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NATO, Climate Change, and International Security

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Abstract

This chapter examines the literature on the potential security consequences of climate change. In particular, this chapter outlines two critical aspects of climate security: the role of the Arctic and the trans-boundary and international nature of climate change (and associated impacts). Finally, this chapter also considers the extensive literature that has attempted to model the linkage between climate change and security through empirical approaches. I find that the academic literature reveals important misalignments when considering climate security with respect to NATO. Firstly, the research evaluated is based upon historical data that is unlikely to reflect the future environment under conditions of unprecedented climate change. Secondly, the research insufficiently accounts for the globally (or trans-boundary) cascading consequences that may arise from climate variation in other regions. Thirdly, the various definitions of security used in the literature do not correspond to the definition used by NATO.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    John D. Steinbruner, “World Affairs Council Keynote Address: The International Security Implications of Climate Change,” 2013.

  2. 2.

    Topics under environmental security include the following: natural resource scarcity and violence linkages; natural resource abundance and violence; resource scarcity and cooperation; environmental degradation resulting from war or conflict; and issues relating to human security. Mark R. Read, “Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for Climate Change Security Challenges and Opportunities” (Pennsylvania State University, 2014), 48.

  3. 3.

    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

  4. 4.

    Ibid., 12. In Climate and Social Stress, the US National Research Council noted that “the types of economic factors associated with increased susceptibility to harm from climate events generally include low levels of per capita income, a lack of livelihood assets and opportunities, poor functioning of local markets, and a high degree of dependency on agricultural food imports to meet basic needs.” Note, also, that many researchers believe the projections of the IPCC to be modest, and actual change could be more severe.

  5. 5.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 3. On the point of national security policies, this has already happened in several instances. In particular, the United States released its Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap in October 2014, which followed various other policies related to climate.

  6. 6.

    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming of 1.5 °C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5 °C above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change,” ed. Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. (Geneva, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107415324.

  7. 7.

    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.”

  8. 8.

    World Commission on Environment and Development, “Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (The Brundtland Report),” vol. 4, 1987.

  9. 9.

    The Center for Naval Analysis, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” 2007. This effort potentially served as a counterweight to the position of the Bush Administration with regard to the reality and consequences of climate change, according to Charles Mead and Annie Snider, “Why the CIA Is Spying on a Changing Climate,” McClatchy DC, 2011.

  10. 10.

    The Center for Naval Analysis, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.” The EU also recognized that climate change is a “threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions, and instability” in developing countries.

  11. 11.

    Their perspective is one of assessing and managing risks: their judgments are informed by the concerning environmental and social factors presumed to result from a changing climate. They supply estimations (via experiential judgment and with the consult of advisors) about how these factors could produce worst-case scenarios, and draw conclusions about how this may affect security (particularly in a manner that would require US military resources). They recognize the range of factors required for a security situation to arise but don’t question the causal chain (its strength, nature, etc.) that leads between climate and the resulting security consequences.

  12. 12.

    The Center for Naval Analysis, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.”

  13. 13.

    Christopher B. Field et al., “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Cilliers, Hughes, and Moyer note that “Climate change will affect Africa more significantly than most other regions due to its already warm climate, inconsistent rains, generally poor soil, extensive floodplains, predominantly rain-fed agriculture and poor governance with limited coping capacity. Warming will occur across the continent (and the extent of warming in Africa is expected to exceed global averages substantially).” Jakkie Cilliers, Barry B. Hughes, and Jonathan Moyer, “African Futures 2050 the Next Forty Years” (Pretoria/Denver: Institute for Security Studies and the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, 2011), 40.

  14. 14.

    O’Brien, Pelling, and Patwardhan, “Toward a Sustainable and Resilient Future,” 458; Adger et al., “Human Security.”

  15. 15.

    Ulrich Cubasch et al., “Introduction,” in The Physical Science Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. T. F. Stocker et al. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 119–58.

