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A Risk Governance Case Study

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NATO, Climate Change, and International Security

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Abstract

This chapter presents a case study of the security consequences of climate change, particularly as they concern NATO, conducted through the prism of the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) Risk Governance Framework. Using Instability Situations identified by NATO ACT in recent foresight initiatives, this analysis examines what is known about the risks that are thought to result from climate-induced change in the natural environment. The analysis reveals and examines what is known about the risks that may emerge from climate-induced change in the natural environment, as well as NATO’s posture and ability to manage them.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Lavell et al., “Climate Change: New Dimensions in Disaster Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability, and Resilience,” 44. The IPCC notes “This process [referring to the risk governance process described in Renn 2008, which was the precursor and forerunner to the framework employed in this book] is consistent with those in the UNISDR Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR 2005), the best known and adhered to framework for considering disaster risk management concerns.”

  2. 2.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework.”

  3. 3.

    These instability situations are “Access to the Global Commons” (the context of climate change I have interpreted to refer to security issues in the Arctic), “Natural Disasters,” and the consequences of (mass, unprecedented) “Migration.”

  4. 4.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 13.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., 19. The ‘event or activity’ is the Risk Agent, or the source of the risk: climate change. Note that Briggs, and others, would add ‘uncertainty’ to the two factors listed here (likelihood and severity) to the definition of risk.

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    Renn, “White Paper No. 1: Risk Governance—Towards and Integrative Approach.”

  8. 8.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 19.

  9. 9.

    Oppenheimer, Campos, and Warren, “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities,” 8. Note that the IRGC, the OECD, and others have also focused on the issue of emerging risk. Among them are the following reports: International Risk Governance Council, “Improving the Management of Emerging Risks”, and OECD, “Emerging Risks in the 21st Century, An Agenda for Action.” NATO has also established a division to focus on Emerging Security Challenges, under the leadership of Dr. Jamie Shea. See NATO, “New NATO Division to Deal with Emerging Security Challenges.”

  10. 10.

    Oppenheimer, Campos, and Warren, “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities,” 8.

  11. 11.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Ensuring a Mission Ready Alliance—Forging the Future, Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 9–10, and NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #3 Read Ahead: The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond Security Implications,” 2012, 2. Note that the Annex of this document contains a useful description of NATO’s three ‘Core Tasks’ in addition to explanatory examples. Maintenance of security in the North Atlantic region is by no means controversial; it is the primary objective of the Alliance and is enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. As signatories of the treaty, all NATO member states subscribe to this overarching purpose. NATO’s three core tasks are the following: (1) Collective Defense (NATO members will assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty), (2) Crisis Management, and (3) Cooperative Security.

  12. 12.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 19.

  13. 13.

    Oppenheimer, Campos, and Warren, “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities,” 11 (Citing IPCC SREX). There is an excellent listing of the hazards that result from climate change on pages 83–100 of Oppenheimer, Campos, and Warren, “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities.”

  14. 14.

    These instability situations are “Access to the Global Commons” (the context of climate change I have interpreted to refer to security issues in the Arctic), “Natural Disasters,” and the consequences of (mass, unprecedented) “Migration.”

  15. 15.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 27.

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    In 2009, Briggs noted that “Understanding the risks and impacts of abrupt climate change requires interdisciplinary cooperation among researchers, which is often hampered by disciplinary boundaries and organizational fragmentation at universities and research centers. Security impacts of abrupt climate change are even more difficult to coordinate, owing to a nascent field of environmental security (which does not even possess its own research journals [circa 2009]), and historic lack of cooperation between environmental scientists and those specializing in traditional security fields.” Briggs, “Environmental Security, Abrupt Climate Change and Strategic Intelligence,” 5.

  18. 18.

    Lavell et al., “Climate Change: New Dimensions in Disaster Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability, and Resilience,” 46.

  19. 19.

    J. Handmer et al., “Changes in Impacts of Climate Extremes: Human Systems and Ecosystems,” in Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 239.

  20. 20.

    In 2017, the NATO Science and Technology Organization created a project entitled “Guideline for Scenario Development” to educate personnel involved in planning, preparing, and executing exercises, training, experimentation and evaluation events about proper scenario development and reuse. In 2018, the NATO Science and Technology Organization created a project entitled “Establishment of a NATO Scenario Repository” to develop a repository of future scenarios with different detail levels that have common characteristics (including threats) for use in defense planning and capability development by NATO and nations. These projects remain ongoing as of the writing of this book, and I have not been able to review any associated public documents. However, that these efforts were initiated is at least suggestive that the scenarios produced will be useful in scenario planning for future climate-related contingencies, and that NATO will hold them in a central repository. NATO Science and Technology Organisation, “Guideline for Scenario Development” (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 2017); NATO Science and Technology Organisation, “Establishment of a NATO Scenario Repository” (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 2018).

  21. 21.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 13.

  22. 22.

    UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, “Adapting Institutions to Climate Change,” 76.

  23. 23.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Global Review,” 3.

  24. 24.

    Note that any member of the Alliance can invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty (a request to convene a meeting of the North Atlantic Council to ‘consult’ with Allies) so long as it ‘feels’ that its security is threatened; it is entirely based upon the perception of the member state. NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” 1949.

  25. 25.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Final Report—Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 12. The following point was raised on page 5 of this source, which has impact on the issue of common threat perspective: “Shifting Migration patterns yield diverse effects on NATO. As NATO nations integrate larger immigrant populations, there is an increase in pressure to intervene or not intervene out of area to shape events in immigrant lands of origin. Also, migration might destabilize and radicalize countries outside NATO and pressure the Alliance to intervene. The migrant population alters the personnel base and potentially challenges the corporate culture within NATO Nations military.” However, a later workshop in this series (#4) expressed a slightly different perspective with respect to migration: “Natural, economic and man-made events yield diverse effects. Economics induced migration could revive western societies, compensate for declining indigenous populations thus supporting workforce and skills base; and/or internal unrest caused by immigrants’ inability or resistance to culturally assimilate. Transnational extremist and criminal organizations may exploit this seam.” NATO SACT, Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #4— Instability Situations in the Future Security Environment, 13.

  26. 26.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Final Report—Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 4.

  27. 27.

    UK Ministry of Defence, “Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2045” (London, UK, 2014), xxiii.

  28. 28.

    O. D. Cardona et al., “Determinants of Risk: Exposure and Vulnerability,” in Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 74, 75.

  29. 29.

    US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, 21.

  30. 30.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 13. Note that Briggs (among others) has observed that the military community can play a key role in strategic scenario planning and developing early warning systems for environmental security in a climate context. Chad M. Briggs, “Environmental Change, Strategic Foresight, and Impacts on Military Power,” Parameters 4, Autumn (2010): 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a538567.pdf, https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA538567; citing John T. Ackerman, “Climate Change, National Security, and the Quadrennial Defense Review. Avoiding the Perfect Storm,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 2.1 (2008): 56–96, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C14&q=Climate+Change%2C+National+Security%2C+and+the+Quadrennial+Defense+Review.+Avoiding+the+Perfect+Storm&btnG=.

  31. 31.

    NATO, “Strategic Concept,” 19–20.

  32. 32.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 24.

  33. 33.

    Briggs, “Environmental Change, Strategic Foresight, and Impacts on Military Power,” 3.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., 3, 4. In 2011, Briggs noted “The US Department of Energy sponsored a prototype early warning system from 2007 to 2010, the Global Energy and Environment Strategic Ecosystem (GlobalEESE), while US military services are attempting to address emerging risks from environmental changes in the Arctic. This includes the Navy’s Task Force Climate, and the Air Force’s Minerva Program.” Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 11.

  35. 35.

    Ian Noble and Saleemul Huq, “Adaptation Needs and Options,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press 2014), 17.

  36. 36.

    Auffhammer et al., “Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts,” 19.

  37. 37.

    Steinbruner, “World Affairs Council Keynote Address: The International Security Implications of Climate Change.” Using national intelligence assets for the purpose of monitoring the impact of climate change was also suggested by Simon Dalby in 1995. Simon Dalby, “Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment,” Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (1995): 175–97.

