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Dieses Kapitel untersucht die Klimapolitik, Instrumente und Ziele von vier kanadischen Provinzen - British Columbia, Ontario, Québec und Nordwest-Territorien - im Kontext der Under2 Coalition (U2C). Es untersucht die unterschiedlichen Grade an Führungskraft und Gefolgschaft im Bereich des Klimaschutzes, die diese Provinzen an den Tag legen, mit besonderem Fokus auf die Auswirkungen der Mitgliedschaft in der U2C. Die Analyse zeigt, dass British Columbia und Ontario als Gründungsmitglieder starke Klimaambitionen an den Tag gelegt haben, wobei British Columbia konsequente politische Aktivitäten an den Tag legt und Ontario politische Instabilität erlebt. Québec, ein früher Schreiner, hat Führungsqualitäten in grenzüberschreitender Regierungsführung und Ressourcennationalismus bewiesen, während der spätere Schreiner Northwest Territories eine ortsspezifische Führungsrolle an den Tag legte. Das Kapitel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Mitgliedschaft in der U2C subnationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen beeinflusst hat, aber das Ausmaß dieses Einflusses variiert aufgrund kontextspezifischer Faktoren. Sie unterstreicht auch die Notwendigkeit weiterer Forschung, um die Mechanismen der Reputationsmotivation in Klimaclubs zu verstehen.
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Abstract
This chapter examines climate policy efforts across four Canadian subnational jurisdictions that joined the Under2 Coalition at different timepoints: founding members British Columbia and Ontario, early joiner Québec, and later joiner Northwest Territories. The analysis compares the adoption of climate policy, policy instruments, and greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets to assess whether founding members demonstrate greater climate ambition than subsequent joiners. British Columbia exhibited sustained climate leadership before and after co-founding the Under2 Coalition, while Ontario’s trajectory was marked by political instability and policy reversals. Québec, despite being only an early joiner and not an Under2 Coalition founder, demonstrated robust climate action intertwined with resource nationalism and paradiplomacy. Northwest Territories, as a later joiner, showed limited policy activity but place-specific innovation in addressing energy needs of remote community. The findings reveal that early Under2 Coalition engagement (whether as founding member or early joiner) facilitates maintenance and enhancement of climate leadership, though context-specific factors—including federal-provincial fragmentation, political transitions, and resource dependencies—significantly shape subnational climate action trajectories and climate policy durability.
Introduction
With regard to its national climate policy, Canada has been described as a laggard (Tobin, 2017). Among other factors, researchers have ascribed this to a resource-driven economy dependent on fossil capital (Tienhaara & Walker, 2021), a tendency to prioritize ambitious rhetoric within international fora over domestic climate action (Winter, 2024), and substantive federal-provincial/territorial fragmentation.
As a highly decentralized federation, Canada grants its provinces—and to a lesser extent territories—considerable jurisdictional autonomy, affording them leeway in their climate policy arrangements (Boyd, 2017; Henstra, 2017). Meanwhile, there is also substantial overlap between federal and provincial authority, which has created some ambiguity and perpetuated a variegated landscape of subnational climate action (Giest & Howlett, 2013), encapsulated by contrasting engagement with U2C.
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Building on multilevel governance literature, this chapter probes Liefferink and Wurzel’s (2017; see also Chap. 2) four ideal types of subnational climate leadership to examine the extent to which founding signatories of U2C (British Columbia and Ontario) have demonstrated more climate policy effort than subnational counterparts that joined earlier (Québec) and later (Northwest Territories).
Founding Members
British Columbia
British Columbia has cultivated ambitious climate policy since 2007—with some labeling it the only carbon neutral jurisdiction in North America (Giest & Howlett, 2013)—and has been described as an “unlikely climate policy vanguard” (Fairbrother & Rhodes, 2023) due to four factors.
First, while existing literature suggests regions with substantive fossil fuel industries generally exhibit low climate ambition (Lamb & Minx, 2020), British Columbia displays high climate ambition despite being a significant fossil fuel “producer” (Fairbrother & Rhodes, 2023, p. 2).