  16. 16.

    Michael McElroy and D. James Baker, “Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National Security” (Boston: Harvard University, 2012).

  17. 17.

    Ibid., 4.

  18. 18.

    Michael Oppenheimer, Maximiliano Campos, and Rachel Warren, “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 23.

  19. 19.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 2. Chapter 12 focused on human security and threats to political stability, among other aspects. Also, as illustrated in here, in addition to quantified measures of uncertainty, the IPCC communicates the degree of certainty in their judgments using (1) confidence in the validity of a finding, and (2) the degree of agreement. The details of this protocol are explained in the 2010 IPCC publication of “Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties.”

  20. 20.

    Sherri Goodman, “National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change” (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analysis, 2014), 5.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., 8.

  23. 23.

    Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, World in Transition—Climate Change as a Security Risk (German Advisory Council on Global Change [WGBU], 2007).

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., 6.

  26. 26.

    Kurt M. Campbell et al., “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change” (Washington, DC: Center for International Strategic Studies, 2007).

  27. 27.

    Ibid., 76.

  28. 28.

    National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” (Washington, DC, 2012), iv.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., 5.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., Location 144, Kindle Edition.

  31. 31.

    ACCES, “Climate Change and Security in Africa,” Manitoba: IISD, 2009, 5.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., 37.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., 8.

  34. 34.

    Sharon Burke, and Christine Parthemore, “Climate Change War Game: Working Paper Major Findings and Background” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2009), 5. Other participants in this event include the following: the Brookings Institution Global Economy and Development Program, the Center for American Progress, CNA, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, McKinsey Global Institute, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Sustainability Institute, and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

  35. 35.

    N. Nicholas Herbert Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press, 2007), vii, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/economics-of-climate-change/A1E0BBF2F0ED8E2E4142A9C878052204.

  36. 36.

    Will Rogers et al., “Lost in Translation: Closing the Gap Between Climate Science and National Security Policy” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010).

  37. 37.

    Jürgen Scheffran and Antonella Battaglini, “Climate and Conflicts: The Security Risks of Global Warming,” Regional Environmental Change 11, no. 1 (2011): S29.

  38. 38.

    Cullen S. Hendrix and Sarah M. Glaser, “Trends and Triggers: Climate, Climate Change and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 696.

  39. 39.

    Scheffran and Battaglini, “Climate and Conflicts: The Security Risks of Global Warming,” S30.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., S31.

  42. 42.

    National Intelligence Council 2012.

  43. 43.

    In 2012, The US National Research Council cited Sandia National Laboratories when indicating in both 2008 and 2030 (forecasted) that 10 of the 15 countries at highest risk of state failure were in Africa. Ibid.

  44. 44.

    Steinbruner, “World Affairs Council Keynote Address: The International Security Implications of Climate Change.”

  45. 45.

    Chad M. Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change” (Washington, DC: Global Inter-Connections, 2011), 3.

  46. 46.

    Chad M. Briggs, “Climate Security, Risk Assessment and Military Planning,” International Affairs 88, no. 5 (2012): 1054.

  47. 47.

    Field et al., “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.”

  48. 48.

    Nathan Halverson, “We’re Running out of Water, and the World’s Powers Are Very Worried,” Reveal, April 2016.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, ed. John D. Steinbruner, Paul C. Stern, and Jo L. Husbands (National Academies Press, 2013), ix.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., 136.

  55. 55.

    Steinbruner, “World Affairs Council Keynote Address: The International Security Implications of Climate Change.”

  56. 56.

    Scheffran and Battaglini, “Climate and Conflicts: The Security Risks of Global Warming,” S37.

  57. 57.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 20. As the Arctic warms, the temperature differential between the pole and the equator becomes smaller. This temperature difference creates much of the atmospheric circulation in the northern hemisphere that carries the weather (warm, cold, or wet conditions) in this hemisphere; circulation gets weaker as the difference becomes smaller, which has corresponding consequences for the weather. Dim Coumou, Jascha Lehmann, and Johanna Beckmann, “The Weakening Summer Circulation in the Northern Hemisphere Mid-latitudes,” Science 348, no. 6232 (2015): 324–27.

