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Theory and Explanations

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Sharing Security

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Abstract

International regimes cannot themselves generate the resources they require to fulfil their objectives. NATO is entirely dependent on member states to provide military capability. The UN, IMF and EU depend for their survival on the willingness of their members to meet their assessed budgetary contributions. The success of the Climate Change Convention depends on whether states fulfil their commitments to reduce their output of greenhouse gases. Central to the effectiveness of all these regimes, therefore, is the ability of states to agree how to share the costs of providing common goods amongst themselves. For only states possess the ability to mobilise the resources — financial or otherwise — on which the provision of so-called ‘international public goods’ depend.

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Notes

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

    Malcolm Chalmers

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  1. Malcolm Chalmers
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© 2000 Malcolm Chalmers

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Chalmers, M. (2000). Theory and Explanations. In: Sharing Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-333-97740-8_1

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