Abstract
Common European legal thinking reveals itself especially in the existence of a common European constitutional law (Ius Publicum Europaeum Commune). It denotes the ensemble of individual constitutional principles that are – written or unwritten – a common heritage of the various national constitutional states. With regard to the principle of democracy, the Jubilee, when conducting a comparative law study, found there to be a “relatively heterogeneous picture” among national constitutions, even though one can find “core elements of a ‘common European democracy’”. According to Albrecht Weber, these include periodic elections of State institutions, legally ensured responsibility of public decision making with the possibility for parliamentary minorities to gain power as well as representative party democracy. Besides these elements, the equal participation of all governed in the exercise of public authority and constitutional freedoms is a mainstay of European “self-government”. The decision for parliamentary democracy in the European Union (Art. 10.1 TEU) is thus predetermined by the Member States’ forms of government and therefore belongs to the fundamental laws (Grundgesetze), to the “essentials” of the EU’s constitutional compound.
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Notes
- 1.
Vari 2013, p. 708, 719 (our translation).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Weber 2010, Chap. 7, para 20. Well before the inclusion of the idea of a political union in the Treaties, the ECJ recognised the principle of democracy as a general legal principle; see Case 138/79, Roquette Frères (ECJ 29.10.1980) para 33.
- 5.
Calliess 2005a, p. 283.
- 6.
See the contribution by Cruz Villalón in this volume.
- 7.
- 8.
Häberle 1991, p. 262, 264.
- 9.
- 10.
Cf. BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 271 – Lisbon.
- 11.
BGBl 2002 II p. 1072.
- 12.
See Art. 14.3 TEU, which does not include the principle of equality of elections. Cf. Schorkopf, in Kahl et al. (2011), Art. 23 GG para 44; Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 223 AEUV para 47.
- 13.
Cf. Act Concerning the Election of the Members of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage, Council Decision of 20 September 1976 (Federal Law Gazette 1977 II p. 733); last amended by the Council Decision of 22 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 (Federal Law Gazette 2003 II p. 810; 2004 II p. 520).
- 14.
Cf. BVerfG 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (judgment of 12 October 1993), para 97 and 100: “At the same time, with the building‐up of the functions and powers of the Community, it becomes increasingly necessary to allow the democratic legitimation and influence provided by way of the national parliaments to be accompanied by a representation of the peoples of the member‐States through a European Parliament as the source of a supplementary democratic support for the policies of the European Union. […] In the federation of States formed by the European Union, therefore, democratic legitimation necessarily comes about through the feed‐back of the actions of the European institutions into the parliaments of the member‐States; and within the institutional structure of the Union there is the additional factor (increasing to the extent that the European nations grow closer together) of the provision of democratic legitimation by way of the European Parliament elected by the citizens of the States.”; BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 262 – Lisbon: “As long as, and in so far as, the principle of conferral is adhered to in an association of sovereign states with clear elements of executive and governmental cooperation, the legitimation provided by national parliaments and governments complemented and sustained by the directly elected European Parliament is sufficient in principle.”.
- 15.
This has been the appropriate conclusion of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) in its decision on the Treaty of Maastricht (BVerfGE 89, 155 [184 f.]). However, in its judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon as well as in its decisions of 9 November 2011 (BVerfGE 129, 300 – 5 % threshold for EP elections) and of 26 February 2014 (BVerfGE 2 BvE 2/13 et al. – 3 % threshold for EP elections), the FCC has erected high obstacles for the EP to evolve into a “full‐fledged parliament”. Calliess 2005a, p. 300, who already in 2005 concluded that with regard to the grown competences of the EP, the lack of a uniform and equal electoral procedure is no longer justified.
- 16.
Cf. Blanke and Pilz 2014, p. 557.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
See the contribution by Luther in this volume.
- 20.
- 21.