  38. 38.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 13.

  39. 39.

    The IRGC notes that finding agreement (consensus) on what requires consideration as a risk depends on the legitimacy of the selection rule. Acceptance of the selection rules rests on two conditions. First, all actors need to agree with the underlying goal. Second, the actors need to agree with the implications that the identified hazard can have on the desired goal.

  40. 40.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 13, 26.

  41. 41.

    Note that the IRGC posits that “increasingly rapid oscillations between extreme states (e.g. increasing market or social volatility) is a potential predictor of a slow developing catastrophic risk (presumably in the later stages … when it emerges as an observable problem); IRGC further notes, however, that the use of these indicators as predictive tools applied to social and economic change is still at an early stage.” International Risk Governance Council, “Preparing for Future Catastrophes: Governance Principles for Slow-Developing Risks That May Have Potentially Catastrophic Consequences” (Lausanne 2013), 3.

  42. 42.

    See USAID, “Measuring Fragility,” 2005; USAID, “Fragile States Indicators: A Supplement to the Country Analytical Template” (Washington, DC: USAID 2006); Javier Fabra-Mata and Bo Jensen, “Governance Measurements for Conlict and Fragility” (Oslo: United Nations Development Programme 2012).

  43. 43.

    See https://strausscenter.org/ccaps/.

  44. 44.

    Noble and Huq, “Adaptation Needs and Options,” 21.

  45. 45.

    Note that the Failed State Index has been criticized for failing to predict the Arab Spring in December 2010.

  46. 46.

    Other metrics include the following: Dimensions of Vulnerability by Downing et al. (1995); the Index of Human Insecurity (IHI) by Lonergan et al. (1999); the Vulnerability-resilience indicators by Moss et al. (2001); the Environmental Sustainability Index of the World Economic Forum (2002); and the Country-level risk measures by Brooks and Adger (2003).

  47. 47.

    Noble and Huq, “Adaptation Needs and Options,” 25. These include the Disaster Risk Index (UNDP 2004); Hotspots Index (Dilley et al. 2005); the Americas Index (Cardona 2005); and an index for South Asia (Moench et al. 2009). The IPCC notes “there has been little effort to further analyze, validate, or compare these metrics.” Further discussion on the development of climate-relevant metrics can be found at the following: Lavell et al., “Climate Change: New Dimensions in Disaster Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability, and Resilience,” 42; Noble and Huq, “Adaptation Needs and Options,” 27; and Cardona et al., “Determinants of Risk: Exposure and Vulnerability,” 92.

  48. 48.

    Briggs, “Environmental Change, Strategic Foresight, and Impacts on Military Power,” 4. He mentions Piers Blaikie et al., At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters (New York: Routledge, 2004), https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C14&q=Blaikie%2C+Piers%2C+Terry+Cannon%2C+Ian+Davis%2C+and+Ben+Wisner.+At+Risk%3A+Natural+Hazards%2C+People%E2%80%99s+Vulnerability+and+Disasters.&btnG=; Hans-Martin Fussel, “Vulnerability: A Generally Applicable Conceptual Framework for Climate Change Research,” Global Environmental Change 17, no. 2 (2007): 155–67.

  49. 49.

    Note that the 2014 Report from CNA Corporation recommended that the US Department of Defense undertake a somewhat related effort, although it was offered in a purely national—vice NATO—context; they state, “In addition to DOD’s conducting comprehensive assessments of the impacts of climate change on mission and operational resilience, the Department should develop, fund, and implement plans to adapt, including developing metrics for measuring climate impacts and resilience.”

  50. 50.

    Briggs, “Environmental Change, Strategic Foresight, and Impacts on Military Power,” 3.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., 13, Footnote 9.

  52. 52.

    Nate Haken, “The Arab Spring: Where Did That Come From?” Fund For Peace (Failed States Index), 2011, http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi11-arabspring.

  53. 53.

    Robin M. Leichenko and Karen L. O. Brien, “The Dynamics of Rural Vulnerability to Global Change: The Case of Southern Africa,” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 7 (2002): 1–18.

