Skip to main content

Hypothesis Withdrawal in Science

  • Chapter
Abduction, Reason and Science
  • 296 Accesses

Abstract

In the previous chapter (section 2.5) I illustrated that contradiction is fundamental in abductive reasoning and that it has a preference for strong hypotheses which are more easily falsified than weak ones. Moreover, hard hypotheses may be more easily weakened than weak ones, which prove difficult subsequently to strengthen. Unfortunately, hypotheses may be unfalsifiable. In this case, it is impossible to find a contradiction from the empirical point of view but also from the theoretical point of view, in some area of the related conceptual systems. Notwithstanding this fact, it is sometimes necessary to construct ways of rejecting the unfalsifiable hypothesis at hand by resorting to some external forms of negation, external because we want to avoid any arbitrary and subjective elimination, which would be rationally or epistemologically unjustified.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Magnani, L. (2001). Hypothesis Withdrawal in Science. In: Abduction, Reason and Science. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8562-0_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8562-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-4637-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-8562-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics