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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

CAPA: The Spirit of Beaver Against Physical Attacks

verfasst von : Oscar Reparaz, Lauren De Meyer, Begül Bilgin, Victor Arribas, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov, Nigel Smart

Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2018

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce two things: On one hand we introduce the Tile-Probe-and-Fault model, a model generalising the wire-probe model of Ishai et al. extending it to cover both more realistic side-channel leakage scenarios on a chip and also to cover fault and combined attacks. Secondly we introduce CAPA: a combined Countermeasure Against Physical Attacks. Our countermeasure is motivated by our model, and aims to provide security against higher-order SCA, multiple-shot FA and combined attacks. The tile-probe-and-fault model leads one to naturally look (by analogy) at actively secure multi-party computation protocols. Indeed, CAPA draws much inspiration from the MPC protocol SPDZ. So as to demonstrate that the model, and the CAPA countermeasure, are not just theoretical constructions, but could also serve to build practical countermeasures, we present initial experiments of proof-of-concept designs using the CAPA methodology. Namely, a hardware implementation of the KATAN and AES block ciphers, as well as a software bitsliced AES S-box implementation. We demonstrate experimentally that the design can resist second-order DPA attacks, even when the attacker is presented with many hundreds of thousands of traces. In addition our proof-of-concept can also detect faults within our model with high probability in accordance to the methodology.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Faster Homomorphic Linear Transformations in HElib

Nächstes Kapitel Fast Message Franking: From Invisible Salamanders to Encryptment

Since our implementation handles 3 shares, we expect to detect leakage in the third order. Due to platform noise, this is not visible.

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Titel: CAPA: The Spirit of Beaver Against Physical Attacks
verfasst von: Oscar Reparaz
Lauren De Meyer
Begül Bilgin
Victor Arribas
Svetla Nikova
Ventzislav Nikov
Nigel Smart
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2018
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-96883-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-96884-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_5

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