Abstract
If opportunity costs are about cabbages, merit wants are about philosopher kings. These rival doctrines may speak in the language of economics but the guiding hand behind them is that of politics. The great questions are there: Who should rule? How should they rule? Who will govern the governors? How might subjective preferences be converted into collective rationality? In short, the question of whether decisions should be made by social interaction, with many minds contributing, or by intellectual cogitation, with an elite acting, in effect, as a single intelligence, will reappear here in different doctrinal form. The better to get to know them, we shall approach opportunity costs analytically, by decomposition, and historically, by evolution, for from these seemingly simple garden-variety notions of cost and merit, we shall peel off layers of ideology. If our economic onion causes more than a few tears, we can say only that it’s better to be sad theoretically than actually sorry for absentmindedly eliminating economics from public policy.
The notion that the cost of any action can only be measured by the value of the opportunities foregone by taking the action is at the same time trivial and profound.
Walter Nicholson in Microeconomic Theory
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Notes
Armen Alchain, “Cost,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol. 4 (1958), p. 472.
Paul Samuelson, Economics ( New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978 ), p. 5.
Walter Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory ( Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1972 ), p. 5.
Frank Knight, “Notes on Utility and Cost,” mimeograph, University of Chicago, 1935, p. 18
cited in James Buchanan,Cost and Choice, Chicago: Markham, 1969.
Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1964 ), p. 917.
Armen Alchian and William Allen, Exchange and Production Theory in Use ( New York: Wadsworth, 1977 ), p. 228.
David I. Green, “Pain Cost and Opportunity Cost,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 8 (January 1894), pp. 218–229.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Andrew Skinner, ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex Eng.: Pelican, 1970 ), p. 47.
David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (New York: Dutton, Everyman Press, 1933), chapter 1, section 1.
Karl Marx, Capital (Newark: International, 1967), Vol. 1, chapter 1.
Blaug, op. cit., p. 492. He suggests reading Wicksteed’s Common Sense of Political Economy (London:G. Routledge, 1933, 1910), pp. 391 ff.
Eric Roll, History of Economic Thought ( Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 1974 ), p. 404.
Alfred Marshall, Principes d’ Economique Politique 2 vols. (Gordon 1971).
See especially Frank Knight, “A Suggestion for Simplifying the Statement of the General Theory of Price,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 36 (June 1928), 353–370.
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, 3rd ed. ( New York: Macmillan, 1966 ), p. 22.
Von Wieser, Social Economics, op. cit., A. F. Hinricks, trans., reprint of 1927 ed. ( New York: Kelly Press, 1967 ).
Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications (New York: Norton, 1975) 1970, pp. 157–158.
Frank Knight, The Ethics of Competition ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935 ), p. 245.
See, for example, Roland McKeon’s piece on “The Use of Shadow Prices” in Samuel Chase, Jr., ed. Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution National Committee on Government Finance, Studies in Government Finance, 1968.
Mancur Olson, Jr., “Economics, Sociology, and the Best of All Possible Worlds,” Public Interest (Summer 1968 ), pp. 96–118.
Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance ( New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969 ), p. 8.
Musgrave, “Public Expenditures,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), Vol. 13, p. 156.
John G. Head, “On Merit Goods,” Finanzarchiv, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1988), p. 2.
Allan C. Pulsipher, “The Properties and Relevancy of Merit Goods,” Finanzarchiv, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1971), p. 278.
Elisha Pazner, “Merit Wants and the Theory of Taxation,” Public Finance, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1972), p. 461.
Peggy and Richard Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 81.
A. Culyer, “Merit Goods and the Welfare Economics of Coercion,” Public Finance, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1971), p. 565.
Charles E. McLure, Jr., “Merit Wants: A Normatively Empty Box,” Finanzarchiv, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1988), p. 481.
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© 1979 Aaron Wildavsky
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Wildavsky, A. (1979). Opportunity Costs and Merit Wants. In: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04955-4_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04955-4_8
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