  58. 58.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 1, 9. Also, as polar ice melts, heat from the sun that would have been reflected back to space (by snow and ice) is absorbed by the oceans. Coumou, Lehmann, and Beckmann, “The Weakening Summer Circulation in the Northern Hemisphere Mid-latitudes.”

  59. 59.

    US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, 61, 62. The current rate at which carbon dioxide is being added to the Earth’s atmosphere is 10 times more than anything in the past 400,000 years … [and] 28,000 times greater than the rate that drove deep ocean temperature to its maximum 55 million years ago. Steinbruner, “World Affairs Council Keynote Address: The International Security Implications of Climate Change.”

  60. 60.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 1.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., 9. John Steinbruner indicated that during the Eemien period approximately 130,000 years ago, when deep ocean temperatures were the same as they are today, sea levels were 4–6 meters higher; during the Plyocene period, approximately 3 million years ago, when deep ocean temperatures were only 1 degree Celsius higher than they are today, sea levels were 25 meters higher. Steinbruner, “World Affairs Council Keynote Address: The International Security Implications of Climate Change.”

  62. 62.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 9.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., 10.

  64. 64.

    Ibid.

  65. 65.

    McElroy and Baker, “Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National Security,” 4.

  66. 66.

    Maximilian Auffhammer et al., “Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, Uk and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 6; Read, “Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for Climate Change Security Challenges and Opportunities,” iii.

  67. 67.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 2. Complex emergent systems are also referred to as complex adaptive systems. Complexity in complex adaptive systems refers to the potential for emergent behavior in complex and unpredictable phenomena.

  68. 68.

    Ka Richardson, P. Gilliers, and Michael Lissack, “Complexity Science: A ‘Gray’ Science for the ‘Stuff in Between’,” Emergence 3, no. 2 (2001): 7.

  69. 69.

    Reinette Biggs et al., “Linking Futures Across Scales: A Dialog on Multiscale Scenarios,” Ecology and Society 12, no. 1 (2007).

  70. 70.

    Lester R. Brown, “The New Geopolitics of Food: From the Middle East to Madagascar, High Prices Are Spawning Land Grabs and Ousting Dictators. Welcome to the 21st-Century Food Wars,” Foreign Policy (Washington, DC, April 2011).

  71. 71.

    Read, “Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for Climate Change Security Challenges and Opportunities,” 2.

  72. 72.

    Briggs, “Climate Security, Risk Assessment and Military Planning,” 1052, citing Sarah Johnstone and Jeffrey Mazo, “Global Warming and the Arab Spring,” Survival 53, no. 2 (2011): 11–17.

  73. 73.

    R. S. Kovats et al., “Europe,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. V. R. Barros et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 37.

  74. 74.

    Richardson, Gilliers, and Lissack, “Complexity Science: A ‘Gray’ Science for the ‘Stuff in Between,’” 7.

  75. 75.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 4.

  76. 76.

    Richard B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, Inevitable Surprises (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002). Also, see Timothy M. Lenton, “Early Warning of Climate Tipping Points,” Nature Climate Change 1, no. 4 (2011): 201–9.

  77. 77.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 4.

  78. 78.

    Mark Boslough et al., “Climate Change Effects on International Stability: A White Paper,” SAND2004-5973. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004.

  79. 79.

    Read, “Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for Climate Change Security Challenges and Opportunities,” 2.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., 3.

  81. 81.

    Oppenheimer, Campos, and Warren, “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities,” 23.

  82. 82.

    International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The IISS Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change and Security: Report to the European Commission” (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 11.

  83. 83.

    Scheffran and Battaglini, “Climate and Conflicts: The Security Risks of Global Warming,” S31; Schellnhuber, World in Transition—Climate Change as a Security Risk.