Second, despite possessing subnational competencies to act on climate change, British Columbia stepped up climate ambitions within a (relatively) unsupportive provincial political context: some of its most prominent early climate policies (including the carbon tax) were enacted by a right-of-center Liberal government (Fairbrother & Rhodes, 2023).
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Third, while decarbonizing electricity generation is an important route to GHG emissions reduction for many subnational governments, British Columbia has historically depended on renewable energy sources (e.g., hydroelectric dams) to generate electricity. Unlike other jurisdictions, British Columbia has been unable to draw on this (relatively) low effort means of stepping up climate action.
Finally, British Columbia is a major gasoline consumer: transportation emissions dominate GHG emissions portfolios, while a provincial light-duty vehicle fleet has been described as “one of the world’s least fuel-efficient” (Fairbrother & Rhodes, 2023, p. 3). Meanwhile, commentators often lament US-Canada gasoline prices (due to significantly lower US prices), making regressive measures increasing vehicle fuel taxes contentious.
Despite operating within this (relatively) unfavorable context, British Columbia has exhibited substantive climate ambitions (Boyd, 2017), as we will see in the remainder of this chapter.
Ontario
Ontarian climate policy predates U2C and is shaped by several context-specific factors, including—but not limited to—its status as a key petroleum refining region/financial hub and its substantive population (about 40% of the national total). Ontarian municipalities are also creatures of the province: they have limited autonomy and must replicate provincial climate policy decisions.
Existing literature distinguishes three phases of Ontarian climate policymaking: (1) a 2001–2014 coal phase-out propelled by campaigns for improved air quality; (2) a 2006–2013 feed-in-tariff program centered around promoting greater use of renewable energy sources; and (3) a 2008–2018 cap-and-trade program and associated climate policy retrenchment (Millar et al., 2021). These phases have produced climate policies of variable traction, underscoring the context-specific nature of climate ambition.
First, in 2001, Ontario legislated closure of the Lakeview coal station because of concerns over air quality and electricity supply (Jones, 2014; Millar et al., 2021). In 2003, a newly elected Liberal Government formalized the closure of all power stations by 2007. While this phase-out was postponed twice, it was delivered in 2014. This landmark contribution to Canada’s Kyoto Protocol commitments has been attributed to a salient public health framing that justifies closure in terms of “public health benefits: cleaner air from reduced local pollutants associated with fossil fuels, rather than a focus on climate change” (Raymond, 2020, p. 1130).
Second, in 2006, Ontario introduced a feed-in-tariff to subsidize low-carbon technologies via long-term contracts designed to create investor certainty, promote innovative renewable energy projects, and reduce prices.
Third, in 2008, the Liberal Government initiated a cap-and-trade policy, but was unable to realize this until 2017 (Millar et al., 2021). In 2018, Ontario joined a cap-and-trade scheme in collaboration with California and Québec, signaling a brief period of U2C-affialiated cross-border collaboration.
However, Ontario rapidly withdrew from this initiative. While it was initially skillfully framed by Liberals as economically beneficial (any revenue would be reinvested to improve the energy efficiency of public infrastructure), when the Progressive Conservatives came to power in 2018, they denounced the program as an affront to “working Ontarians” and as a “slush fund” to finance a fanciful liberal wish list (Raymond, 2020, p. 1134).
In summary, Ontario adopted a range of climate policy measures before and after co-founding U2C; these were shaped by context-specific factors including the rise and decline of political administrations.
Early Joiner
Québec
Existing literature describes Québec as having developed “an important web of actions, commitments and cooperative efforts” which transcend borders, span governance levels, and predate U2C participation (Chaloux & Boudreau, 2025, p. 264). Participation in U2C, which Québec joined in 2015 shortly after it was founded, represents a continuation of these diverse activities.
