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Principle of Non-discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Same-Sex Marriage. A Comparison Between United States and European Case Law

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General Principles of Law - The Role of the Judiciary

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 46))

Abstract

By way of a comparison between European and United States case law regarding same-sex marriages, this chapter aims at stressing the important role of judicial activity in implementing the full meaning of equality in exercising the fundamental right to marry. From an analysis of different judgments concerning the same-sex marriage, it is possible to observe a gradual global prevailing of the “paradigm of heterosexual marriage”, as a result of the non-discrimination principle on the grounds of sexual orientation, which is consolidated by the occidental juridical culture. The study of this case law also points out the relationship between social consent, judicial activity and legislative power. The European supranational courts as well as the US Supreme Court seem to check in a more stringent manner the discretion of the domestic/State legislators, in accordance with the growing social consent in favor of same-sex marriages. The “new approach” of the European supranational courts and the US Supreme Court has the merit to trigger a virtuous dialog among lower courts, State legislators and civil society in order to gradually give fullness to the meaning of the non-discrimination principle on the grounds of sexual orientation. Hence, it is possible to say that the current question is not if the same-sex marriage is constitutional but who decides about it. Judicial action, in the absence of legislative answers, risks guaranteeing only a fragmentary (and often contradictory) protection of fundamental rights. It should be desirable that the legislator will choose suggestions coming from the “living law” and that the “dichotomy” between the two powers will be reduced to unity, according to the rules of a democratic system, based on the separation of and loyal cooperation between the same powers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Clear differences, if we only compare the US government system—US Federalism—with the EU governing system (a Union of States) and if we consider the role played by European courts—the European Court of Human Right and the European Court of Justice—at the European supranational and at national level.

  2. 2.

    See Sperti (2013).

  3. 3.

    Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (App. no 7525/76), ECtHR, judgment of 22 October 1981.

  4. 4.

    Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620 (1996).

  5. 5.

    Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003).

  6. 6.

    Case C-249/96 Grant, [1998] ECR I-00621.

  7. 7.

    Joined cases C-122/99 and C-125/99 D. and Kingdom of Sweden [2001] ECR I-04319.

  8. 8.

    E.g. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 852 P.2d 44 (1993); Goodridge v. Department Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003); Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 908 A 2d 196 (2006). In Europe: the decisions of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1 BvF 1/01, 1 BvF 2/01 of 2002 and 1/11 and 1 BvR 3247/09 of 2013; the judgments of the Portuguese Tribunal Constitutional, no. 359 of 2009 and no. 192 of 2010; the decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court, no. 138 of 2010 and no. 170 of 2014; the ruling of the French Conseil Constitutionnel no. 663 of 2013 and the decision of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional no. 198 of 2012. We can also mention the case law of the ECtHR (in particular: Schalk and Kopf v. Austria , App. no. 30141/04, ECtHR, judgment of 24 June 2010, and Vallianatos v. Greece , App. nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, ECtHR [GC], judgment of 7 November 2013) and of the US Supreme Court (United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2013, and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2013).

  9. 9.

    BVerfG, 1 BvR 1164/07 of 2009; BVerfG, 1 BvR 611/07 of 2010.

  10. 10.

    BVerfG, BvR 1/11, BvR 3247/09 of 2013.

  11. 11.

    See Perelli (2013), p. 3.

  12. 12.

    See, for an Italian issue about this decision, D’Aloia (2014a, b).

  13. 13.

    Schalk and Kopf v. Austria cit.. See for the analysis of this decision Crivelli ( 2011).

  14. 14.

    See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria cit., para. 94.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., para. 61.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., para. 62.

  17. 17.

    Case C-267/06 Maruko [2008] ECR I-1757.

  18. 18.

    Case C-147/08 Römer [2011] ECR I-3591.

  19. 19.

    See, for example, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom cit., a real “leading case” in the history of the gay rights, that continues to be mentioned in many decisions of the national Constitutional Courts of different Countries. See the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court no. 138 of 2010 but also the Lawrence case, ruled by the US Supreme Court, which is the first case in which the Supreme Court referred to a foreign European case (Lawrence v. Texas cit.).

  20. 20.

    On this issue see Sperti ( 2006, 2013); De Vergottini (2010); Ruggeri (2013, 2014b). About the notion of “community of judges”, are also interesting the considerations outlined in the Seminar “Implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: a shared judicial responsibility?” (Strasbourg, 31 January 2014), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2014_ENG.pdf.

  21. 21.

    For the problematic relationship between national judges, Constitutional Courts, supranational and international courts see D’Aloia (2014a). See also Ruggeri (2013), Tega ( 2012).

  22. 22.

