Beyond the Turnout Paradox

The Political Economy of Electoral Participation

verfasst von: Luis Fernando Medina Sierra

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Buchreihe : SpringerBriefs in Political Science

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox—the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election—is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game’s structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Beyond the Voters’ Paradox

Abstract

The life of the rational-choice theory of electoral participation resembles at times that of Viscount Medardo de Terralba, the fictional character of Italo Calvino’s The Cloven Viscount. In Calvino’s novel, the viscount bravely goes to battle in the frontlines only to be horribly wounded by a cannonball that splits him vertically in half. From that point on, each half, with one arm, one leg, one eye, one nostril and half a mouth, lives on its own. They never meet again, except for the final and felicitous showdown, but before that, their paths cross so that invariably one half sabotages the plans of the other.

Luis Fernando Medina Sierra

Chapter 2. A General Model of Strategic Voting

Abstract

In the last chapter we studied the canonical model of voting and came to the conclusion that the “turnout paradox” is not really a cause of concern in the game-theoretic study of elections because it is easy to generate high-turnout equilibria for very plausible cost parameters. Some relatively minor problems remain. In particular, this model cannot account for realistic margins of victory. Furthermore, its equilibria tend to be hard to describe since they require combinations of pure and mixed strategies for large numbers of players. In this chapter we will see that these difficulties are the result of some excessively restrictive assumptions of the model and that, once we consider more general, and more plausible specifications, they are easily overcome.

Luis Fernando Medina Sierra

Chapter 3. The Stability Analysis of Voting Games

Abstract

In the preceding chapter we established that voting games resemble the well-known “tipping games” of the literature on collective action. This resemblance is hardly surprising. After all, it is possible to conceive of voting games as a more general case of tipping games, one where the threshold level is endogenously chosen by a group of players with opposing interests. This suggests that as we proceed in our analysis themes familiar from the theory of collective action will emerge. After characterizing the solutions of voting games we encountered one such theme: multiplicity of equilibria.

Luis Fernando Medina Sierra

Chapter 4. Electoral Participation Bias and the Welfare State

Abstract

For all the attention that levels of turnout receive in the game-theoretic literature, a case can be made that the most important problem in this regard is not the level of turnout but its bias. In principle, if every segment of the populace voted at the same rates, we could say that the lower the turnout the better; we could obtain the same degree of representation with a cheaper electoral exercise. But in reality this is not the case. There is massive evidence that, in country after country, electoral participation is biased so that those citizens at the top of the socioeconomic ladder vote at higher rates than the rest (Lijphart 1997).

Luis Fernando Medina Sierra

Chapter 5. Toward a Structural Theory of Turnout

Abstract

Political scientists in need of reassurance about the worthiness of their endeavor can do worse than visualize Buenos Aires’s Avenida 9 de Julio. One of the world’s widest urban thoroughfares, by the time it reaches the obelisk, a major symbol of the city, it opens creating a large expanse that is often pressed into service as a public square. Reportedly, the largest demonstrations this open space has witnessed in recent memory were the closing acts of the presidential campaign of 1983, a feat that becomes more impressive when we consider that Argentina has won the football (soccer) World Cup twice. But these elections were special. A military regime that “disappeared” more than 20,000 citizens, after exiling, imprisoning and torturing many others, that had brought about a serious economic collapse and that, in its agony, had embarked upon an irresponsible international war which it fought incompetently, was about to exit history through the back door.

Luis Fernando Medina Sierra

Backmatter

Titel: Beyond the Turnout Paradox
verfasst von: Luis Fernando Medina Sierra
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-73948-9
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73947-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9