Abstract
Ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed, the probability of conflict goes to zero. However, conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender’s reservation value. I employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power-centric theories of world politics, balance of power and power transition theory. The formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity, information asymmetries are greatest, thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict. Uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities. Recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power-centric explanations of world politics.
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Reed, W. (2006). Information, Power, and War. In: Trappl, R. (eds) Programming for Peace. Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4390-2_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4390-2_13
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