    Tribunal Constitutional de España, decision no. 198/2012, 6 November 2012, available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Sentencia.aspx?cod=20674. The Court wrote: “Si se acude al Derecho comparado, en la balanza de la integración del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo en la imagen actual del matrimonio pesa el hecho de que la equiparación del matrimonio entre personas de distinto sexo y entre personas del mismo sexo se ha consolidado, en los últimos años, en el seno de varios ordenamientos jurídicos integrados en la cultura jurídica occidental”.

  23. 23.

    In the same decision, the Court wrote: “Pues bien, la cultura jurídica no se construye sólo desde la interpretación literal, sistemática u originalista de los textos jurídicos, sino que también contribuyen a su configuración la observación de la realidad social jurídicamente relevante, sin que esto signifique otorgar fuerza normativa directa a lo fáctico, las opiniones de la doctrina jurídica y de los órganos consultivos previstos en el propio ordenamiento, el Derecho comparado que se da en un entorno socio-cultural próximo y, en materia de la construcción de la cultura jurídica de los derechos, la actividad internacional de los Estados manifestada en los tratados internacionales, en la jurisprudencia de los órganos internacionales que los interpretan, y en las opiniones y dictámenes elaboradas por los órganos competentes del sistema de Naciones Unidas, así como por otros organismos internacionales de reconocida posición”. See for a comment Ibrido (2012, 2013).

  24. 24.

    See Sperti (2013).

  25. 25.

    In particular, see Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (App. no. 33290/96), ECtHR, judgment of 21 December 1999.

  26. 26.

    Karner v. Austria (App. no. 40016/98), ECtHR, judgment of 24 July 2003.

  27. 27.

    Schalk and Kopf v. Austria cit..

  28. 28.

    See cit., footnote 12.

  29. 29.

    Vallianatos v. Greece cit.. See for a comment Rudan (2014), p. 1; Valenti ( 2013).

  30. 30.

    On the relationships between different courts, see Gallo (2012), Ruggeri (2013).

  31. 31.

    We can read in that decision: “the trend emerging in the legal systems of the Council of Europe member States is clear: of the nineteen States which authorize some form of registered partnership other than marriage, Lithuania and Greece are the only ones to reserve it exclusively to different-sex couples … In other words, with two exceptions, Council of Europe member States, when they opt to enact legislation introducing a new system of registered partnership as an alternative to marriage for unmarried couples, include same-sex couples in its scope. Moreover, this trend is reflected in the relevant Council of Europe materials …” (para. 91).

  32. 32.

    The judges of Strasbourg write: “The fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a country finds itself in an isolated position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that aspect conflicts with the Convention … Nevertheless, in view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the government have not offered convincing and weighty reasons capable of justifying the exclusion of same-sex couples from the scope of Law no. 3719/2008” (para. 92).

  33. 33.

    Hämäläinen v. Finland (App. no. 37359/09), ECtHR [GC], judgment of 16 July 2014.

  34. 34.

    The Court writes: “Same-sex marriages are not, for the time being, permitted in Finland although that possibility is currently being examined by Parliament. On the other hand, the rights of same-sex couples are currently protected by the possibility of contracting a registered partnership” (para. 69).

  35. 35.

    Hämäläinen v. Finland cit., para. 88.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., para. 71: “The Court reiterates its case law according to which Article 8 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to marriages”.

  38. 38.

    See Pustorino (2014).

  39. 39.

    As noticed by judges Sajó, Keller e Lemmens in their dissenting opinion: “In this context, we note that proof of the existence of a consensus, when adduced, must not depend on the existence of a common approach in a super-majority of States: the Court has some discretion regarding its acknowledgment of trends (compare Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, para. 91, ECHR 2013)”.

  40. 40.

    See Helfer and Voeten ( 2014), p. 105: “In the context of ECtHR judgments on LGBT rights, we find evidence that even where international judges take social trends into consideration, they nonetheless retain considerable discretion and can encourage policy change by noncompliant Countries under the right domestic political and institutional conditions. In particular, ECtHR judgments increase the likelihood that all European nations—even Countries whose laws and policies the court has not explicitly found to violate the European Convention—will adopt pro-LGBT reforms. The effect is strongest in Countries where public support for homosexuals is lowest”.

  41. 41.

    Maruko  cit..

  42. 42.

    Römer  cit..

  43. 43.

    Case C-267/12 Frédéric Hay [2013] nyr.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., para. 33.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., para. 34.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., para. 47.

  47. 47.

    Cf. Valenti ( 2014).

  48. 48.

    Cf. De Pasquale et al. ( 2012).

  49. 49.

    See Winkler (2011), p. 10. See also Rijpma and Koffeman (2014), Orzan (2014).

  50. 50.

    Maruko cit., paras. 67–69; Römer cit.,  para. 4.