  54. 54.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 19.

  55. 55.

    However, lack of coordination among the relevant entities has been problematic previously and historically. Briggs notes that “Lack of information sharing among and within agencies is problematic even for traditional security concerns, but it is especially ill-fitting for environmental science issues that rely upon free flow of data, and where expertise exists not in the government agencies, but among international communities of researchers.” Briggs, “Environmental Security, Abrupt Climate Change and Strategic Intelligence,” 5. Perhaps this is one possible reason why NATO would be a good venue to host collaboration on climate security researchers—it already has the established committees and organizational design to coordinate issues across a wide variety of domains.

  56. 56.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 13, 35. In the case of climate change, society at this point does not have a choice as to whether the ‘risk’ should be taken. Risk Governance issues, and Risk Assessment, in the context of security have also been examined on multiple instances by the OECD: Regina Schröter, Aleksandar S. Jovanovic, and Ortwin Renn, “Social Unrest” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012); OECD, “Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012); OECD, “Linking Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011); OECD, “Investing in Security” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011); OECD, “Conflict and Fragility The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010); OECD, “Future Global Shocks” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011); OECD, “Emerging Risks in the 21st Century, An Agenda for Action”; OECD, “Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009); and OECD, “Armed Violence Reduction” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013).

  57. 57.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 34.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., 35.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., 14.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., 26. Note that the probabilities with respect to security implications of climate change are not clear. The observations of Briggs are relevant: “If one treats foresight as an exercise in risk assessment, the bias of past experience must be taken into account. This bias, which applies both to risk perception and to construction of methodological tools, results in underestimation of future risk probabilities. Probability estimations are based upon past experience and familiarity, and in general people do not expect nor plan for those events with which they have had little experience. The bias can be made structural by the manner in which assessments are constructed, where only certain measurements and observations are considered, while others are largely ignored.” Briggs, “Environmental Security, Abrupt Climate Change and Strategic Intelligence,” 5. However, in discussing this matter for the 2014 CNA Corporation paper on climate change and National Security, Retired Admiral Frank Bowman noted “Managing risk is seldom about dealing with absolute certainties but, rather, involves careful analysis of the probability of an event and the resultant consequences of that event occurring. Even very low probability events with devastating consequences must be considered and mitigation/adaptation schemes developed and employed.”

  61. 61.

    Note that the IPCC concluded (specifically in the context of disaster) that “climate change will make it more difficult to anticipate, evaluate, and communicate both probabilities and consequences that contribute to disaster risk, in particular that associated with extreme events.” With extreme events (those likely to result in disaster), their infrequency makes it difficult to estimate probabilities and consequences, while climate change worsens this challenge in that it is anticipated to change their frequency and character. Lavell et al., “Climate Change: New Dimensions in Disaster Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability, and Resilience,” 46. As such, climate change is expected to reduce the accuracy of past observations—to the extent that they were useful as predictors for future risk.

  62. 62.

    Briggs, “Environmental Change, Strategic Foresight, and Impacts on Military Power,” 6.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 29. In cases where probabilities are not known in advance (as the case of preparations/ planning for security), or the dose/response relationship is difficult to identify, scenarios are often used to explore different possible pathways from which a risk agent can lead to various consequences.

  65. 65.

    Ibid.

  66. 66.

    International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 30.

  67. 67.

    Renn and Walker, Global Risk Governance: Concept and Practice Using IRGC Framework, 78.

  68. 68.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 14.

  69. 69.

    Noble and Huq, “Adaptation Needs and Options,” 21.

  70. 70.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 29.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., 51, 52.

  72. 72.

    US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, 8.

  73. 73.

    US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., 116.

  75. 75.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 30.

  76. 76.

    UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, “Adapting Institutions to Climate Change,” 66.

  77. 77.

    Ibid.

  78. 78.

    Ibid.

  79. 79.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 28.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., 30.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Howard Kunreuther et al., “Risk Management and Climate Change,” Published Articles & Papers, 2013, 1.

  84. 84.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 30.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., 31.

  86. 86.

    International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 12.

  87. 87.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 33.