Cf. e. g. Art. 3.1 and 3.2 French Constitution; Art. 20.2 first sentence German Constitution; Art. 1.2 Italian Constitution; Art. 6.1 Irish Constitution.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
Cf. Pernice 1993, p. 477 et seq.; Maurer 2013, p. 3 et seq.; in more detail Augustin 2000, especially p. 63 et seqq., 393 et seqq.; Peters 2001, p. 657 et seqq., 700 et seqq.; v. Komorowski 2010, p. 1014 et seqq., who from the perspective of the Basic Law reconstructs the model of dual legitimation as a model of off‐centred, but also territorially uniform (staatsgebietseinheitlich) people’s sovereignty.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
See also the contribution by Tomuschat in this volume.
- 30.
Cf. Ruffert and Walter 2015, para 337–338.
- 31.
Cf. Höreth 1999, p. 88 et seq.
- 32.
- 33.
On this element see Eder and Trenz 2007.
- 34.
Cf. also Franzius and Preuß 2012, p. 24 et seqq.
- 35.
Cf. Schliesky 2004, p. 599 et seqq.
- 36.
Cf. Ipsen 1972, p. 1045. With regard to the US‐American regulation commissions, G. Majone speaks of a “fourth branch of government”. He holds that also the Community Treaties have established a “fourth branch of government”, namely with the instrument of harmonisation (Art. 114 TFEU), which characterises the Union as a “regulatory State”. See Majone 1994, p. 77 et seqq.; Majone 1996, passim; Majone 1998, p. 5 et seqq.; Majone 1999, p. 1 et seqq.; Majone 2001, p. 57 et seqq.; cf. in this respect also Case C‐62/14, OMT (Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015) para 109 et seqq. with regard to the European Central Bank.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
See also Art. 2 of the French Constitution: gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple.
- 43.
- 44.
Kohler‐Koch and Rittberger 2007, p. 13.
- 45.
Grzeszick, in Maunz and Dürig (2010), Art. 20 II GG, para 12.
- 46.
Böckenförde 2004, § 24, esp. para 11–25; Grzeszick, in Maunz and Dürig (2010), Art. 20 II GG, para 61; Sommermann 2005, p. 203 et seqq., proves that the doctrine of derivation is not the prevailing model in the constitutional law of the Member States of the Union. With a critical view Nettesheim 2005, p. 178, who rejects this model as “chain‐of‐legitimation fetishism” and who, not without irony, refers to Luhmann 2000, p. 36, when speaking of the inept idea of the people as a sort of overarching entity in which the miracle of the fusion of the individual wills to common will can happen.
- 47.
- 48.
Art. 23.1 GG reads as follows: “With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law [which] shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79”. According to the aforementioned paragraph 3 of Art. 79 GG, amendments to the Basic Law “affecting […] the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible”. Art. 79.3 GG protects the so‐called “inviolable core content of the Basic Law’s constitutional identity” which is excluded from any transfer of sovereign rights.
- 49.
Di Fabio 1993, 210.
- 50.
Cf. BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 228, 347, 266 et seq. – Lisbon. This view is shared by the European Commission in its letter in response to the Opinion of the House of Lords concerning the role of national Parliaments in the EU, C (2014) 4236 final of 23 June 2014. p. 3: “This general principle goes hand-in-hand with a second general principle, namely that ‘in developing EMU, the level of democratic legitimacy always needs to remain commensurate with the degree of transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the European level’.”
- 51.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 351 – Lisbon.
- 52.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 235, 239, 255 – Lisbon; see before BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 (12 October 1993) para 101 – Maastricht. In the words of the FCC, in its judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon (para 249), these “essential areas of democratic formative action” include, among others, “citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure including external financing and all elements of encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of fundamental rights, above all in major encroachments on fundamental rights such as deprivation of liberty in the administration of criminal law or placement in an institution. These important areas also include cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, press and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology”.
- 53.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 216 – Lisbon.
- 54.
Grzeszick, in Maunz and Dürig (2010), Art. 20 II GG, para 294.
- 55.
- 56.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 113, 277 et seq., 334 – Lisbon.
- 57.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 281 – Lisbon; cf. also see also Franzius and Preuß 2012, p. 30 et seq.
- 58.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 334 – Lisbon.
- 59.
Cf. the wording of the German FCC, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) – Lisbon and BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 (12 October 1993) – Maastricht.
