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Taking Stock of the Situation: NATO

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NATO, Climate Change, and International Security

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Abstract

This chapter first provides an overview of NATO’s current posture toward climate security risk, surveying the history of NATO’s institutional transformation, its current environmental policies, and its previous engagement and activities concerning the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the Arctic. The chapter then discusses two recent foresight efforts conducted by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT): The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) and the subsequent Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO). I discuss the relationship between these two efforts, as well as their outcomes. In particular, I identify three Instability Situations that will serve as the basis for analysis in subsequent chapters. I conclude the chapter with a critique of the common characteristics among these scenarios, and a discussion of how each one compares to its counterpart in the core conclusions of the IPCC Summary for Policymakers. In so doing, I establish why the NATO ACT Instability Situations serve as a reasonable proxy for the perspective of NATO Headquarters with respect to the security consequences anticipated to result from climate change.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rühle, “NATO and Emerging Security Challenges: Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm,” 278–79.

  2. 2.

    O’Brien, Pelling, and Patwardhan, “Toward a Sustainable and Resilient Future,” 465. IPCC: “Transformation can be defined as a fundamental qualitative change, or a change in composition or structure that is often associated with changes in perspectives or initial conditions.”

  3. 3.

    Brian Walker et al., “Looming Global-Scale Failures and Missing Institutions,” Science 325 (2009): 7–8.

  4. 4.

    In the context of NATO, ‘partners’ refers to nations who are involved with NATO through the Partnership for Peace Program.

  5. 5.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Climate Change, International Security and the Way to Paris (2015 Draft Special Report),” 2015.

  6. 6.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa,” 2017, https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1144-9; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “NATO and Security in the Arctic,” 2017; and NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Assessing and Mitigating the Cost of Climate Change,” 2017.

  7. 7.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Climate Change, International Security and the Way to Paris (2015 Draft Special Report).”

  8. 8.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Climate Change and Global Security,” 2009.

  9. 9.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Security at the Top of the World: Is There a NATO Role in the High North?” 2010; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Climate Change: Thinking Beyond Kyoto,” 2007; and NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Climate Change in the Arctic: Challenges for the North Atlantic Community,” 2005.

  10. 10.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Climate Change, International Security and the Way to Paris (2015 Draft Special Report).”

  11. 11.

    NATO, “Strategic Concept,” 2010.

  12. 12.

    NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” 2014; NATO, “Chicago Summit Declaration,” 2012; and NATO, “Lisbon Summit Declaration,” 2010.

  13. 13.

    Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, “NATO: The Next Decade Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the Security and Defence Agenda” (Brussels: NATO, 2008).

  14. 14.

    Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Climate Change” (Brussels: Huffington Post, 2010).

  15. 15.

    NATO, “NATO—Topic: Environmental Security,” 2011.

  16. 16.

    A catalog of research and workshops sponsored or conducted under the auspices of Science for Peace and Security for the period 2002–2012 can be found here: http://www.nato.int/science/2012/scientific_publications.pdf.

  17. 17.

    A list of the research produced as a result of this series can be found here: http://www.nhbs.com/series/159431/nato-science-for-peace-and-security-series-c-environmental-security.

  18. 18.

    NATO, “Meteorology and Oceanography,” 2011.

  19. 19.

    The EARDCC was established in 1998. NATO, “Civil Emergency Planning,” 2014.

  20. 20.

    NATO, “Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC),” 2011.

  21. 21.

    The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center is often used. In addition to the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, NATO also uses the Defense and Environmental Experts Group to focus on areas such as infrastructure and property issues arising from the management of defense estates, and the impact on soldiers of climatic and biological threats.

  22. 22.

    NATO, “Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC),” 2014.

  23. 23.

    NATO, “NATO Response Force,” 2014.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    NATO, “NATO Aircraft to Deliver Humanitarian Relief Goods to Pakistan,” 2010.

  26. 26.

    Politico Brussels, “Playbook Cocktails with Jens Stoltenberg” (Brussels, 2016); Yuri M. Zhukov, “NATO’s Mediterranean Mission: What the Alliance Is Doing in the Aegean Sea,” Foreign Affairs, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-02-21/natos-mediterranean-mission.

  27. 27.

    “European Security Round Table,” n.d., http://www.security-round-table.eu/esrt/index.php.

  28. 28.

    ENVSEC focuses on eastern and southeastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Their climate change work involves technical assistance to enhance knowledge of climate change impacts and their interrelation with security: vulnerability assessments of climate change induced security impacts; support to regional dialogue and cooperation; information sharing and regional coordination; strengthening policies, institutions and capacities on national and regional levels to address climate change risks and develop regional adaptation strategies; and facilitating risk communication and raising awareness on security impacts of climate change: information dissemination, establishment and support to knowledge networks. See http://www.envsec.org.

  29. 29.

    NATO, “NATO’s Energy Security Agenda,” NATO Review Magazine, 2014, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/NATO-energy-security-agenda/EN/index.htm.

  30. 30.

    “Round Table on Climate Security Risks, March 21, 2012 NATO HQ, Brussels” (Brussels, 2012).

  31. 31.

    NATO, “NATO Workshop Focuses on Energy and Environmental Risks Facing the Alliance,” 2012.

  32. 32.

    NATO, “Security Issues of Desertification in the Mediterranean Region Debated at NATO Workshop,” 2 December 2003.

  33. 33.

    NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

  34. 34.

    Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “‘Hungry for Security: Can NATO Help in a Humanitarian Crisis?’—Speech by NATO Secretary General at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands” (Rotterdam: NATO, 2011).

  35. 35.

    Daniel G. Huber and Jay Gulledge, “Extreme Weather & Climate Change: Understanding the Link and Managing the Risk” (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2011), 1.

  36. 36.

    Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, “Putting the ‘N’ Back into NATO: A High North Policy Framework for the Atlantic Alliance?” (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2013), 10.

  37. 37.

    Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on Security Prospects in the High North” (Brussels: NATO, 2009).

  38. 38.

    Smith-Windsor, “Putting the ‘N’ Back into NATO: A High North Policy Framework for the Atlantic Alliance?” 1.

  39. 39.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Security at the Top of the World: Is There a NATO Role in the High North?”

  40. 40.

    NATO, “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO,” 2010, 41.

  41. 41.

    Luke Coffey, “NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities” (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2012), 2.

  42. 42.

    Sven G. Holtsmark, “Towards Cooperation or Confrontation? Security in the High North” (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2009), 10.

  43. 43.

    Klaus Dodds, “A Polar Mediterranean? Accessibility, Resources and Sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean,” Global Policy 1, no. 3 (2010): 306.

  44. 44.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Security at the Top of the World: Is There a NATO Role in the High North?” 15.

  45. 45.

    Smith-Windsor, “Putting the ‘N’ Back into NATO: A High North Policy Framework for the Atlantic Alliance?” 5. Note, however, that the US and Canada have an Arctic Cooperation framework, and Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland have a Nordic Air Policing mission. Sweden and Finland are non-NATO. A variety of types of military cooperation also takes place among the Scandinavian countries under the umbrella of ‘Nordic Defense Cooperation’ which merged previous transnational military and security related contacts among Nordic countries in 2009. Ann-Sofie Dahl, “NORDEFCO and NATO: ‘Smart Defense’ in the North?” (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2014).

  46. 46.

    Coffey, “NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities,” 2. According to Smith-Windsor, “Concerns about provoking the Russian Federation (at the time already engaged in a substantial northern rearmament program of its own) and about giving countries with no High North geography undue influence in the region, were apparently at the heart of the Canadian policy calculus.” Smith-Windsor, “Putting the ‘N’ Back into NATO: A High North Policy Framework for the Atlantic Alliance?”

  47. 47.

    Dodds, “A Polar Mediterranean? Accessibility, Resources and Sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean,” 306.

  48. 48.

    Coffey, “NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities,” 2.

  49. 49.

    NATO, “New NATO Division to Deal with Emerging Security Challenges,” n.d. Also, the following provides a tidy overview and summary of the role of the Emerging Security Challenges Division: “‘Emerging Security Challenges’ has become a term used at NATO and in public policy debate to deal with potential, upcoming, non-traditional threats to our security. At NATO, they are defined as covering the issues of cyber security, counter terrorism, and energy security. But there is no consensus on substance and scope of these issues to be dealt with by the organization. These challenges are real, but meeting them does not fit into any traditional policymaking. Thus, the ‘real’ emerging challenge seems to be whether and how we have to change our policy patterns to effectively provide security from such threats.” Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, “Emerging Security Challenges,” n.d., http://www.pfpconsortium.com/#!emerging-security-challenges/c1sda.

  50. 50.

