the prisoners in a yard scenario [13], where a group of prisoners commits a group killing, and it’s impossible to identify the single innocent prisoner.
 
2
The content of the guilt statement is \(\mathtt {G}\) which has the form of \(G\equiv g_1\wedge \cdots \wedge g_l\) for appropriate \(g_1, \dots , g _l\in \mathcal {L}\).
 
3
In contexts in which it is irrelevant whether a narration is an accusing one or not, I will suppress the superscripts.
 
4
A set of sentences is relevant for the case if it is consistent with the background knowledge and there is a narration such that its posterior probability given all background knowledge together with that set is different from its posterior probability given all background knowledge only. A set of sentences is a minimal relevant set if no proper subset thereof is a relevant set. A sentence is relevant if it or its negation is a member of a minimal relevant subset.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Beating the Gatecrasher Paradox with Judiciary Narratives
verfasst von
Rafal Urbaniak
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_44