  88. 88.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report,” 14.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., 11.

  90. 90.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #3 Final Report: The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond Security Implications,” 3. A related point from the first Workshop in this series: “NATO’s ability to achieve strategic power projection degrades. NATO’s collective ability is weakened by individual nations deploying capabilities in support of national interest to mitigate their own perceived risks and threats. NATO’s ability to perform strategic power projection is challenged as perceived threats change.” NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Final Report—Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 12.

  91. 91.

    Phillip R. Cuccia, “Implications of a Changing NATO” (Washington, 2010).

  92. 92.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #3 Read Ahead: The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond Security Implications,” 5–6.

  93. 93.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #3 Final Report: The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond Security Implications,” 3.

  94. 94.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 14. IRGC notes that concern assessment is a social science activity to provide insights and a comprehensive diagnosis of concerns, expectations, and perceptions that individuals or groups link to the hazard; social scientific analysis should be submitted to methodological scrutiny and peer review, and it should not be confused with eliciting stakeholder feedback or providing platforms for participatory processes.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., 31.

  96. 96.

    As an example in the United States, see “Yale Project on Climate Change Communication” (Yale University, 2015), http://environment.yale.edu/poe/v2014/; Cary Funk et al., “Public and Scientists’ Views on Science and Society” (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015).

  97. 97.

    Irene Lorenzoni and Nick F. Pidgeon, “Public Views on Climate Change: European and USA Perspectives,” Climatic Change 77 (August 2006): 73–95. “Yale Project on Climate Change Communication.”

  98. 98.

    Howard Kunreuther and Shreekant Gupta, “Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies,” in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. O. Edenhofer et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 52, 53.

  99. 99.

    Ibid.

  100. 100.

    Holger Schütz and Hans Peter Peters, “Risiken Aus Der Perspektive von Wissenschaft, Medien Und Öffentlichkeit,” Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte 10–11 (2002): 40–45, as cited by Renn and Walker, Global Risk Governance: Concept and Practice Using IRGC Framework. The following report demonstrates this: Funk et al., “Public and Scientists’ Views on Science and Society.”

  101. 101.

    In late 2018, U.S. Global Change Research Program released the Fourth National Climate Assessment (of the United States) to inform decision-makers, utility and natural resource managers, public health officials, emergency planners, and other stakeholders by providing a thorough examination of the effects of climate change on the United States. US Global Change Research Program, “Fourth National Climate Assessment,” vol. II (Washington, DC, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pbb.2008.09.016.

  102. 102.

    Chris Mooney, The Republican War on Science (Basic Books, 2005).

  103. 103.

    Liisa Antilla, “Climate of Scepticism: US Newspaper Coverage of the Science of Climate Change,” Global Environmental Change 15 (2005): 338–52.

  104. 104.

    As mentioned in Chapter 4, the US Defense Department has continually acknowledged and highlighted the risk of climate change to international security. In early 2019, the US Defense Department released a report concerning the “Effects of a Changing Climate on the Department of Defense.” US Department of Defense, “Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense.”

  105. 105.

    The Arab Spring and massive flooding in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015 are but two examples.

  106. 106.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 14.

  107. 107.

    NATO, “Climate Change (Video Clip)—Copenhagen Spot,” 2009.

  108. 108.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 36, 37.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., 37.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., 37–39.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., 39.

  112. 112.

    Ibid., 43.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., 39.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    Ibid.

  116. 116.

