Abstract
The period of the late 1950s and early 1960s was one of great turmoil in weapons technology and strategic thinking. Increasingly the wisdom of the nuclear bias of NATO’s strategy was questioned as the Soviet Union made impressive strides in the development of its own nuclear capability. Serious doubts were raised as to whether it was realistic to expect an American President to initiate a nuclear war, with the probable consequence of the devastation of his own country, in the event of conventional attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe.
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Notes
So remarkable in fact that President Kennedy asked Professor Richard Neustadt to prepare a study of the matter. A version appears in Professor Neustadt’s Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
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© 1980 Royal Institute of International Affairs
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Freedman, L. (1980). From Skybolt to Polaris. In: Britain and Nuclear Weapons. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-30511-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-16388-5
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