Through early advocacy (since the 1970s) on issues including acid rain, chlorofluorocarbons, and water management, Québec has used climate policy to foster interprovincial and international ties (Boyd, 2017; Teare, 2012). This is epitomized by early collaboration with New England states in the United States in the framework of the NEG-ECP (Selin & Vandeveer, 2005; see also Chap. 3). Chaloux et al. (2022, p. 267) examine Québec’s decades-long efforts to establish itself as an “autonomous paradiplomatic actor in the global climate regime”. They outline how Québec has stepped up its climate ambition through paradiplomacy—acts through which actors project “themselves globally to find support for initiatives, offering expertise and sharing best practices, sometimes to protect their own interests, but more often to gain positive international exposure that reflects well domestically” (Chaloux et al., 2022, p. 268). Québec has joined a range of international initiatives alongside U2C, including Regions4. In 2016, Québec declared itself an autonomous participant of the Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC (Chaloux, 2016). Engagement with these initiatives reflects a desire to accelerate the proliferation of provincial climate “policies, plans and measures” (Chaloux et al., 2022, p. 269).
Nonetheless, various other contextual factors have shaped Québec’s climate policy effort. Key among these is substantive renewable energy capacities (e.g., hydroelectricity and mineral endowments) and the absence of any major oil or gas industry. Its plural electoral system and unicameral legislature marked by majority governments historically advocating contrasting political ideologies (Lemphers et al., 2022)—combined with its cultural distinctiveness (a French-speaking majority), nationalist sentiments, and long-standing Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, which asserts that “what Québec is competent to do within its borders, it is also competent to do beyond its borders” (McSweeney & Ouellet, 2025, p. 164)—have shaped its foreign policy objectives, often in favor of climate action. Another significant factor is Québec’s history of effective grassroots campaigning against extractivist proposals prior to U2C formation.
Later Joiner
Northwest Territories
The existing literature synthesizes endemic factors shaping Northwest Territories climate policy. These include (1) a legacy of federal involvement in territorial governance through “spending powers and control of residual policy areas” (though devolution has ceded more autonomy over time); (2) a regional economy dominated by natural resource extraction (diamond mining and oil and gas extraction constitute about 25% of territorial Gross Domestic Product); (3) public administration, construction, and real estate as significant local economic sectors; (4) a bipartite electricity system, comprising a Thermal and Hydro Zone; and (5) a population of about 44,000, of which approximately half consider themselves Indigenous. Notably, many remote Indigenous communities rely on diesel as a heating/electricity source, while two communities—Inuvik and Norman Wells—are “electrified via natural gas” (Mallett & Cherniak, 2018, pp. 1326–1327).
Moreover, Northwest Territories have effectively linked climate policy to other salient local issues, namely, territorial autonomy. This facilitated the (successful) pursual of climate policy innovation through unconventional modes of generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity. The Northwest Territories have further been described as an “open opportunity structure” where climate policy entrepreneurship could thrive despite the dominance of conventional electricity generation (Mallett & Cherniak, 2018, p. 1333).
In summary, Northwest Territories’ climate policy is shaped by context-specific factors including a legacy of federal governance, resource-dependent economy, significant Indigenous population, and geographically specific opportunity structure. These factors have shaped a unique territorial climate policy approach vis-à-vis subnational counterparts.
Comparative Analysis
Policies
British Columbia expanded its climate policies prior to co-founding U2C, while Ontario significantly expanded its climate policies shortly afterwards. In contrast, Québec and Northwest Territories, as early and later joiners respectively, exhibited notable activity in issuing various climate plans before and after joining U2C, while their enactment of climate policies remained (relatively) low even after joining the coalition (especially for Northwest Territories). In short, these findings (partially) support the central proposition of this volume formulated in Chap. 2 that founding members face stronger reputational incentives to adopt more ambitious climate measures than later joining subnational counterparts. However, they also suggest that being an early joiner matters, too.
The findings additionally suggest that U2C membership can be leveraged to maintain and step up subnational climate ambitions, but that membership is less consequential for the legal codification of climate policy than softer measures, including climate plan adoption. Early and later joiners even exhibit more activity in terms of plan creation compared to U2C co-founders (see Fig. 4.1). The following subsection expands on these findings by comparing the climate policy adoption of British Columbia and Ontario vis-à-vis Québec and Northwest Territories.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates how U2C founding members—British Columbia and Ontario—adopted more climate legislation than early and later joiners. However, Québec and Northwest Territories have been especially active in issuing various climate plans and have even exceeded founding members in terms of policy activity. The remainder of this subsection will examine each subnational entity in detail.