    Jamie Shea, “Q&A About NATO’s New Division for Emerging Security Challenges,” Atlantic Community (YouTube), 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FziXbYrmAdk.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Security at the Top of the World: Is There a NATO Role in the High North?” 17.

  53. 53.

    A good discussion of NATO in the Arctic can be found in Exner et al., who note that the “EU and NATO have been examining the issues of governance and security in the Arctic.” Heather Exner-Pirot et al., “Climate Change & International Security: The Arctic as a Bellweather” (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012), 3.

  54. 54.

    Foresight methodology refers to the means used to conduct future studies to support long-term planning. Note the following observation of the IRGC (and that NATO’s foresight efforts are consistent with the conceptual foundation of risk governance): “Humans have the ability to design different futures, i.e., construct scenarios that serve as tools for the human mind to anticipate consequences in advance and change, within constraints of nature and culture, the course of actions accordingly.” Ortwin Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework” (Geneva: International Risk Governance Council, 2013), 23. Indeed, Briggs observes that “Despite the preponderance of effort spent on operational and tactical intelligence in government, the knowledge that is often most needed are long-term trends and ideas concerning ‘what the world around us’ will look like in the future. This is the purpose of foresight efforts, and the resultant scenario planning. Chad M. Briggs, “Environmental Security, Abrupt Climate Change and Strategic Intelligence” (Washington, DC: US Department of Energy, 2009), 4.

  55. 55.

    These efforts have been conducted either by NATO’s Research and Technology Organization, or by an NATO’s Allied Command for Transformation; in both cases, their primary objective was to draw conclusions with respect to the operational or technological preparedness of the Alliance.

  56. 56.

    Stephan De Spiegeleire et al., “NATO Future Worlds An Input into the NATO Long-Term Requirements Study,” vol. 212 (The Hague, 2005). NB: I was unable to find the actual Long Term Requirements Study, which is unlikely to be publicly available; however, this product described a scenario analysis effort in support of it.

  57. 57.

    NATO ACT, “Multiple Futures Project—Final Report,” 2009.

  58. 58.

    NATO Research and Technology Organisation, “Joint Operations 2030—Final Report (Opérations Interarmées 2030—Rapport Final).”

  59. 59.

    This effort brought together participants from 15 NATO and partner nations, and it featured presentations of papers submitted by subject matter experts from across the Alliance, industry and academia; it also considered the ways foresight analysis can be used to influence national defense policy; briefings are available here: https://www.cso.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-SAS-088.

  60. 60.

    For instance, the May 2011 initiative on “Emerged/Emerging ‘Disruptive’ Technologies”; briefings available at: https://www.cso.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-IST-099.

  61. 61.

    NATO, “NATO Risk Based Planning Conference (SAS-093),” 2011, https://www.cso.nato.int/Activity_Meta.asp?ACT=1714.

  62. 62.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis 2015 Interim Update to the SFA 2013 Report,” 2016.

  63. 63.

    NATO ACT, “NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017,” 2017.

  64. 64.

    Note that the ‘futures’ work conducted by NATO ACT (comprised of the SFA and FFAO) efforts seeks to establish a methodology to examine the future security environment with the intent to have the results support and inform the NATO Defense Planning Process, NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #2 Read-Ahead: Military Implications in a Complex Security Environment—Forging the Future Leading; NATO Military Transformation,” 2013, 5. Also, The International Risk Governance Council includes the building of a capacity for surveillance (early warning) and foresight—as NATO has attempted to do—among eleven themes for improving the management of emerging risks. International Risk Governance Council, “Improving the Management of Emerging Risks” (Geneva, 2011).

  65. 65.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018,” 2018.

  66. 66.

    A variety of workshops have been held to push forward this effort.

  67. 67.

    NATO ACT, “NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017,” 7.

  68. 68.

    In 2018, NATO ACT indicated that the FFAO project used a qualitative, focus-group methodology that brought together military and civilian subject matter experts through a series of workshops, independent reviews, and experimentation. NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018.”

  69. 69.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #1 Final Report: The World in 2030 and Beyond,” 2012, 2.

  70. 70.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Ensuring a Mission Ready Alliance—Forging the Future, Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 2013, 3–4.

  71. 71.

    NATO ACT failed to provide any indication as to what this ‘independent concept test’ entailed in the Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018 report.

  72. 72.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018,” 10.

  73. 73.