- 60.
- 61.
Cf. Schorkopf, in Kahl et al. (2011), Art. 23 GG para 42.
- 62.
- 63.
- 64.
Cf. Schorkopf, in Kahl et al. (2011), Art. 23 GG para 34.
- 65.
- 66.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 279 – Lisbon; see also the contribution by Tomuschat in this volume.
- 67.
For the whole panorama of arguments about the democratic quality of the EU and on the question if there is a democratic deficit (G. Majone, R. Dahl, P. Graf Kielmansegg, A. Moravcsik, R.M. Lepsius, A. Follesdahl and S. Hix et al.) see Kohler‐Koch and Rittberger 2007, p. 6 et seqq.
- 68.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 265 et seqq. (272) – Lisbon; see also di Fabio 2014, p. 13.
- 69.
Cf. Schorkopf, in Kahl et al. (2011), Art. 23 GG para 42.
- 70.
- 71.
Cf. Schorkopf, in Kahl et al. (2011), Art. 23 GG para 44.
- 72.
- 73.
Cf. von Bogdandy 2012, p. 322.
- 74.
Habermas 2011, p. 62.
- 75.
Pernice 1998, p. 40 (43 et seqq.).
- 76.
Cf. Pernice 2005, p. 759 et seq.; Pernice 2002; Pernice 2009, p. 376; Peters 2001, p. 566; von Achenbach 2014, p. 416 et seq.; Uerpmann‐Wittzack, in von Münch and Kunig (2012), Art. 23 para 14–16, 18; Härtel 2014, para 85; von Bogdandy 2010, p. 48. With a view on these two entities as separate and not coinciding see BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 346 et seqq. – Lisbon.
- 77.
- 78.
- 79.
See also BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 249, 251 et seqq. – Lisbon.
- 80.
Cf. Art. 3.1 and 3.2 of the French Constitution: “National sovereignty shall vest in the people, who shall exercise it through their representatives and by means of referendum. No section of the people nor any individual may arrogate to itself, or to himself, the exercise thereof.” Art. 1.2 of the Italian Constitution: “Sovereignty belongs to the people and is exercised by the people in the forms and within the limits of the Constitution”. Art. 6.1 of the Irish Constitution: “All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good”.
- 81.
“Le principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément.”.
- 82.
“La Souveraineté est une, indivisible, inaliénable et imprescriptible. Elle appartient à la Nation; aucune section du peuple, ni aucun individu, ne peut s’en attribuer l’exercice.”.
- 83.
In the current Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) it says in the preamble: “Le peuple français proclame solennellement son attachement aux Droits de l’Homme et aux principes de la souveraineté nationale tels qu’ils ont été définis par la Déclaration de 1789, confirmée et complétée par le préambule de la Constitution de 1946 […]”. Art. 3 of the French Constitution: “La souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple qui l’exerce par ses représentants et par la voie du référendum. Aucune section du peuple ni aucun individu ne peut s’en attribuer l’exercice.” On the meaning of “nation” as subject of legitimation see Duguit 1921, § 48; Sommermann 1997, p. 86 et seq.
- 84.
von Bogdandy 2010, p. 48.
- 85.
Nettesheim 2005, p. 172.
- 86.
Heller 1963, 176.
- 87.
See Di Fabio 1993, 202 et seqq., who speaks of the European Parliament as a “State convention”; Nettesheim 2005, 170 et seqq. (172 et seq.), and others, see the chance for the formation of a political community in the Union, if it’s action is based on universalistic principles such as freedom, equality, minority protection, neutrality or the commitment to neminem laedere.
- 88.
Cf. Hrbek 2012, p. 131 et seq.
- 89.
- 90.
- 91.
- 92.
Franzius and Preuß 2012, p. 56 et seq.
- 93.
Appl. No. 24833/94, Matthews v. United Kingdom (ECtHR 18 February 1999) para 52 with regard to Art. 3.1 of the Additional Protocol No. to the ECHR.
- 94.
BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 (12 October 1993) para 100 – Maastricht.