In 2007, British Columbia adopted the GHG Reductions Target Act, signaling the first concerted effort by the provincial Liberal Party to legislate climate action and marking a wider shift in the adoption of climate laws. In 2016, shortly after co-founding U2C, British Columbia implemented the GHG Industrial Reporting and Control Act. It also approved a Pacific NorthWest Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) project and updated its Climate Leadership Plan (which expounds a series of sector-specific commitments to reduce GHG emissions).
In 2021, the CleanBC Roadmap to 2030 was published, building on the wider CleanBC program (which won an U2C award for being the most creative climate policy solution to have emerged from the coalition as of 2021). The new roadmap also facilitated the creation of several specific climate policies, including the 2021 Hydrogen Strategy, the 2022 Low Carbon Fuels Act, and the 2022 Climate Preparedness and Adaptation Strategy.
In short, British Columbia demonstrated relatively consistent climate policy activity—through early policy action, progressive but contested initiatives like LNG development, and an expanding CleanBC framework that won U2C recognition.
In contrast, Ontario’s climate policy trajectory has been shaped by political instability, with significant early innovations dismantled. As such, Ontarian climate policy activity reveals the susceptibility of subnational climate ambition to political instability and demonstrates the (potential) benefits of U2C membership in counteracting these effects. Early administrations (e.g., that of Dalton McGuinty) failed to implement a cross-sectoral approach to climate policy, partly due to a lack of formal processes and procedures to coordinate policy initiatives across ministries in Ontario’s Westminster-based parliamentary system (Jones, 2014).
Nonetheless, the Liberal Government retained majority control of the Ontarian government for eight years, introducing: (1) the Places to Grow Act (2005), (2) Greenbelt Act (2005), and (3) a 2006 feed-in-tariff for renewable energy production (see section “Founding Members”).
In 2009, Ontario legislated the Green Energy and Green Economy Act (GEGEA), framing it as an “economic development policy” that would grow the local renewables sector (Raymond, 2020, p. 1130). This act expanded the feed-in-tariff by raising subsidies: by 2011, Ontario had signed about 5500 MW of wind energy contracts.
However, the GEGEA was dismantled in 2013 by a newly elected Liberal Government: voters “punished” the incumbent government due to perceived (economic) harm to local communities (Stokes, 2016). Elements of the feed-in tariff, including the removal of municipal control on the siting process, allowed policy opponents to create significant resistance to the policy (Millar et al., 2021).
While Ontario adopted more climate policies shortly after co-founding U2C in 2015 (see Fig. 4.1), climate policy development stagnated following the 2018 election of the Progressive Conservatives. Ontario’s cap-and-trade scheme was repealed, about 750 renewable energy projects were canceled, and the GEGEA was removed entirely (which, in essence, made it more difficult to implement new renewable energy projects). In their place—and following the IPCC’s 2018 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C—a Made-in-Ontario Environment Plan was published. However, the plan does not stipulate action in the transportation sector, even though this is a major source of Ontarian GHG emissions. Consequently, in 2019, Ontario’s Auditor General said that the state’s 2030 emissions reduction targets were unobtainable.
In 2024, Ontario published an Affordable Energy Future plan, accompanied by a telling ministerial message describing it as “a pro-growth agenda” rather than ideological dogma at the expense of workers and businesses (Ministry of Energy and Mines Ontario, 2024).
Overall, Ontario adopted various climate policies with variable traction. Several policies were adopted prior to co-founding U2C, while others were adopted afterward. Ontarian climate policy has been notably shaped by political instability, which led to the dismantling of several innovative initiatives (e.g., the GEGEA) adopted after co-founding U2C.
Despite (only) being an early joiner of U2C, Québec adopted its first climate plan in 2001, followed by updates in 2006, 2013, and 2015. After joining U2C in 2015—and serving as North American co-chair 2015–2018—Québec adopted (among other policies) the ZEV Act, a 2030 Plan for a Green Economy, and a refreshed Northern Action Plan 2023–2028.
However, existing literature provides important nuance. Fopa Tchinda and Talbot (2025) uncovered a lack of policy coherence which has constrained Québec climate policy implementation across successive plans. Beigi and Picard (2025) connected the dominance of flagship organizations like Hydro-Québec—a publicly owned electricity utility—to the retrenchment of resource nationalism, in this instance, resource extraction to facilitate state-building.