    Ibid., 9.

  74. 74.

    NATO, “The NATO Defence Planning Process,” 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm.

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    The FFAO 2018 will be used to help inform the development of the Military Committee input to the Political Guidance 2019. NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018,” 41.

  77. 77.

    NATO, “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” 2006; NATO, “Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO’s Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction,” 2011.

  78. 78.

    NATO is focused on understanding the drivers that will shape the future security environment, according to page 3 of the following text: NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Global Review,” 2012.

  79. 79.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #1 Final Report: The World in 2030 and Beyond,” 2.

  80. 80.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Global Review,” 3.

  81. 81.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report,” 2013, 34.

  82. 82.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Ensuring a Mission Ready Alliance—Forging the Future, Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 3–4; NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report,” 34. According to page 3 of the latter document, the “Strategic Foresight Analysis sought to inform NATO’s Political Guidance in accordance with AC/281-N(2012)0154-REV9(R) Enhancing the NATO Defense Planning Process, 12 March 2013.”

  83. 83.

    Note that the ‘change’ referenced here does not solely refer the external security environment; while not precisely defined, in addition to security aspects, it also concerns changes within NATO member states and demographic/political dynamics that will affect the way the organization operates, such as the absence of a shared threat perspective that could encumber the consensus process in the future. Moreover, the ‘drivers’ identified were not clearly delineated from each other, and several of the drivers were influenced by other drivers—climate change is listed as a driver, which has very clear potential to increase natural disasters and could also influence migration; however, both ‘disasters’ and ‘migration’ were listed as ‘drivers’ separately without reference to climate. NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Ensuring a Mission Ready Alliance—Forging the Future, Leading NATO Military Transformation.”

  84. 84.

    Ibid., 4.

  85. 85.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Global Review,” 6. Note, there was no explanation as to what distinguished “National Organizations” from “Governments.”

  86. 86.

    Ibid., 4. The SFA effort reviewed 48 documents pertaining to the nature of the future security/operating environment. The sources for these documents varied widely, including think tanks, national and international governmental organizations, and the private sector. One publication came from Shell Corporation, one from India, and yet another from the Russian Academy of Sciences. A full list of the documents reviewed can be found at the following link: http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2012/fc_ipr/sfa_literature_review.pdf.

  87. 87.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #2 Read Ahead: The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond Themes and Drivers,” 2012, 3.

  88. 88.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Ensuring a Mission Ready Alliance—Forging the Future, Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 8.

  89. 89.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #3 Final Report: The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond Security Implications,” 2012, 7.

  90. 90.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report,” 2.

  91. 91.

    NATO ACT, “NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017,” 67–70.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., 71–72.

  93. 93.

    Note that the categorization referenced in this sentence was not specifically evident in any of the Strategic Foresight Analysis documents publicly available. However, the final report for the first FFAO Workshop indicated that this occurred. NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Final Report—Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 2013.

  94. 94.

    The FFAO is a qualitative approach to requirements development; note that Joint Operations 2030 attempted this and failed.

  95. 95.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Ensuring a Mission Ready Alliance—Forging the Future, Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 9–10. Note that the Annex of this document contains a useful description of NATO’s three ‘Core Tasks’ in addition to explanatory examples.

  96. 96.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018,” 9.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., 6.

  98. 98.

    See Appendix C for a discussion of the process used in the FFAO to develop the Instability Situations.

  99. 99.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018,” 15. Note that previously versions of the FFAO (and the associated workshop reports) grouped arctic issues within the ‘Access and Use of Global Commons Challenged’ instability situation.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., 16.

  101. 101.

    Ibid.

  102. 102.

    This book makes no effort to validate or determine the extent to which climate is a driving factor in the emergence of these situations.

  103. 103.

    This creates a potential misalignment from the perspective of risk governance (although this institutional aspect is not addressed in this book).

  104. 104.

    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability—Contributions of the Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report, ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 12.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., 32.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., 12.

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., 17.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., 20.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., 18.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., 12.

  112. 112.

    Ibid.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., 13.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    Ibid., 14.

  116. 116.

    Ibid., 20.

  117. 117.

    Ibid., 6.

  118. 118.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #2 Read Ahead: The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond Themes and Drivers,” 2.

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    Tyler H. Lippert PhD, JD

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Lippert, T.H. (2019). Taking Stock of the Situation: NATO. In: NATO, Climate Change, and International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14560-6_3

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