- 95.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 265 et seqq. (271) – Lisbon. See before BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 (12 October 1993) p. 18 et seq. – Maastricht. In the Maastricht judgment the judges have regarded the European Parliament’s “complementary” function in providing “the basis for democratic support for the policies of the European Union” and thus they have made the national legislative bodies the relevant organs to convey democratic legitimacy in the context of Germany’s participation in the process of European integration; see later on BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 (judgment of 18 July 2005) para 81 – European Arrest Warrant.
- 96.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 289, 278 – Lisbon; see Schönberger 2009, p. 1213 et seq.
- 97.
- 98.
Cf. von Achenbach 2014, p. 19 et seq., 403.
- 99.
von Achenbach 2014, p. 439 et seq.
- 100.
Böckenförde 2004, para 16.
- 101.
Rightly so Doehring 1997, p. 1133 et seq.
- 102.
von Achenbach, p. 405 et seq., 441.
- 103.
Mayer 2012, p. 69 et seq.
- 104.
von Achenbach 2014, p. 445.
- 105.
Ruffert 2004, p. 184.
- 106.
- 107.
In analogy to the criticism voiced by the German FCC with regard to the European Parliament; see BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (judgment of 30 June 2009) para 281, 292 – Lisbon.
- 108.
von Achenbach 2014, p. 443 et seq.
- 109.
Calliess 2014, Part 3, C, para 15.
- 110.
Cf. COM(2006) 211; Pierafita 2013, p. 6 et seqq.
- 111.
- 112.
- 113.
In this respect also De Wilde 2012, p. 12.
- 114.
- 115.
Kiiver 2006, p. 158 et seqq. who speaks in terms of a “COSAC subsidiarity experiment” and the “phantom collective”.
- 116.
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 318 reasoned opinions have been issued by national Parliaments/chambers under the Article 6 procedure. The Swedish parliament has issued a total of 51, the Dutch House of Representative 20, the Dutch Senate 17 and the French Senate 21. Germany accounts for 13 reasoned opinions, of which 10 originate from the Bundesrat and only 3 from the Bundestag. However, it is difficult to establish whether these reasoned opinions find there to be an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity, as foreseen by Art. 6 of Protocol No. 2 TEU, or if they claim there to be other shortcomings of the draft, such as the material scope, content etc. Conversely, since 2006 a total of 1,174 opinions have been issued under the (informal) “political dialogue” initiated by the Commission (data as of 18 February 2015).; on the latter see Casalena, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Protocol No. 1 TEU para 18.
- 117.
Kiiver 2006, p. 158 et seqq. who speaks in terms of a “COSAC subsidiarity experiment” and the “phantom collective”.
- 118.
Kiiver 2006, p. 168.
- 119.
Cf. Stratulat et al. 2014, p. 6 et seq.
- 120.
UK House of Lords, Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the European Union, Inquiry on “Renegotiation and Referendum on UK Membership of the EU”, 30 June 2015, evidence by Mr David Lidington MP, p. 27.
- 121.
This is a crucial point within the approach by British Prime Minister D. Cameron for the reform of the EU: “…National parliaments able to work together to block unwanted European legislation…”; see The Telegraph (telegraph.co.uk) of 15 March 2014, “The EU is not working and we will change it“. A similar idea had been voiced by then British Foreign Secretary W. Hague at a speech given on 31 March 2013 in Neuhardenberg near Berlin: ″Maybe we should go ahead and think about a red card, granting national Parliaments the right to block EU legislation.”
- 122.
Norton 1984, p. 201 distinguishes the types of parliaments (policy‐making, policy‐influencing and advisory). In recent literature cf. Buzogány and Stuchlik 2012, S. 359 et seq.; on the Danish model see Buche 2013, p. 367 et seqq. and Finke and Melzer 2012; cf. (without an analysis of the Baltic States) Mayer 2012, p. 177 et seqq., 210. Participation rights of the national Parliaments in Finland, Ireland, Malta, the Czech Republic and in some respect in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia are similar to those of the German Bundestag (Sect. 5.3); see Grabenwarter 2011, p. 112.