  84. 84.

    Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies” (Zurich: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2006); Scheffran and Battaglini, “Climate and Conflicts: The Security Risks of Global Warming,” S31. Arguments that rely upon the linkage that resource-scarcity leads to conflict are known as “Neo-Malthusian.” Homer-Dixon is typically given credit.

  85. 85.

    Schellnhuber, World in Transition—Climate Change as a Security Risk.

  86. 86.

    Ibid. US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, 20.

  87. 87.

    Timothy M. Lenton, “Arctic Climate Tipping Points,” Ambio 41, no. 1 (2012): 10–22.

  88. 88.

    A. Kaitlin Shilling, “Climate Change and Conflict: Identifying the Mechanisms” (Stanford University, 2011), 13; Briggs, “Climate Security, Risk Assessment and Military Planning,” 1055.

  89. 89.

    Auffhammer et al., “Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts,” 25.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    The UCDP/PRIO database requires the following in defining civil war (or, “conflict”): the state is one of the involved parties; there is an opposition organization; control of the government or territory is contested; and there is a minimum of 25 battle-deaths per year, on each side of the conflict. Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–37; L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1989–2006,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 5 (2007): 623–34. The Correlates of War project requires that national governments participate in a conflict; that there are 1000 battle-deaths per year; that there is resistance by both sides; and that the conflict is within national territory. Meredith Reid Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1 (2000): 123–44.

  92. 92.

    Jürgen Scheffran et al., “Climate Change and Violent Conflict,” Science 336, no. 6083 (2012): 869.

  93. 93.

    Halvard Buhaug, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Ole Magnus Theisen, “Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), 2.

  94. 94.

    Scheffran et al., “Climate Change and Violent Conflict,” 869; Jürgen Scheffran et al., “Disentangling the Climate-Conflict Nexus: Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Vulnerabilities and Pathways,” Review of European Studies 4, no. 5 (2012): 1–13.

  95. 95.

    Ole Magnus Theisen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, “Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed Conflict?” Climatic Change 117, no. 3 (2013): 613–25.

  96. 96.

    Jon Barnett, “Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 2 (2000): 271–88.

  97. 97.

    Jon Barnett, “Security and Climate Change,” Global Environmental Change 13, no. 1 (2003): 7–17.

  98. 98.

    Simon Dalby, “Security and Environment Linkages Revisited,” in Globalisation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century, ed. Hans Günter Brauch et al., 2008, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C14&q=+%E2%80%9CSecurity+and+Environment+Linkages+Revisited.%E2%80%9D+In+Globalisation+and+Environmental+Challenges%3A+Reconceptualising+Security+in+the+21st+Century%2C+edited+by+Hans+G%C3%BCnter+Brauch%2C+John+Grin%2C+Czeslaw+Mesjasz%2C+Pal+Dunay%2C+B%C3%A9chir+Chourou%2C+Ursula+Oswald+Spring%2C+P.+H.+Liotta%2C+and+Patricia+Kameri-Mbote.&btnG=.

  99. 99.

    Betsy Hartmann, “Population, Environment and Security: A New Trinity,” Environment and Urbanization 10, no. 2 (1998): 113.

  100. 100.

    Conor Devitt and Richard S. J. Tol, “Civil War, Climate Change, and Development: A Scenario Study for Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 130.

  101. 101.

    Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19, no. 1 (2013): 5–40.

  102. 102.

    Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (1998): 314.

  103. 103.

    Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger, “Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict,” Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 639–55.

  104. 104.

    Michael Kevane and Leslie Gray, “Darfur: Rainfall and Conflict,” Environmental Research Letters 3 (2008), https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C14&q=Kevane%2C+Michael%2C+and+Leslie+Gray.+%E2%80%9CDarfur%3A+Rainfall+and+Conflict.%E2%80%9D+Environmental+Research+Letters+3&btnG=.