Consequently, by using decarbonization to pursue state-building, Québec climate policy has continued, rather than departed from, “the province’s pursuit of extractive growth and accumulation” (Beigi & Picard, 2025, p. 16). Climate policy developments—ranging from the 2011 Plan Nord to the Sustainable Mobility Plan 2030—arguably entrench dependencies on “intensive hydroelectric production, mineral extraction and large-scale battery production” (Beigi & Picard, 2025, p. 16).
While Québec has stepped up climate ambitions, it has neglected to integrate diverse voices, including environmental NGOs and Indigenous peoples, into the policymaking process (Chaloux et al., 2015).
Overall, Québec adopted multiple climate policies. While several were adopted prior to joining U2C, several more specific policies (e.g., on ZEVs and sustainable mobility) were adopted after joining. However, by prioritizing state-building, these policies arguably intensify Québec’s legacy of resource extractivism and reify power asymmetries.
To this end, Québec’s U2C participation reflects a growing path dependency (centered around large infrastructure clean energy projects), intensification of (inter)national climate commitments, and growing commitment to climate paradiplomacy. The presence of a range of complex, interlocking contextual factors shaping climate ambitions makes it difficult to discern the extent to which U2C membership has had a singular influence on Québec’s climate policy ambitions.
As a later joiner, Northwest Territories adopted the fewest laws but the most climate plans. Beginning in 2001, Northwest Territories published a series of Greenhouse Gas Strategies covering 2001–2015. Notably, these climate policies prioritized corporate over jurisdiction-wide emissions.
Following a 2012 Energy Charrette, Northwest Territories released an Energy Plan, pivoting from reactive energy management toward proactive investment in renewables (e.g., hydro, solar, biomass), to reduce reliance on diesel in off-grid communities, increase support for energy efficiency initiatives across residential, commercial, and government sectors, and strengthen partnerships with Indigenous governments and local communities in energy planning and delivery. The plan also stipulated support for solar photovoltaic installations in remote communities (e.g., Colville Lake), expansion of biomass heating systems in public buildings, and ongoing support for Arctic Energy Alliance-affiliated programs.
In 2016, Northwest Territories adopted the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change (PCF), a federal government-led initiative designed to align subnational actors with the Paris Agreement. While the framework was designed to introduce a degree of equivalency across Canadian jurisdictions (Mascher, 2018), it has been critiqued as a top-down governance solution which reinscribes asymmetric settler-colonial relations, violates Indigenous rights, and systematically excludes Indigenous peoples (Reed et al., 2021).
In 2018, Northwest Territories published a 2030 Energy Strategy and a Climate Change Strategic Framework, setting ambitious goals to reduce diesel usage in remote communities. A 2022–2025 Energy Action Plan then outlined actions and investments needed to meet the goals of the 2030 Energy Strategy, including projects to enhance renewable energy deployment, improve energy efficiency, and support clean transportation. Finally, in 2023, Northwest Territories became the second Canadian jurisdiction (after British Columbia) to enact the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Implementation Act.
In short, Québec and Northwest Territories, as early and later U2C joiners, respectively, adopted a range of climate policies which predate U2C membership. Québec pursued ambitious climate planning since 2001 and later intensified its action through major hydroelectric and mineral extraction projects, reflecting path-dependent resource nationalism. Its U2C membership coincided with expanded paradiplomacy and the enactment of numerous sector-specific policies. In contrast, Northwest Territories climate policy evolved through community-focused energy strategies aimed at reducing diesel reliance and enhancing autonomy. The adoption of plans after joining U2C amplified its focus on renewables, Indigenous collaboration, and rights-based frameworks. While Northwest Territories had adopted GHG emissions reduction strategies before joining U2C, the jurisdiction-wide policies it adopted afterward were notably more ambitious.
Policy Instruments
This subsection compares similarities and differences between the climate policy instruments adopted by each subnational actor (see Fig. 4.2).