- 123.
Cf. BVerfG – 2 BvE 2/08 (30 June 2009) para 246, referring to BVerfG – 2 BvR 2134/92 – Maastricht. As a result of this judgment the German Bundestag has enacted the “Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters concerning the European Union” of 22 September 2009 (BGBl. I, p. 3022), amended by Art. 1 of the law of 1 December 2009 (BGBl. I, p. 3822).
- 124.
- 125.
- 126.
- 127.
Cf. Deubner 2014, p. 24.
- 128.
Deubner 2014, p. 25.
- 129.
Cf. most recently BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12 et al. (judgment of 18 March 2014) – ESM, for example para 163.
- 130.
Cf. Deubner 2014, p. 35: “serious gap in parliamentary attendance”.
- 131.
European Commission, Ex ante coordination of plans for major economic policy reforms, COM(2013) 166 and European Commission, The introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument, COM(2013) 165.
- 132.
European Parliament resolution of 23 May 2013 on future legislative proposals on EMU: response to the Commission communications, P7_TA(2013)0222, point 5.
- 133.
P7_TA(2013)0222, point 7.
- 134.
P7_TA(2013)0222, point 16.
- 135.
Bauer 2005, p. 9; Sommermann 2005, p. 216 et seq., also sees parliamentary countermovements in some Member States; for the “increasingly compound and accumulated ‘order’ of executive power in Contemporary Europe”; see also Curtin 2014, p. 206 et seqq.; but in her opinion, “there is no single, comprehensive and unitary European executive institution or body that can in any meaningful way be described as an EU government…” (“fragmentation”).
- 136.
- 137.
Cf. Mangiameli 2013, sub 3 b, d, e.
- 138.
Cf. Maurer 2013, p. 5 et seqq.
- 139.
The institutional binding effect of a treaty revision would naturally be greater than the durability of a treaty under public international law, notwithstanding Art. 62 VCLT; with the same view apparently Kingreen 2015.
- 140.
- 141.
European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012, P7‐TA‐2012‐430, Recommendation 2.7 on ensuring democratic oversight of the ESM. The Parliament adds, that “key decisions, such as the granting of financial assistance to a Member State and the conclusion of memorandums, should be subject to proper scrutiny by the European Parliament.” See also European Parliament resolution of 12 June 2013 on strengthening European democracy in the future EMU, P7_TA‐PROV(2013)0269, point 11.
- 142.
European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. Launching a European debate, COM(2012) 777 final/2, p. 36 et seq.
- 143.
European Parliament resolution of 12 June 2013 on strengthening European democracy in the future EMU, P7_TA‐PROV(2013)0269, point 10; see most recently, European Commision, 5‐Presidents‐Report ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’, 2015, p. 17.
- 144.
Blanke 2011, p. 402 et seqq.
- 145.
Nettesheim 2013, p. 49.
- 146.
Nettesheim 2013, p. 41 et seq.
- 147.
Nettesheim 2013, p. 47 et seqq.
- 148.
- 149.
- 150.
- 151.
Cf. in the case of Germany BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12 et al. (judgment of 18 March 2014) para 162 – ESM.
- 152.
- 153.
- 154.
Corbett 2013.
- 155.
Kiiver 2006, p. 162 who emphasises the right of the national Parliaments to scrutinise “proportionality and other criteria” notwithstanding the fact that in his opinion there is “no protocol or treaty provision authorizing […] to do so”.
- 156.
Cf. Sects. 5–9 EUZBBG on the broad range of matters that activate the Bundestag’s right to early notification and involvement by the federal government as well as to deliver opinions to the federal government. A sign of the mainly weak role of national Parliaments beyond matters concerning the European Union stricto sensu is the fact that only four national Parliaments (Finland, Estonia, Germany and The Netherlands) had to consent to the bilateral financial aid for Greece (international treaty).
- 157.
See the instructive study conducted by Auel and Tacea 2014.
- 158.
- 159.
Olivetti, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Art. 12 para 72.
- 160.
Cf. Grabenwarter 2011, p. 110.
- 161.
