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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. Calculated Costs and Non-participatory Membership

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Abstract

This chapter adds to the literature on non-participatory membership by examining not only the exporter’s decision to file, but the importer’s choice to become a defendant as well. It does this by probing why China in its dispute chose to avoid the DSB, while Guatemala and the United States accepted their complainants’ threat to litigate in their respective cases. It therefore addresses why states initiate disputes as well as why prospective defendants pursue and not back down from threats. Other scholars have also looked at the financial, reputational, audience and interdependent payoffs of litigation, but hardly in a single study. This chapter takes a more general approach to costs to test for a wider variety of determinants of non-participatory membership in the DSB. These are then probed through the information-theory approach to assess the litigation choices that China, Jamaica, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States made.

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Metadaten
Titel
Calculated Costs and Non-participatory Membership
verfasst von
Felicia A. Grey
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00458-3_5