Fig. 4.2
Policy instruments to reduce regional GHG emissions
British Columbia introduced three notable policy instruments via their 2008 climate plan: (1) a Carbon Tax; (2) a Clean Energy Standard (or CES, which banned coal-fired electricity generation and required 90% of new electricity generation to come from zero-emission sources); and (3) a 2010 Low Carbon Fuel Standard (which stipulated Renewable and Low Carbon Fuel Requirements; Fairbrother & Rhodes, 2023).
The 2008 carbon tax was designed to reduce fossil fuel consumption. However, it was repealed in 2025 because of a (political) desire to prioritize economic recovery.
The CES, conversely, was particularly consequential and immediately resulted in the cancelation of new coal-fired and gas-fired electricity plants, making it one of the most impactful policies at that time (Fairbrother & Rhodes, 2023).
Similarly, British Columbia increased Low Carbon Fuel Standard stringency over time by widening its scope (e.g., introducing carbon intensity reduction requirements for jet fuels, starting at 2% in 2026 and increasing to 10% in 2030) and by enhancing reductions targets (e.g., in 2022, British Columbia amended the 2030 reduction target from 20 to 30% below 2010 levels by 2030).
Since co-founding U2C, British Columbia has introduced a suite of other policy instruments, including a 2018 Better Buildings energy efficiency program, a 2019 CleanBC Industry Fund, and a 2019–2024 Industrial Incentive Program.
Ontario has adopted various policy measures to reduce GHG emissions. Of these, several (e.g., coal phase-out, feed-in-tariff, and ZEV uptake measures) were implemented before co-founding U2C, while others (e.g., a cap-and-trade scheme) were adopted after.
Between 2006 and 2007, Ontario adopted a feed-in-tariff to support renewable energy development, introduced MoveOntario 2020 to increase public transport usage, and created a Next Generation Jobs Fund to promote low-carbon industry growth.
To promote EV uptake, Ontario introduced an Incentive Program in 2010 to support and reward early adopters of EVs and to stimulate market demand (Erutku, 2020). This initial scheme was further bolstered in 2016 and 2018.
Meanwhile, Ontario adopted a cap-and-trade scheme in 2017 after joining U2C. However, the rapid repeal of this instrument (see section “Founding Members”) underscores the salience of economic framings in determining the longevity of climate policy instruments despite the historic prioritization of climate action (Young et al., 2022).
Despite joining U2C shortly after it was founded, Québec adopted a variety of climate policy instruments (Chaloux & Boudreau, 2025).
In 2007, Québec became one of the first North American subnational actors to introduce a carbon levy and, in 2013, co-created a carbon market with California by integrating and harmonizing two pre-existing cap-and-trade programs (Boyd, 2017). This established the first “multisectoral carbon market in North America, and the second most important carbon market in the world after the European Union” (Chaloux, 2016). In 2017, Québec and California furthered collaborative ambitions by legislating greater transparency and deeper integration of the program, in accordance with the Paris Agreement. Québec retained the scheme in 2025 despite widespread subnational repeals following the termination of a Federal Consumer Carbon Tax, underscoring the importance of transboundary collaboration within an otherwise unsupportive national policy context.
In 2016, after joining U2C, Québec stepped up activity on transportation electrification, becoming the first province to adopt a ZEV uptake mandate (Aubertin et al., 2024). Lemphers et al. (2022, p. 9) suggest the agency of subnational climate policy actors was crucial to securing this mandate without a major provincial automotive industry.
Northwest Territories introduced a limited number of policy instruments before joining U2C, including a Capital Asset Retrofit Fund to improve the energy efficiency of government-owned buildings and an Arctic Energy Alliance to provide jurisdiction-wide energy efficiency education, technical support, and funding. Meanwhile, a 2012 Energy Charette—a territory-wide, multi-stakeholder consultation process—established broad consensus on the need to transition away from fossil fuel energy dependencies (e.g., diesel in remote communities).
In 2017, Northwest Territories introduced a Buildings and Industry grant to encourage commercial and industrial sectors to invest in energy efficiency upgrades and/or energy systems. Similarly, in 2018, an additional GHG grant program was introduced, offering funding for clean energy projects and/or retrofits of publicly owned infrastructure.