Raunio 2005, p. 322 et seq.
- 162.
Cf. Mayer 2012, p. 191.
- 163.
Cf. Møller Sousa 2008, p. 432.
- 164.
Cf. Mayer 2012, p. 197 et seq.
- 165.
Cf. Baach 2008, p. 183 et seqq.; von Achenbach 2014, p. 442 et seq.; see also Dann 2004, p. 254 et seqq., who regards the collision of the logic of negotiation and decision making in the Council with effective parliamentary participation on the basis of the model of executive federalism (p. 269), which is founded on efficient, flexible negotiation and compromise (p. 95 et seqq.); on structural problems of control of international organisations or institutions by national Parliaments see Krajewski 2008, para 14.
- 166.
Finke and Melzer 2012, p. 10.
- 167.
- 168.
Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters concerning the European Union (Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz – BGBl. I p. 3022) as amended by Art. 1 of the Act of 1 December 2009 (BGBl. I p. 3822); cf. Casalena, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Protocol No. 1 TEU para 100; on the whole see also Calliess 2014, Part 3, C, para 32 et seqq.
- 169.
Section 8 (4) EUZBBG (emphasis added): “If the Bundestag avails itself of the opportunity to deliver an opinion […], the Federal Government shall invoke the requirement of prior parliamentary approval in the negotiations if the main interests expressed in the decision of the Bundestag cannot be asserted. The Federal Government shall notify the Bundestag thereof without delay in a special report. In its form and content, this report must lend itself to discussion by the bodies of the Bundestag. Before the final decision, the Federal Government shall endeavour to reach agreement with the Bundestag. […] The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the right of the Federal Government, in awareness of the Bundestag’s opinion, to take divergent decisions for good reasons of foreign or integration policy.”.
- 170.
Section 5 (2) EUZBLG (emphasis added): “To the extent that a project primarily affects the legislative powers of the Länder and the Federation has no legislative power, or a project primarily affects the structure of Land authorities, or the Land administrative procedures, the position of the Bundesrat shall be given the greatest possible respect in determining the Federation’s position […]. This is without prejudice to the responsibility of the Federation for the nation as a whole, including matters of foreign, defence and integration policy. […] If agreement with the Federal Government is not reached and the Bundesrat confirms its opinion by a majority of two thirds, the Bundesrat’s opinion is decisive. In matters that may result in increased expenditures or reduced revenues for the Federation, the consent of the Federal Government shall be required.”.
- 171.
Cf. Saberzadeh, in von Arnauld and Hufeld (2011), Chap. 11 para 34 et seq.
- 172.
Cf. Saberzadeh, in von Arnauld and Hufeld (2011), Chap. 11 para 42 with further reference.
- 173.
Calliess 2010b, p. 23.
- 174.
Cf. U. Guérot and R. Menasse, Es lebe die europäische Republik, F.A.Z. of 24 March 2013, p. 24; M. Roth, Der Euro braucht ein Parlament, 17 November 2011.
- 175.
Cf. See The Spinelli Group/Bertelsmann Stiftung, A Fundamental Law of the European Union, 2013; cf. also Andrew Duff (who was a member of the Federalists project group), A Fundamental Law of the European Union, Speech to the Federal Trust in London on 10 January 2012, http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/filepool/Andrew_Duff_Speech_10thJanuary2013.pdf
- 176.
See for example Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, Final Report of 17 September 2012; cf. also Deubner 2014, p. 41.
- 177.
Emphasis added. Cf. also Maurer 2013, p. 6.
- 178.
See Parliamentary Resolution on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 (2009/2134(INI)), A7‐0027/2012. For genuine European (transnational) elections see Franzius and Preuß 2012, p. 118 et seqq.
- 179.
Cf. J. Fischer, Die ZEIT of 10 November 2011; see also Deubner 2014, p. 42.
- 180.
See with a similar idea Kadelbach 2013, p. 499 et seqq.
- 181.
This is the criticism with regard to the general idea of a national chamber at EU level voiced by Corbett 2013.
- 182.
Cf. Mangiameli 2013, sub 4 b, c, d.