  105. 105.

    Ian A. Brown, “Assessing Eco-scarcity as a Cause of the Outbreak of Conflict in Darfur: A Remote Sensing Approach,” International Journal of Remote Sensing 31, no. 10 (2010): 2513–20.

  106. 106.

    Behrooz Hassani Mahmooei and Brett Parris, “Why Might Climate Change Not Cause Conflict? An Agent-Based Computational Response,” 2013, 1.

  107. 107.

    Harry Verhoeven, “Climate Change, Conflict and Development in Sudan: Global Neo-Malthusian Narratives and Local Power Struggles,” Development and Change 42, no. 3 (2011): 679–707.

  108. 108.

    Betsy Hartmann, “Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse,” Journal of International Development 22, no. 1 (2010): 236.

  109. 109.

    Shira Yoffe et al., “Geography of International Water Conflict and Cooperation: Data Sets and Applications,” Water Resources Research 40, no. 5 (2004).

  110. 110.

    Joshua W. Busby et al., “Of Climate Change and Crystal Balls: The Future Consequences of Climate Change in Africa,” in American Political Science Association Annual Conference (Seattle, 2011), 1; Joshua W. Busby, “Who Cares About the Weather? Climate Change and US National Security,” Security Studies 17, no. 3 (2008): 468–504; Joshua W. Busby et al., “Climate Change and Insecurity: Mapping Vulnerability in Africa,” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 132–72; and Joshua W. Busby, Kaiba L. White, and Todd G. Smith, “Mapping Climate Change and Security in North Africa,” Policy Brief (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010).

  111. 111.

    Brendan M. Buckley et al., “Climate as a Contributing Factor in the Demise of Angkor, Cambodia,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107, no. 15 (April 13, 2010): 6748–52.

  112. 112.

    P. B. DeMenocal, “Cultural Responses to Climate Change During the Late Holocene,” Science 292, no. 5517 (2001): 667–73.

  113. 113.

    Geoffrey Parker et al., “Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered,” American Historical Review Forum (October 2008): 1053–79.

  114. 114.

    David D. Zhang et al., “The Causality Analysis of Climate Change and Large-Scale Human Crisis,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 42 (2011): 17296–301.

  115. 115.

    See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion concerning empirical models of conflict.

  116. 116.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 23. Paleo-climate records indicate that the last few decades of observed climate data do not represent the full natural variability of many important climate variables. A. Lavell et al., “Climate Change: New Dimensions in Disaster Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability, and Resilience,” in Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 46, citing Bjørg Risebrobakken et al., “A High-Resolution Study of Holocene Paleoclimatic and Paleoceanographic Changes in the Nordic Seas,” Paleoceanography 18, no. 1 (2003).

  117. 117.

    Read, “Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for Climate Change Security Challenges and Opportunities,” 61; Adger et al., “Human Security.”

  118. 118.

    Read, “Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for Climate Change Security Challenges and Opportunities,” 56, 57, 61.

  119. 119.

    Busby et al., “Of Climate Change and Crystal Balls: The Future Consequences of Climate Change in Africa,” 1.

  120. 120.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 2.

  121. 121.

    Read, “Embracing Uncertainty: Scenario Planning for Climate Change Security Challenges and Opportunities,” 47.

  122. 122.

    Ibid., 24.

  123. 123.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 17.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., 23.

  125. 125.

    Ibid., 22.

  126. 126.

    Ibid.

  127. 127.

    According to Dupont, “Policymakers around the world now accept there is sufficient scientific data to conclude that the speed and magnitude of climate change in the twenty-first century will be unprecedented in human experience, posing daunting challenges of adaptation and mitigation for all life forms on the planet.” Alan Dupont, “The Strategic Implications of Climate Change,” Survival 50, no. 3 (2008): 30.

  128. 128.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 22.

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Lippert, T.H. (2019). Literature Review. In: NATO, Climate Change, and International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14560-6_2

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