  51. 51.

    US Supreme Court, United States v. Windsor cit., and Hollingsworth v. Perry cit..

  52. 52.

    For some Italian comments on this decision see: D’Aloia (2014a, b), Massa Pinto ( 2013 ), Schillaci ( 2013 ).

  53. 53.

    US Supreme Court, United States v. Windsor cit., opinion of the Court, III.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Sperti (2013).

  58. 58.

    Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (2013).

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., para. 33.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., para. 53.

  63. 63.

    Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See: National Center for Lesbian Rights. 2015. Marriages, Domestic Partnerships and Civil Unions: Same-sex Couples within the United States, available at http://www.nclrights.org. See also for an Italian comment Sperti (2014).

  64. 64.

    See for example: Latta v. Otter, no. CV-00482-CW (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (2014); Baskin v. Bogan,  766 F.3d 648 (2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp.2d 982 (2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp.2d 410 (2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp.2d 1128 (2014); Wright v. Arkansas, no. CV-14-414 (2014); Garden State Equality et al. v. Dow,  82 A.3d 336 (2013). See also the pending cases: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, DeBoer v. Snyder, Bourke v. Beshear, Tanco v. Haslam, Obergefell v. Hodges; and  US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, De Leon v. Perry.

  65. 65.

    DeBoer v. Snyder, Bourke v. Beshear, Tanco v. Haslam, Obergefell v. Hodges cit..

  66. 66.

    Ibid., para. II.G.

  67. 67.

    See Romeo (2014).

  68. 68.

    In this regard, the words of Martha Craig Daughtrey, in her dissenting opinion to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (DeBoer v. Snyder case), seems to me very significant: “Today, my colleagues seem to have fallen prey to the misguided notion that the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution can be effectuated only by cleaving to the legislative will and ignoring and demonizing an independent judiciary. Of course, the framers presciently recognized that two of the three co-equal branches of government were representative in nature and necessarily would be guided by self-interest and the pull of popular opinion. To restrain those natural, human impulses, the framers crafted Article III to ensure that rights, liberties, and duties need not be held hostage by popular whims. More than 20 years ago, when I took my oath of office to serve as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, I solemnly swore to ‘administer justice without respect to persons’, to ‘do equal right to the poor and to the rich’, and to ‘faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me … under the Constitution and laws of the United States’. … If we in the judiciary do not have the authority, and indeed the responsibility, to right fundamental wrongs left excused by a majority of the electorate, our whole intricate, constitutional system of checks and balances, as well as the oaths to which we swore, prove to be nothing but shams”.

  69. 69.

    Italian Constitutional Court, decision no. 134 of 2010.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    In my opinion, the core of the decision is represented precisely by the word “potential”.

  72. 72.

    With this judgment, the Court states the constitutional illegitimacy of the norm that provides the automatic nullity of the marriage in case of change of sex of one of the spouses. At the same time, the Court doesn’t consider the couple (become same-sex couples) as married or joined in a civil union.

  73. 73.

    As suggested by some authors: see, for example, Cartabia ( 2012), Pinto and Tripodina (2010).

  74. 74.

    See Ferrando ( 2014), at 2.

  75. 75.

    See, for examples, the decisions nos. 359 of 2009 and 210 of 2010 of the Portuguese Constitutional Court; the decision no. 198 of 2012 of the Spanish Constitutional Court or the ruling no. 669 of 2013 of the French Constitutional Court.

  76. 76.

    See Pezzini (2014), at 2; Brunelli ( 2014), at 2.

  77. 77.

    This decision is available at http://www.giurcost.org/casi_scelti/Cassazione/Cass.sent.4184-2012.htm.

  78. 78.

    See Italian Constitutional Court, decision no. 317 of 2009.

  79. 79.

    Decision available at http://www.articolo29.it.

  80. 80.

    Decision available at http://www.articolo29.it.

  81. 81.

    To the contrary, see, Tribunal of Pesaro, Decree, 14 October 2014; Tribunal of Milan, Decree, 17 July 2014, available at http://www.articolo29.it.

  82. 82.

    See cit., footnote 52.

  83. 83.

    See Spanish Constitutional Court, decision no. 198 of 2012. See also supra, footnotes 21 and 22.

  84. 84.

    See about this matter Ruggeri (2014a).

  85. 85.

    For the same conclusions see again Ruggeri (2014a).

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  1. Researcher in Constitutional Law, University of Parma, Parma, Italy

    Veronica Valenti

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    Laura Pineschi

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Valenti, V. (2015). Principle of Non-discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Same-Sex Marriage. A Comparison Between United States and European Case Law. In: Pineschi, L. (eds) General Principles of Law - The Role of the Judiciary. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 46. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19180-5_11

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