To what extent and how soon expectations for CBDC are met depends on the design principles for implementing CBDC. The chapter discusses the Top Ten of CBDC design principles, dealing, for example, with the provision of CBDC according to market demand; the convertibility of CBDC and other types of money; open or restricted access to CBDC and its quantitative availability; whether central-bank support and government guarantees for bank money can be reduced; or the channels by which CBDC is circulated.
Moreover, a number of concerns about CBDC are addressed, for example, whether CBDC increases or decreases the likelihood of a run on bank money; what happens to the functioning of the monetary system when CBDC is increasingly substituted for bank money; or how banks deal with CBDC side by side with bank money, specifically how banks continue to finance their operations.
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A variety of approaches to CBDC design principles inter alia in IMF (2018), Kumhof and Noone (2018), Ingves (2018), Sveriges Riksbank (2017, 2018a, b), Meaning et al. (2018), Barrdear and Kumhof (2016), and Bindseil (2019).
Georgieva (2022), Federal Reserve (2022), McKinsey Global Institute (2021, p. 7), De Bode et al. (2021), BIS (2021, pp. 65–95), Fatas (2021), Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli (2021), Boar et al. (2020, p. 4), OMFIF and IBM (2019, pp. 6, 13), and BIS (2019, p. 9).