Abstract
We have seen that for Peirce abduction is an inferential process in a very particular sense (cf. chapter 1, sections 1.2 and 3.2), abduction is logical inference […] having a perfectly definite logical form. […] The form of inference, therefore, is this: The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true (CP 5.188-189, 7.202).
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Magnani, L. (2001). Governing Inconsistencies. In: Abduction, Reason and Science. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8562-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8562-0_6
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