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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

BETA: Biometric-Enabled Threshold Authentication

verfasst von : Shashank Agrawal, Saikrishna Badrinarayanan, Payman Mohassel, Pratyay Mukherjee, Sikhar Patranabis

Erschienen in: Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2021

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In the past decades, user authentication has been dominated by server-side password-based solutions that rely on “what users know”. This approach is susceptible to breaches and phishing attacks, and poses usability challenges. As a result, the industry is gradually moving to biometric-based client-side solutions that do not store any secret information on servers. This shift necessitates the safe storage of biometric templates and private keys, which are used to generate tokens, on user devices.

We propose a new generic framework called Biometric Enabled Threshold Authentication (BETA) to protect sensitive client-side information like biometric templates and cryptographic keys. Towards this, we formally introduce the notion of Fuzzy Threshold Tokenizer (\(\text {FTT}\)) where an initiator can use a “close” biometric measurement to generate an authentication token if at least t (the threshold) devices participate. We require that the devices only talk to the initiator, and not to each other, to capture the way user devices are connected in the real world. We use the universal composability (UC) framework to model the security properties of \(\text {FTT}\), including the unforgeability of tokens and the privacy of the biometric values (template and measurement), under a malicious adversary. We construct three protocols that meet our definition.

Our first two protocols are general feasibility results that work for any distance function, any threshold t and tolerate the maximal (i.e. \(t-1\)) amount of corruption. They are based on any two round UC-secure multi-party computation protocol in the standard model (with a CRS) and threshold fully homomorphic encryption, respectively. We show how to effectively use these primitives to build protocols in a constrained communication model with just four rounds of communication.

For the third protocol, we consider inner-product based distance metrics (cosine similarity, Euclidean distance, etc.) specifically, motivated by the recent interest in its use for face recognition. We use Paillier encryption, efficient NIZKs for specific languages, and a simple garbled circuit to build an efficient protocol for the common case of \(n=3\) devices with one compromised.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Round-Optimal Verifiable Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions from Ideal Lattices

Nächstes Kapitel Masked Triples

Note that corrupt parties can of course freely interact amongst themselves.

Recall that by one communication round, we mean a unidirectional/non-simultaneous message exchange channel over a peer-to-peer network. That is, in each round either the initiator sends messages to some subset of the other participating devices or vice versa. In contrast, one round of communication over a broadcast channel means that messages are being sent simultaneously by multiple (potentially all) parties connected to the channel and all of them receive all the messages sent in that round. All our \(\text {FTT}\) protocols use peer-to-peer channels which is the default communication model in this paper.

Note that the creation and broadcasting of these ciphertexts can happen in parallel within a single round of communication between \({P}^*\) and the other parties in the set \(S\).

Our construction can also be extended to work for the related Euclidean Distance function but we focus on Cosine Similarity in this section.

However, we allow the attacker to decide on the corrupt set adaptively after receiving the public values.

The arrowhead denotes that in this round messages are outgoing from party \(\mathcal {P}^*\).

The arrowhead denotes that in this round messages are outgoing from party \(\mathcal {P}_i\).

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Titel: BETA: Biometric-Enabled Threshold Authentication
verfasst von: Shashank Agrawal
Saikrishna Badrinarayanan
Payman Mohassel
Pratyay Mukherjee
Sikhar Patranabis
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2021
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-75247-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-75248-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75248-4_11

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