The PCF—designed to help fulfill Canada’s commitments under the Paris Agreement—stipulated the introduction of a pan-Canadian carbon price by the end of 2018 (c.f. Mascher, 2018). However, in recognition of the various carbon pricing initiatives already in place across Canada, provinces and territories were granted flexibility to adopt either a carbon tax, cap-and-trade, or hybrid system. In 2019, Northwest Territories opted for a carbon tax on fuels, starting at $20 per ton and increasing annually to $50 per ton. There were some exemptions to this tax: aviation fuel was excluded, residents/small businesses received a 100% rebate for any heating fuel, and a Cost-of-Living Offset was introduced to reduce residential impacts. To align with changes in national-level carbon pricing policies, the tax was repealed for all consumers except large emitters in 2025.
Finally, in 2022, Northwest Territories emulated other U2C members by introducing a ZEV measure to support the installation of related infrastructure—an initiative championed by U2C.
In summary, all four regions implemented various policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions. Québec and British Columbia were early adopters of a carbon tax (in 2007 and 2008, respectively). Notably, Québec expanded its carbon market in collaboration with California in 2013. Ontario was the second of the four jurisdictions to create a cap-and-trade system in 2017 (however, this was repealed after just one year). All actors granted various subsidies early on to promote more climate-friendly behaviors. British Columbia and Ontario have most actively implemented regulatory measures, especially standards for transport, energy generation, and energy efficiency in buildings. All four jurisdictions generally implemented only a limited number of informational or voluntary policy measures. Finally, British Columbia and Québec led on information and training measures since early on.
Targets
All four subnational entities adopted GHG emissions reduction targets with various time frames: short, medium, or long term (see Fig. 4.3). Short- and medium-term targets are generally considered to be the most ambitious as they put immediate pressure on policymakers to take climate action.
The findings suggest that co-founders of U2C do not necessarily adopt more ambitious (short-term) climate targets than early and later joiners: while British Columbia adopted a short-term target prior to co-founding U2C, Ontario did not, and both have since refrained from adopting such targets. Similarly, while Québec adopted a short-term target prior to joining the coalition, Northwest Territories adopted a short-term target in 2018 after joining U2C.
Significantly, British Columbia and Ontario committed to long-term GHG emissions reduction prior to participating in U2C, while Québec and Northwest Territories adopted long-term targets after joining the coalition.
Québec and British Columbia were the first of the four regions to adopt net-zero targets in 2020 and 2021, respectively, followed by Northwest Territories in 2024.
In short, the findings are mixed: they suggest co-founders of U2C do not necessarily adopt more ambitious climate targets than early and/or later joiners. While U2C membership might in some instances (e.g., Northwest Territories) support target-setting, this activity appears to be largely context-specific and a substantive political achievement. This might go some way to explaining the uniformity in the adoption of (comparatively less contentious) long-term targets, whereby co-founders adopted these targets prior to creating the coalition and other states adopted these targets after joining it.
Leadership
The analysis revealed varied and evolving yet fragile modes of subnational climate leadership associated with U2C membership.
In line with the existing literature (c.f. Dale et al., 2020), British Columbia exhibited climate leadership before and after co-founding U2C, adopting various climate policies, instruments, and targets, including a landmark 2008 carbon tax. While substantial renewable energy capacities and devolved competencies facilitated structural leadership, co-founding U2C provided a valuable opportunity to maintain and step up climate ambitions within a (broadly) unsupportive national context. However, examples of (contested) entrepreneurial and cognitive leadership were also identified, including efforts to articulate a “progressive extractivism” storyline to legitimize LNG industry development (Chen, 2020). While proponents of LNG framed it as symbolically “cleaner” than other “dirtier” energy sources (e.g., coal, oil; Chen & Gunster, 2016), opponents highlighted its potential to ossify power inequities and extractive ideologies. Similarly, British Columbia repealed its carbon tax in 2025. In summary, while U2C membership provided an opportunity to maintain leadership credentials, it did not fundamentally alter the contested, context-specific nature of climate action.