- 183.
Cf. the speech delivered by J. Fischer 2000 and by T. Blair, Rede vor der Warschauer Börse v. 6.10.2000, http://www.europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/reden/blair.shtml
- 184.
L. Jospin, L’Avenir de l’Europe, 28.5.2001.
- 185.
Cf. Mayer 2012, p. 554 et seq.
- 186.
Cf. however the position of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who declared already in June 2011: “Or, le Parlement européen n’est pas directement en contact avec le milieu politique des Etats : c’est un milieu européen en fait. Il faudrait donc faire un congrès une fois par an – je crois que je suis raisonnable – avec les députés européens et deux fois plus de députés nationaux choisis selon les mêmes critères de représentation.” (http://www.euractiv.fr/avenir-europe/valery-giscard-destaing-leurope-interview-506089).
- 187.
- 188.
Cf. also Fasone, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Protocol No. 1 TEU para 159.
- 189.
Cf. Becker 2013.
- 190.
See Kreilinger 2013, p. 4 et seqq.
- 191.
- 192.
Decision 13.
- 193.
Cf. Mayer 2012, p. 170 with further reference in footnote 110.
- 194.
In that sense Mayer 2012, p. 173.
- 195.
- 196.
Maurer 2013, p. 11.
- 197.
Norman 2003, p. 98.
- 198.
European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. Launching a European debate, COM(2012) 777 final/2, p. 36.
- 199.
Cf. Deubner 2014, p. 37 et seqq.
- 200.
With this proposal Maurer 2013, p. 13.
- 201.
Cf. See Kreilinger 2013, p. 17.
- 202.
Peidrafita 2013, p. 8.
- 203.
Cf. Kiiver 2006, p. 185 et seqq.
- 204.
Danish Folketing, Twenty-three Recommendations – to strengthen the role of national parliaments in a changing European governance, January 2014, p. 2–3; UK House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report on “The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union” of 24 March 2014, para 55; Dutch Tweede Kamer, “Ahead in Europe. On the role of the Dutch House of Representatives and national parliaments in the European Union” see the final report on “democratic legitimacy” of 9 May 2014, p. 29; Lord Boswell of Aynho (Chairperson of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee), letter of 28 January 2015 to the national parliaments’ European Affairs Committees, “Towards a ‘green card’”.
- 205.
COSAC, Twenty-second Bi-annual Report, 4 November 2014, p. 33 et seqq.; Twenty-third Bi-annual Report, 6 May 2015, p. 31 et seqq.
- 206.
European Commission, letter in response to the Opinion of the House of Lords concerning the role of national Parliaments in the EU, C(2014) 4236 final of 23 June 2014. p. 2.
- 207.
Kiiver 2006, p. 187.
- 208.
- 209.
See for example the speech delivered by the Italian President Napolitano in October 2012: http://www.italianieuropei.it/italianieuropei-9-2012/item/2806-unione-politica-ed-europeizzazione-della-politica.html
- 210.
European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012, P7‐TA‐2012‐430, Decision 13.
- 211.
Cf. Wagener and Eger 2014, Chap. 11.
- 212.
With the same result Maurer 2013, p. 6.
- 213.
Cf. European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012, P7‐TA‐2012‐430, Decisions no. 1 and 13. Cf. also Decision no. 9: “The European Parliament [c]onsiders a substantial improvement of the democratic legitimacy and accountability at Union level of the EMU governance by an increased role of Parliament as an absolute necessity and a precondition for any further step toward a banking union, a fiscal union and an economic union” See most recently, European Commission, 5-Presidents-Report ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’, 2015, p. 17.
- 214.
Benz 2005, p. 276.
- 215.
Cf. Lord 2007, p. 150 who adds, that “the representative qualities of parliamentary policies can be achieved by filtering bottom‐up initiatives”.
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Blanke, HJ., Böttner, R. (2015). The Democratic Deficit in the (Economic) Governance of the European Union. In: Blanke, HJ., Cruz Villalón, P., Klein, T., Ziller, J. (eds) Common European Legal Thinking. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19300-7_14
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