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Erschienen in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management 4/2013

01.12.2013

Business groups and corporate transparency in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from India

verfasst von: Chinmay Pattnaik, James Jinho Chang, Hyun Han Shin

Erschienen in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management | Ausgabe 4/2013

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Abstract

This study examines the difference in corporate transparency of firms affiliated with business groups and unaffiliated firms in India. Based on previous studies we measured corporate transparency using equity analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. We find that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent than unaffiliated firms. Lack of transparency leads to higher analyst forecast error and dispersion. This study also finds that business group-affiliated firms with more intra-group capital transactions have higher forecast error and dispersion. The findings of this study suggest that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent due to their reliance on internal capital markets, and therefore lack incentives to disclose information to market participants. As a result, the information asymmetry between business groups and the capital market is higher, restricting the activities of information intermediaries such as equity analysts, who play an important role in the external capital market.

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Fußnoten
1
A yearly breakdown of the sample shows that it is well balanced in each year: 1995: 61 (8.57%), 1996: 114 (16.03%), 1997: 112 (15.75%), 1998: 81 (11.39%), 1999: 76 (10.68%), 2000: 86 (12.09%), 2001: 84 (11.81%), 2002: 54 (7.59%), 2003: 43 (6.04%).
 
2
For example, our sample includes the Tata Group: Tata Chemicals, Tata Motors, Tata Power, Tata Tea, Titan Industries, and Tata Steel; the AV Birla Group: Grasim Industries, Hindalco, Indian Rayon, and Indo-Gulf Fertilizers; Thapar Group: Ballarpur Industries, Crompton Greaves, and JCT Ltd; Wadia Group: Bombay Dyeing; TVS Iyenger Group: TVS Motors and Sundaram Fasteners; and Bajaj Group: Bajaj Auto.
 
3
Before the actual EPS figure is released, analysts usually forecast the EPS of a particular fiscal year several times. The frequency of forecasting differs depending on the analyst. The I/B/E/S collects the forecast data from individual analysts around the world once a month, and with it calculates statistics such as mean, median, standard deviation, etc. Only the final estimates of the analysts are included in the monthly calculation. Thus, the I/B/E/S Summary History Tape provides calculated statistics of analysts’ forecasts of EPS once a month. In this study, we use the final, calculated median of analysts’ forecasts of EPS before the actual EPS is released.
 
4
In Table 1, Panel A, the mean and median of Forecast Error is .04 and .01 respectively. Further, the minimum and maximum values of this variable are .00005 and 1.30, respectively. These values show that the distribution of Forecast Error is skewed, and thus log transformation is needed for normality. For example, the mean and median of Log(Forecast Error) are −4.55 and −4.53, respectively, showing that the distribution of Log(Forecast Error) is closer to normality than the Forecast Error.
 
5
In Table 1, Panel A, the mean of Forecast Dispersion is .027, while the median of Forecast Dispersion is .01. Further, the minimum and maximum values of this variable are .0002 and 1.0181, respectively. These values show that the distribution of Forecast Dispersion is skewed, and thus log transformation is needed for normality. For example, the mean and median of Log(Forecast Dispersion) are −4.56 and −4.59 respectively, showing the distribution of Log(Forecast Dispersion) to be closer to normality than Forecast Dispersion.
 
6
The economic magnitude of the group dummy is calculated as exp(0.42) − 1 ≒ 0.52.
 
7
The economic magnitude of group dummy is calculated as exp(0.54) − 1 ≒ 0.71.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Business groups and corporate transparency in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from India
verfasst von
Chinmay Pattnaik
James Jinho Chang
Hyun Han Shin
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2013
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Asia Pacific Journal of Management / Ausgabe 4/2013
Print ISSN: 0217-4561
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9958
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-011-9273-5

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