Ontario’s climate leadership was marked by political instability. For example, cognitive leadership is inherent in Ontario’s early coal phase-out framed around public health benefits. Its feed-in-tariff program and 2009 GEGEA signaled further cognitive and entrepreneurial leadership through efforts to rebrand Ontario as a “green leader” (Nishimura, 2012; Stokes, 2016). However, Ontario’s cap-and-trade scheme was repealed shortly after co-founding U2C, amid public backlash following its depiction as a blight to working Ontarians. In short, Ontario illustrates how while co-founding U2C can (seemingly) create strong reputational incentives to maintain climate ambitions, climate leadership remains vulnerable to context-specific factors (e.g., adversarial politics).
Québec exhibited climate leadership despite (only) being an early joiner. Early ratification of a carbon levy and co-creation of a cap-and-trade system (with California) situated Québec as leading on collaborative, transboundary governance. A 2016 ZEV mandate further demonstrated instrumental leadership on transportation electrification. Nonetheless, Québec’s climate ambitions are intertwined with resource nationalism: state-led hydroelectric and mineral extraction projects bolstered state-building aspirations that prioritize resource accumulation over participatory policymaking. In short, Québec exemplifies how while climate leadership can step up ambition, it can also reinscribe inequities.
Despite being a later joiner and (largely) resembling a climate follower (e.g., on legislative and instrument adoption) facing weaker reputational incentives, Northwest Territories exhibited some leadership traits. Contextual factors (e.g., remote communities) necessitated innovative climate action distinct from more industrialized provinces. Consequently, Northwest Territories used cognitive leadership to integrate climate action into salient local issues and thereby step up climate action (e.g., territorial autonomy). Despite exhibiting less policy activity than U2C co-founders and (largely) exhibiting followership, Northwest Territories has begun to exercise place-specific leadership, seemingly facilitated primarily by U2C membership.
Overall, British Columbia, Québec, and Ontario exhibited sustained leadership despite variable temporal engagement with U2C. While Northwest Territories was less prolific, it has (seemingly) used U2C to step up its climate ambitions, recently demonstrating cognitive leadership by integrating climate action into salient local issues. In short, these findings suggest that early engagement with U2C (either as a founding member or early joiner) facilitates the maintenance and/or enhancement of climate leadership, and while there is limited difference between founding members and early joiners, both actors (broadly) demonstrate more ambitious climate activities than later joiners. However, they also reveal the diverse, context-specific manifestations of subnational climate leadership.
Conclusion
This chapter has explicated the modes of leadership and followership exhibited by two U2C co-founders compared to one early and one later joiner, with reference to the existing literature on subnational climate action and a novel synthesis of the climate policies, instruments, and targets adopted before and after joining the coalition.
The analysis reveals that Canadian subnational climate policy often stems from a combination of national-level leadership vacuum and place-specific contextual factors. All four subnational actors have engaged with U2C to varying degrees, but the extent to which their involvement marked a change in their modes of leadership and/or followership varies.
The findings suggest that, facing strong reputational incentives, U2C co-founders leveraged the coalition to maintain and enhance subnational climate ambitions, which often predated the coalition. Meanwhile, in the absence of national-level climate leadership, Québec (as an early joiner) appears to have used it as an opportunity to consolidate more established ambitions centered around climate paradiplomacy, and the Northwest Territories (as a later joiner) appear to have used it to emulate subnational counterparts. Thus, the temporality of U2C membership, and ensuing strength of reputational incentives, (seemingly) matters. Nonetheless, analysis also revealed how the adoption and repeal of ambitious climate measures is susceptible to context-specific changes within individual jurisdictions, exemplified by the widespread diminution of cap-and-trade measures in 2025.
Even so, it remains difficult to prove definitively that U2C membership has a singular influence on subnational climate action: while the Canadian case suggests that early and later joiners may well emulate best practice solutions of founding members, it is also feasible that these actors gravitate toward the same/similar policy solutions independent of U2C participation, and that the increased density of policy measures is merely emblematic of the wider proliferation of substate climate ambitions post Paris. In short, more in-depth process tracing analysis is warranted to examine why, how, and to what effect different actors engage with U2C over time (i.e., the mechanisms of reputational motivation) as well as with any other climate clubs. This would enable researchers to more closely examine their implications for subnational climate leadership and followership.
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