    Briggs notes that vulnerability definitions for policy can be divided into four components: risk/hazard, sensitivity, resilience, and fragility. Sensitivity is the extent to which the hazard affects a group or region, while resilience is the ability to return to the baseline condition within a reasonable timeframe following exposure to the hazard. The final component, fragility, represents the extent to which a group or region can be stressed before its underlying resilience is irreparably weakened. An assessment for NATO would need to proceed region by region (MENA, Arctic, elsewhere) to grasp these aspects in the context of climate and security. Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 5. The following offers a good overview of resilience: Simin Davoudi et al., “Resilience: A Bridging Concept or a Dead End? ‘Reframing’ Resilience: Challenges for Planning Theory and Practice Interacting Traps: Resilience Assessment of a Pasture Management System in Northern Afghanistan Urban Resilience: What Does It Mean in Planni,” Planning Theory & Practice 13, no. 2 (June 2012): 299–333. According to the IPCC, “The ‘standard approach’ to assessment has been the climate scenario-driven impacts-based approach, which developed from the seven-step assessment framework of the IPCC (Carter et al. 1994; Parry and Carter 1998): (1) Define problem (including study area and sectors to be examined), (2) select method of problem assessment, (3) test methods/conduct sensitivity analyses, (4) select and apply climate change scenarios, (5) assess biophysical and socio-economic impacts, (6) assess autonomous adjustments, and (7) evaluate adaptation strategies.” Noble and Huq, “Adaptation Needs and Options,” 20.

  117. 117.

    Hartmann, “Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse.”

  118. 118.

    Ibid.

  119. 119.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 48.

  120. 120.

    The definition of “Global Commons” in this Instability Situation is broad, and includes a variety of aspects (such as cyber and out-space) not significantly impacted by climate change. The dissimilarity of issues is striking: cyber is essentially a functional domain while outer space generally requires distinct consideration. NATO identified climate change as a driving factor in this Instability Situation; to that extent, the Arctic is the only aspect that would be significantly impacted. There would be no single policy, capability, or insight that could address all three (cyber, outer space, Arctic) areas; each would have ones distinct to its situation. The resources, capabilities, programs, and relationships needed for Arctic maritime access are fundamentally different than what is required to maintain access to cyber or outer space; there don’t appear to be any aspects (or, many) that tie climate to cyber or outer space. This book considers only the aspects that regard the Arctic, as the intent is to examine NATO’s posture with regard to the risks posed by climate change, to the extent they can be reasonably distinguished and suggest a role for NATO to consider or a situation for which it must be concerned. Publication with respect to climate security risk in the Arctic is not empirical, and it is often found in policy-oriented grey literature.

  121. 121.

    Dodds notes the differing perspectives about whether the Arctic is a global common, and the potential for various sovereignty claims and conflict over associated resource rights, and their interplay with shipping routes and transit passage. Dodds, “A Polar Mediterranean? Accessibility, Resources and Sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean.”

  122. 122.

    Olga Alexeeva and Frédéric Lasserre, “China and the Arctic,” Arctic Yearbook, 2012, 80.

  123. 123.

    Nong Hong, “The Melting Arctic and Its Impact on China’s Maritime Transport,” Research in Transportation Economics 35, no. 1 (2012): 1. China sent an icebreaker on its third Arctic expedition in 2008. Scott G. Borgerson, “The Great Game Moves North,” Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-commons/2009-03-25/great-game-moves-north.

  124. 124.

    Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 69.

  125. 125.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 21.

  126. 126.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Final Report—Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 16.

  127. 127.

    Goodman, “National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change,” 10.

  128. 128.

    NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis Workshop #1 Read Ahead: Global Review,” 5.

  129. 129.

    Hong, “The Melting Arctic and Its Impact on China’s Maritime Transport,” 53.

  130. 130.

    Borgerson, “The Great Game Moves North,” 63.

  131. 131.

    Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” 63.

  132. 132.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 9.

  133. 133.

    Among the Mediterranean cities at risk of flooding are Alexandria (Egypt), Istanbul (Turkey), Benghazi (Libya), Casablanca (Morocco), Smyrna (now Izmir, Turkey), Algiers (Algeria), and Rabat (Morocco). More generally throughout the MENA region, low-lying coastal areas in Tunisia, Qatar, Libya, UAE, Kuwait, and Egypt are at particular risk.

  134. 134.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Final Report—Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 15.

  135. 135.

    Ibid., 16.

  136. 136.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 24.

  137. 137.

    A. Cooper Drury and Richard Stuart Olson, “Disasters and Political Unrest: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 6, no. 3 (1998): 153.

  138. 138.

    Philip Nel and Marjolein Righarts, “Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 159–85.

  139. 139.

    Rune T. Slettebak, “Don’t Blame the Weather! Climate-Related Natural Disasters and Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 163–76.

