Abstract
The main aim of this book thus far has been to describe, as fully as possible, the evolution of British nuclear weapons policy and the factors that have influenced it. However, it would be wrong to conclude without some attempt to assess the arguments for and against Britain remaining a nuclear power.
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Notes
Memorandum by Ministry of Defence (SC OE/73/1) Second Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1975–7, para 32.
The description is that of former US Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, taken from a document prepared by the Congressional Research Service, for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC, US GPO, 1975). Britain is discussed on pp. 10–14.
Roger D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980S (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 121–3.
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© 1980 Royal Institute of International Affairs
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Freedman, L. (1980). Rationales. In: Britain and Nuclear Weapons. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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