  140. 140.

    Drago Bergholt and Päivi Lujala, “Climate-Related Natural Disasters, Economic Growth, and Armed Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 147–62.

  141. 141.

    Steven Landis, “Natural Disasters, State Capacity, and Armed Conflict…? A Closer Look at the Foundations of the Climate Change-to-Conflict Debate,” in A Closer Look at the Foundations of the Climate Change-to-Conflict Debate (August 5, 2012): APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, 2012.

  142. 142.

    The OECD has examined aspects of reducing armed violence in urban areas. OECD, “Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence in Urban Areas” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011).

  143. 143.

    Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, “Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

  144. 144.

    Chad M. Briggs, “Climate Change and Environmental Migration, Briefing for OSCE Workshop on Migration” (The Hague, 2009), 1.

  145. 145.

    US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, 20.

  146. 146.

    Cilliers et al., “African Futures 2050 The Next Forty Years,” 9.

  147. 147.

    Oppenheimer et al., “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities,” 22–23.

  148. 148.

    NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center received a request from Turkey in 2012 to coordinate aid and assistance for the situation; however, other members of the international community stepped forward to share the burden, and NATO has not mobilized resources.

  149. 149.

    “Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.

  150. 150.

    Oppenheimer et al., “Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities,” 22.

  151. 151.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 12.

  152. 152.

    Ibid., 24.

  153. 153.

    Schellnhuber, World in Transition—Climate Change as a Security Risk.

  154. 154.

    National Intelligence Council, “North Africa: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030,” 2009, 4.

  155. 155.

    Ibid.

  156. 156.

    Ibid.

  157. 157.

    National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” 23.

  158. 158.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 39–40.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    NATO ACT, “Framework for Future Alliance Operations Workshop #1 Final Report—Leading NATO Military Transformation,” 5.

  161. 161.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 28.

  162. 162.

    Briggs, “Climate Change and Environmental Migration, Briefing for OSCE Workshop on Migration,” 1.

  163. 163.

    Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 7.

  164. 164.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 21.

  165. 165.

    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Video on the Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report, 2014.

  166. 166.

    Kunreuther et al., “Risk Management and Climate Change,” 1. “There is a growing recognition that today’s policy choices are highly sensitive to uncertainties and risk associated with the climate system and the actions of other decision makers. The choice of climate policies can thus be viewed as an exercise in risk management.”

  167. 167.

    Note that the IPCC has concluded with high confidence that “vulnerability and exposure are dynamic, vary across time and space, and depend on economic, social, geographic, demographic, cultural, institutional, governance, and environmental factors.” The IPCC additionally noted that risk management practices will be more successful if they account for this characteristic, and include an explicit characterization of uncertain and complexity. Cardona et al., “Determinants of Risk: Exposure and Vulnerability,” 67. This corresponds to the recommendation and protocol of the IRGC framework. Page 88 of the same source “The timing of events may also create ‘windows of vulnerability,’ periods in which the hazards are greater because of the conjunction of circumstances (Dow 1992). However, a key challenge for enhancing knowledge of exposure and vulnerability as key determinants of risk requires improved data and methods to project and identify directions and different development pathways in demographic, socioeconomic, and political trends that can adequately illustrate potential increases or decreases in vulnerability with the same time horizon as the changes in the climate system related to physical-biogeochemical projections (see Birkmann et al. 2010b).”

  168. 168.

    “Based on the dominant characteristic of each of the four risk categories (‘simple,’ ‘complexity,’ ‘uncertainty,’ ‘ambiguity’), it is possible to identify specific safety principles and, consequently, design a targeted risk management strategy. ‘Simple’ risk problems can be managed using a ‘routine-based’ strategy that draws on traditional decision-making instruments, best practices, as well as time-tested trial-and-error. For ‘complex’ and ‘uncertain’ risk problems it is helpful to distinguish the strategies required to deal with a risk agent from those directed at the risk-absorbing system: complex risks are thus usefully addressed on the basis of ‘risk-informed’ and ‘robustness-focused’ strategies, while uncertain risks are better managed using ‘precaution-based’ and ‘resilience-focused’ strategies. Whereas the former strategies aim at accessing and acting on the best available scientific expertise and at reducing a system’s vulnerability to known hazards and threats by improving its buffer capacity, the latter strategies pursue the goal of applying a precautionary approach to ensure the reversibility of critical decisions and of increasing a system’s coping capacity to the point where it can withstand surprises. Finally, for ‘ambiguous’ risk problems the appropriate strategy consists of a ‘discourse-based’ strategy which seeks to mutual understanding of conflicting views and values with a view to eventually reconciling them.” Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 14.

  169. 169.

    International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 20.

  170. 170.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 52.

  171. 171.

    Ibid., 40.

  172. 172.

    Ibid., 46.

  173. 173.

    Ibid.

  174. 174.

    Ibid., 52.

  175. 175.

    Ibid. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (RAND Corporation, 2005).

  176. 176.

    OECD, “OECD Guidance Document on Risk Communication for Chemical RiskManagement” (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002).

  177. 177.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 109.

  178. 178.

    Ibid., 55.

  179. 179.

    Ibid.

  180. 180.

    NATO, “Strategic Concept.”

  181. 181.

    NATO, “Lisbon Summit Declaration”; NATO, “Chicago Summit Declaration”; and NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration.”

  182. 182.

    NATO, “Lisbon Summit Declaration.”

  183. 183.

    NATO, “The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security” (Warsaw: NATO, 2016); NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communique” (Warsaw: NATO, 2016).

  184. 184.

    NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communique.”

  185. 185.

    Ibid.

  186. 186.

    NATO, “Commitment to Enhance Resilience” (Warsaw: NATO, 2016).

  187. 187.

    Scheffer, “NATO: The Next Decade Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the Security and Defence Agenda.”

  188. 188.

    Rasmussen, “NATO and Climate Change.”

  189. 189.

    Scheffer, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on Security Prospects in the High North.”

  190. 190.

    Ibid.

  191. 191.

    Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on Emerging Security Risks—Lloyd’s of London” (London: NATO, 2009). With respect to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review cited by the NATO Secretary General above, it notes that “While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world. In addition, extreme weather events may lead to increased demands for defense support to civil authorities for humanitarian assistance or disaster response both within the United States and overseas.”

  192. 192.

    Rasmussen, “‘Hungry for Security: Can NATO Help in a Humanitarian Crisis?’—Speech by NATO Secretary General at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands.”

  193. 193.

    Ibid. “NATO disaster response capabilities are frequently employed. Over the past 12 years the Alliance has responded to over 50 requests for assistance from nations. In the summer of 2005, NATO flew aid to the US to help New Orleans, following hurricane Katrina. In the same year, NATO delivered 3500 tons of aid after the earthquakes in Pakistan, and when floods hit Pakistan in 2010, NATO contributed to the relief operation. NATO also responded to requests for aid as a result of floods, fires, and earthquakes from a range of countries including, Tajikistan, Poland, Israel, and Montenegro.” Also, Dupont notes that “When Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in August 2005, a full US Army division, the famed 82nd Airborne, was called into restore order and assist in emergency relief.” Dupont, “The Strategic Implications of Climate Change,” 39.

  194. 194.

    NATO held a workshop in 2012 to examine and better understand the environmental risks facing NATO, of which some result from climate change. See NATO, “NATO Workshop Focuses on Energy and Environmental Risks Facing the Alliance.”

  195. 195.

    Politico Brussels, “Playbook Cocktails with Jens Stoltenberg.”

  196. 196.

    Ibid.

  197. 197.

    Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 57.

  198. 198.

    Ibid.

  199. 199.

    US National Research Council, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis.

  200. 200.

    Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” 69.

  201. 201.

    Adger et al., “Human Security,” 21.

  202. 202.

    NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center received a request from Turkey in 2012 to coordinate aid and assistance for the situation; however, other members of the international community stepped forward to share the burden, and NATO has not mobilized resources.

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Lippert, T.H. (2019). A Risk Governance Case Study. In: NATO, Climate Change, and International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14560-6_5

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